THE
DESTINY OF THE VEDA
IN
INDIA

by

Louis Renou

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by

LOUIS RENOU
Member of the Institute
and
Professor at the Sorbonne,
Paris.

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EDITOR'S PREFACE

It gives us a great deal of pleasure to present the English version of Prof. Louis Renou's work, *The Destiny of the Veda in India*. As is well-known, after many years of devoted labour, Prof. Renou has turned his attention to the job of translating the Ṛgveda, which, when completed, will be the first definitive rendering after that of Geldner.

But this task required a lot of preliminary work, which he has been doing through notes on various Vedic words and through studies like the one concerning the vocabulary of Vedic ritual. A number of these articles have appeared in the series *Etudes védiques et pāṇinéennes* of the Institut de civilisation indienne at the Sorbonne, whose activities Prof. Renou has been directing for many years.

The present work has appeared as the sixth volume in the series referred to above. Its perusal will show that it is also meant to 'clear the decks' for the main task of translation. In this work he directly comes to grips with the immense task of critically examining the *entire* gamut of works on the Ṛgveda —what he calls "quantité d'ouvrages et d'articles."

It is really surprising that even after the revival of modern interest in Vedic learning, not one scholar has thought it worth his while to examine the treatment the premier Veda has received during its extremely long life. The brilliant analysis by the learned author brings out clearly and irrefutably the fact that there has been no attempt at an understanding *per se* of the Ṛgvedic stanzas. In reality "Behind diverse marks... of homage, India, in reality, has known *diverse* behaviours in face of" the Ṛgveda. Prof. Renou is the first author to point out : "Popular beliefs alone, or again those which are not primarily concerned with the Veda, ...revere it in indistinct fashion, most often in vague terms, behind which *one does not arrive at grasping whatever concrete reality the authors had in view.*" (Italics ours.)

In this work, the learned author starts by tackling the mediaeval accretion on Vedic studies. Clearing off the shadows cast by Tantrism, the Smṛtis, the Epics and the Purāṇas and having studied the Vedic impact on iconography, etc., he deals with the present-day interpretations and tributes. Thereafter he examines the Vedic texts themselves and touches on their relationship with that of the premier Veda. Follows an analysis of the Vedāṅgas, the scholarly texts and commentaries vis-à-vis the Ṛgveda. The attitude of the materialists, the Buddhists and the Jainas towards this Veda is then stated.

Its position in relation to the six schools of philosophy as also grammar is discussed at this stage, wherein all relevant points, such as the *ānarthakya* of the Vedic mantras, are carefully examined. At many of these places, the summing up itself of divergent positions sheds unexpected light on points hitherto held obscure.

This tantalizingly short study is also a masterly exposition of the history of literature on the Ṛgveda and is therefore doubly precious. To those finding themselves in disagreement here or there, we may point out that it contains nothing not based on a painstakingly long and serious study of *almost* the entire data. Those who have already seen some of his translations in French (in the series referred to above) or have had some idea thereof in the hymns translated by us, following his interpretation (*Ṛgbhāṣya-saṃgraha*, Delhi, 1961) will agree that here is one of those rare scholars to whom fits perfectly the Niruktian saying : "The gods have given to trained men the faculty of reasoning as Ṛṣis, so that all an instructed man can deduce, takes (immediately) an *ārṣic* value."

While presenting this work of Prof. Renou to our compatriots, we are thinking specially of those, who out of high regard for his scholarship, keep on presenting him with copies of their published material. As most of them do not read French, this book should help establish a real 'two-way' rapport with this Dean of Vedic studies.

Fortunately we have been able to show the mss. to the learned author. This has helped us avoid many pitfalls and also add a number of references, not found in the French original. To him we offer our grateful thanks for this favour as also for having allowed us to undertake this translation.

Incidentally, this is the second book in a projected series of translations of French classics on Indology. The first, *The Classical Doctrine of Indian Medicine* by Prof. J. Filliozat, was published in January, 1964. The third volume, *The Formation of the Marathi Language* by the late Prof. Jules Bloch is now in press. In case the scholarly world receives these two volumes with equal enthusiasm, it will be our endeavour to present other works in course of time. We need not point out that, with English being the most widely known language among our intelligentsia, it is imperative to make such authoritative works available in English.

For practical reasons, it has not been possible for us to print notes at the foot of each page. They are to be found at the end. This, however, does not detract one little bit from their importance as they contain a great deal of equally essential information. As the work is divided into paragraphs, the notes have been numbered accordingly and not page-wise.

We had asked Prof. Renou if a bibliography could be given at the end of this version. In his reply, he wrote : "I have not prepared a general bibliography, which I could send to you. Truly speaking, if I have cited a large number of works and articles, not one of them has served me as a basis, because I think that I have been the first to deal with this subject. Hence I feel that a bibliography will not be of much use, unless we were to mechanically enumerate all the texts, cited by me in a more or less isolated manner..."

In the end we would like to mention our source of inspiration, Prof. J. Filliozat of the Collège de France. Keen on promoting a two-way traffic between Indologists of the two countries, he has constantly encouraged us and has been ever helpful. But for him, this 'single-person' project would not have progressed so far.

It is our pleasant duty to thank our esteemed colleague, Mrs. Menon for helping us by preparing the draft-translation in a near-finished form. We have, however, to point out that neither she nor the author are responsible for the errors that may have crept in. For all these imperfections, the responsibility is entirely ours and we crave the indulgence of the scholarly world for the same. We have also to express our sincere appreciation of the courtesy of M/s. Motilal Banarsi Dass in agreeing to accept both these volumes for publication.

Institute of Post-Grad. (eve.) Studies,
Delhi University, Delhi.
Aug. 15, 1965. *Dev Raj Chanana.*

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ABBREVIATIONS

A. B.=*Aitareya Brāhmaṇa.*
ABORI=*Annals of the Bhandarkar Oriental Research Institute.*
Archiv Or.=*Archiv Orientalni.*
Āśv. G.S.=*Āśvalāyana Gṛhya-sūtra.*
AV=*Atharva-veda.*
AV Prāt.=*Atharva Prātiśākhya.*
BEFEO=*Bulletin de l'Ecole Française d'Extrême Orient.*
BSOAS=*Bulletin of the School of Oriental and African Studies.*
Ch. Up.=*Chāndogya Upaniṣad.*
Ep. Ind.=*Epigraphia Indica.*
ERE=*Encyclopaedia of Religion and Ethics.*
G.G.A.=*Göttingische Gelehrte Anzeigen.*
IHQ= *Indian Historical Quarterly.*
JAOS=*Journal of the American Oriental Society.*
JBoRAS=*Journal of the Bombay* (*Branch of the*)*Royal Asiatic Society.*
J.G. Jha Inst.=*Journal of Ganganath Jha Res. Institute.*
J. Or. Res.=*Journal of the Oriental Res. Inst., Madras.*
JA=*Journal asiatique.*
JRAS=*Journal of the Royal Asiatic Society.*
MBh=*Mahābhārata.*
NIA=*New Indian Antiquary.*
Nir.=*Nirukta.*
Rev. Hist. Rel.=*Revue de l'histoire des religions.*
Ṛk Prāt.=*Ṛk Prātiṣakhya.*
RV=*Ṛgveda.*
Sb. Heidelb. Ak.=*Sitzungsberichte der Heidelberg Akademie.*
ŚB=*Śatapatha Brāhmaṇa.*
WZKM=*Weiner Zeitschrift für die Kunde des Morgenlandes.*
ZDMG=*Zeitschrift der Deutschen Morgenlandischen Gessellschaft.*

The Destiny of the Veda in India

§1. Examined[1] in the perspective of Indian History, the Vedas present a striking paradox[2] : on the one hand, they are revered, are recognised as the omniscient, infallible, eternal principle—something like God in the form of "Knowledge", a God-made Book (the Bible), Indian Logos—they are referred to as the source itself of *dharma*, as the authority from which arises the totality of Brahmanic disciplines. On the other hand, what we may call the philological traditions, relating to the Vedas, that form the very substance of the constituent texts, are from a very early date, weakened, if not altered or lost.[3]

Looked at a little closer, the reverence to the Vedac arries more than one nuance. Under the non-precise generic allusions, (for example, "Thus is it said in the Śruti......")[4], as are presented all the adorations of the Veda, a number of misunderstandings lie hidden. From the very fact that the Veda is supposed to contain every thing in its bosom (*yad ihāsti tad anyatra, yan nehāsti na tat kva cid*,[5] "that which is found herein exists elsewhere; that which is not, is nowhere") in the manner of an *avyaktam brahma*, certain authors have come to the point of citing it to justify their data, which are manifestly anachronistic, or what is worse, surreptitiously reinterpreted. One always believes oneself to be in the wake of the Veda, when one turns one's back on it. The term tends to serve as a symbol, and the notion which it covers has been the object of a veritable alienation.

Leaving aside the anti-Vedic attitude of the Jainas[6], the Ājīvikas[7] and, at least on the philosophical plane, that of the Buddhists[8], one is led to distinguish amongst the apparently faithful doctrines, what can be called semi-Vedic tendencies (those of the Vishnuites and of the Shivaites in their pronounced sectarian character) and others which are rather a-Vedic (those of the Śāktas and more generally of the Tāntrikas).[9] In other words, the integral acceptance of Vedism is far less current than would at first appear; it is to be found, above all—and a little reflection shows this to be natural enough—wherever beliefs are less narrowly religious. Nevertheless, at the heart of religious beliefs, there are numerous survivals, although beside the speculations, doctrines in secularizing themselves, have little by little put Vedic thought at a distance and rarified the borrowings from the old concepts.

Even in the most orthodox domains, the reverence to the Vedas has come to be a simple "raising of the hat", in passing, to an idol by which one no longer intends to be encumbered later on. We have just spoken of orthodoxy: the Veda is precisely the sign, perhaps the only one, of Indian orthodoxy.[10] One sees in effect, at the very heart of the "*Six Darśanas*", that is to say, of that which passes as representing the orthodox Brahmanic thought, some of these doctrines accusing such and such others of heresy—and the major plank on which this accusation rests, is precisely the Vedas, the foundation of Vedic authority. Śaṅkara for example (who, of all Indian philosophers, was the most often criticised) teaches that "the doctrines of Kapila, Kaṇāda and others are found to be tainted with errors (*bhrānti*), being without any foundation (*mūlabhāva*) and in contradiction with the Veda (*veda-virodha*).[11]

Lastly, we must distinguish between the real extensions, that is to say, those felt as such, of Vedic thought in post-Vedic India, and on the other hand, the connections, justified or not, which modern scholarship establishes between Vedic data and that of Hinduism.[12]

§2. At the heart of Hinduism, the first sect (but doubtless there were others before it) which to us seems to have rejected the Veda, is that of the Vīraśaivas (Liṅgāyats) formed in the 12th century.[1] It is not surprising that it was again this sect in which progressive tendencies were manifested for the first time. But, within a group as much linked to the Vedānta as were the Śrīvaiṣṇavas, the Tamil sect of the Tengalai appears to have equally renounced the Veda.[2] Similarly, in a more modern era, the Mānbhāu (Mahānubhāva) sect of Maharashtra. Among the Sahajiyās of Bengal, the aversion for the Veda stems from their general attitude towards everything that is scholarly or esoteric.[3]

Here and there, individuals declare themselves against the Veda (although without making any specific criticism) and that too the more readily as they are less cultured; the erudite aspect of this literature, its technical cumbersomeness, embarrasses these simple souls. Thus Tukaram, who seems to have ignored the old texts, affirms that: "from the wearisome repetition of the syllables of the Veda, is born pride".[4] Similarly Kabir declares that "the mysterious Being is inaccessible to the Veda and Koran" and in a more drastic manner, "the Brahmin gets entangled in the four Vedas and dies therein".[5] To the thinking of Ramakrishna, who did not fear to teach that "the truth is not in the Vedas, one should act according to the Tantras, not according to the Vedas; the latter are impure from the very fact of being pronounced, etc." (Ramakrishna compares them to the impurity caused by the *ucchiṣṭa*),[6] is opposed the very much more deferential attitude of Vivekānanda, even though with him, as with many others, Vedism comes to be dissolved in an ambiguous ensemble combining Hinduism and Buddhism.[7] The case of Tulsidas resembles that of Tukaram in that he also ignores the contents of the texts, but parts company from him in so far as he renders them consistant homage, likening what he calls the Nigama to "a boat for crossing the ocean of existence".[8] We cannot fail to mention here Gandhi: Gandhi interested himself, if not in the Veda, then at least in the Upaniṣads, without depriving himself of associating them with other religious testimony in his *vyāmiśra dharma*, "his mixed religion" (sufficiently analogous to the mixed Purāṇas).[9]

With the scholars, the "renaissance of Hinduism"[10] (I mean to say) that of the 19th century, occurred at least as regards the principle, under the sign of the Veda. Rammohan Roy inaugurates a modernising (atheist) interpretation of the Upaniṣads, whose teaching he integrates with his belief, and for the first time perhaps, a small fragment of the Veda becomes an element of living faith, at the cost, it is true, of all that was the *raison d'être* of the ancient Veda, mythology and ritual, and which remains the necessary base of the Upaniṣads themselves. The attempt has been often repeated since that time: for example, with Rabindranath Tagore and S. Radhakrishnan, who arrived at a more or less humanistic synthesis, the former on a rather poetic plane, the latter on a resolutely philosophical one.[11] Certainly the Veda, properly speaking, is not at all touched by these speculations: it is only a back-drop on which the completely spiritual images of the Vedanta come to fix themselves in vivid colours. On the contrary, the Hymns matter the most to Dayananda Sarasvati and to his Arya Samaj, with a vigorous (and from our point of view, extremely aberrant) interpretation in the social and political sense, and today we would say in the "cultural"[12] sense. Nearer to us, A.K. Coomaraswamy, starting from the Hymns and Brāhmaṇas, outlines a *philosophia perennis* incorporating comparative and semi-erudite elements.[13] Aurobindo is not afraid of systematising the "profound" thought of the Ṛgveda on a mystical base.[14] Others reject the Veda, such as Debendranath Tagore, or practically ignore them, such as Keshab Chandra Sen.[15]

§3. Let us hasten to return to antiquity, which alone can provide us with a useful discussion.

With regard to religious doctrines, there would be many distinctions to be made. One often says that Shaivism is nearer to the Vedas than Vaishnavism, perhaps because there existed a sort of pre-Shivaite impregnation in certain texts of the Vedic epoch. But if elementary Shaivism had had, in effect, to absorb the practices of Vedic appearance, Shivaite speculations themselves were happily far removed from Vedanta, taken as the norm of orthodoxy. The Vishnuite doctrines on the other hand have never been able to completely liberate themselves from it.[1] Within a similar group, that of the Pāśupatas, people believe they have discerned certain non-Vedic tendencies, others (that are attributed to the Lakulīśas or Nakulīśas),[2] on the contrary, take the Atharvaśiras (Up.) and the Śatarudriya for a message. The Śivadṛṣti has as its countersign a verse from the Taittirīya Saṃhitā, often cited in other connections[3], *eka eva rudro 'vatasthe na dvitīyaḥ*. The Kashmiri Shaivism in it sentirety—of which the *Śivadṛṣṭi* is one of the basic texts—does not recognise the authority of the Veda.[4] In brief, only the Vedānta-Śaivas follow the tradition, that is to say, those of the Shivaites who are dependent on one of the branches of the Vedānta; others diverge from it more or less, either to substitute another Canon for it, or to juxtapose or to mix together disparate Scriptures.[5]

In the Vishnuite domain the situation is no less complex.[6] Ritual at every epoch has preserved specific links with antiquity; it utilises here and there the famous hymn to Puruṣa (in itself not very significant, it is true); such a *mantra* is there called *sāmavedīya*;[7] the tantric imprint, which coincides with a clear departure, by contrast with ancient liturgy, is here far less accentuated than in Shaivism. On the other hand, its doctrinal apparel shows, at least in its origins, a great deal of liberty. The Bhāgavatas, of uncertain Vedic adhesion, are rather slack.[8] But it is above all the Pañcarātras (if they must be decidedly separated from the preceding ones) which are often taxed with non-Vedism, even anti-Vedism.[9] Certain texts put them in the ranks of the pāṣandas.[10] But even there, some reconciliation must have occurred. The ritual is mixed. A *Saṃhitā* belonging to the *pañcarātras*[11] shows a devotion (to the extent that it can be discerned) of Vedic bearing, a devotion based on the *Ekāyana*, which passes for a version of the Yajurveda.[12] Like the Shivaites, the Vaishnavas of Vedāntin obedience remain attached to the Veda, even when they are influenced by *bhakti* (an a-Vedic phenomenon, if ever there was one). Vedanta is the rallying point of Vedic tendencies, and one is faithful to the Veda to the extent that one is *Vedāntin*.[13]

§4. The rupture with Vedism is largely effected in the Āgamas in general, and more particularly in the Tantras in so far as this mass of texts succeeds in raising itself to the rank of a Canon.[1] The end of the Vedic period has been marked by a reaction which must have had the aspects[2] given below: the constitution of Vaishnavism and of Shaivism, the anti-ritualistic pressure of the Buddhist environment, the development of ascetic practices (also, by definition, anti-ritualistic); the spread of such beliefs to wider social circles; the afflux of popular religiousness which had for long been repressed by the solemn cult. One may add to this the disaffection of secular power from the ancient beliefs, henceforth confined to schools of specialists. All things considered, the retraction of Vedic centres was the determining factor of the rapid decline: as always the greatest peril comes from within. Is it not the Upanishads themselves, "the end of the Veda") which begin a new orientation with their *pre-kṣatriya* tendencies, their teaching carried beyond the ritual ?[3]

With the advent of the Guptas there is produced a sort of partial re-Vedisation of Hinduism: such is the probable sense of what has abusively been called the renaissance of Hinduism.[4] The initiative for this goes back, perhas in part, to the *Smārta* circles which were formed within the sects, circles not precisely

"Vedic" (as it is sometimes said), but of a reduced degree of "sectarianism" and consequently, nearer the ancient state of things.[5]

From the VIIIth century onwards, according to the regions or circumstances—before or after this date, Purāṇic Hinduism was driven back by the Āgamas and the Tantras.[6] Tantrism in part abolishes the earlier practices, in part absorbs them in altered form. From the beginning, the Purāṇic religion—and as a consequence, the subjacent Vedism—finds itself more or less submerged. All the later literary evidence which appears exempt from Tāntrism (or Āgamism) risks merely reflecting a desire, as it were, quasi-archeological, of regenerating ancient Hindusim.[7] All the same, it must be recalled that the Smṛti, in its totality, has been far less affected than the later Purāṇas by what is called the Tantric "leprosy": all that is institutional in India remains near the sources, at least in outward structure.

§5. It has often been said that (Hindu) Tantrism is permeated with Vedic influence.[1] This shows itself in effect (if one can show an influence of this nature, strictly speaking) on the scholastic plane; it could hardly have been felt by the followers of the belief. Similar doubtlessly was the case of the Pagan elements in Christianity. Moreover, even within the scholastic perspective, there has been, on the whole, an over-estimation of the Atharvanic links of Tantrism, obtained by lifting out fragments of the ancient cult and joining them on to other fragments from the new culture. It is also as easy in India to take note of prolongations as it is difficult to point out ruptures. The *mantra-śāstra,*[2] the (phonematic, or rather trans-phonematic) theory of the Formulae, has been really inspired by an ancient *mantra-śāstra* applied to the Veda, but it goes beyond the same or denies it, implying that the Tantric *mantra* has no independent existence (nor moreover an existence linked to a specific ritual), that it is the divinity *par excellence,* the phonic manifestation of the divine, its creative impact, its *śakti,* that it avails itself of a complex of dispositions, not only visual and auditive, but also graphic (diagraphic), that it fills itself with an esoteric syllabism, comparable to the *anubandha* of the Grammarians. In brief, it tends to place itself beyond language, eventually upto the very zone of silence, whereas the

Vedic *mantra* was more on this side of language, witness of incomplete semantics.

Tantrism, therefore, liberates man from the necessity of following the narrow approach represented by the Veda. But it is also said that the Tantra is the long road, which indirectly leads to the Veda: "Those who have lost (the sense of) *śruti* must run back to the Tantra to re-discover the path to the Vedas".[3] The Devibhāgavata-purāṇa[4] assures us that the "Āgamas were composed to deliver those of the Brahmins who had been pushed to deviate from the Veda"; it adds that "these works, in places do not go against the Vedas, so that in accepting these portions of the works the *Vaidikas* do not commit any fault." One also finds the idea that the Vedas and the Āgamas are two revelations of equal value, of equal rank; is not the effort at reconciliation present throughout India ?

§6. For those posing the question of the Veda after the Vedic era, the first documentary mass which presents itself is the Smṛti (strict sense),[1] that is to say the Dharmaśāstra. The latter uniformly proclaims its adherence to the Veda; it ignores the Purāṇic diversity and the sectarian tendencies. Also, the versified treatises which succeed each other from the time of Manu, put on the shoes, so to speak, of the Dharmasūtras adhering to the ancient schools. The Smṛti is accepted as an authority, secondary certainly in relation to the Veda, but conforming to it in all points. Wherever there is conflict (which can only be at the level of appearances) the last word rests with the Veda. Such is the scheme that Mīmāmsā takes up in a vast orchestration[2].

The Nibandhas with their strictly juridical character, stay away, as one would expect, from religious preoccupations. On the contrary, the encyclopedic compilations which succeed each other up to the modern epoch, preserve great developments which are the setting in form, with or without adaptations, of ancient data. Such, in the first place, is the section of the *Sāmskāra* or private rites, in the second place, those of the *dāna*, *prāyaścitta*, *vrata* and *śrāddha*. Puranic quotations, often of Vedic inspiration, abound in them as in the Kṛtyakalpataru or the Caturvarga-cintāmaṇi.

This loyalty to the base, contrasts with the alienation from the form. In fact, it seems that after the Dharmasūtras, one no longer finds quotations of the *mantras*;[3] the latest texts which contain it are the *Vaikhānasa* and the Viṣṇusmṛti,[4] which guarantees for the latter (despite its title and despite its partially versified character) a place in the ranks of the Dharmasūtras. By contrast, Gautama[5] has no more quotations, a fact which could confirm the relative youth of this manual.[6]

§7. The Purāṇas form another repository of Vedic thought. Less traditional externally than the Smṛtis, they share with the Veda the mythological description, the cosmogony and eventually the ritual teaching.

But it will be better to place the Epics[1] first. These *Kṣatriya* and semi-secular profane texts, these narratives have few chances of referring to the Veda, except in their normative positions, numerous, it is true, where they take up the stand of *dharma*, in close harmony with the Smṛtis. Most often the Epics confine themselves to revering the Smṛtis from afar, referring, *en passant*, to sacrifices and recitations. The picture of the hermitage of Kaṇva, at the beginning of the Ādiparvan is full of Vedic memories. Without being very characteristic, quotations of the *mantras* are not wanting, at least in the Mahābhārata,[2] which appears to be quite a sign of its antiquity. The Rāmāyaṇa makes use of Vedic objects as a sort of decorative element.[3]

§8. The Purāṇas[1] are sometimes considered as the successors of the Veda, inferior to the latter, but sometimes they are also placed in the same rank and even on a higher rank. At certain places they are said to form part of the Vedas, probably as a souvenir of an Upanisadic text where the (ambiguous) name of "*purāṇa*" is listed among the works emanating from the breath of the Great Being.[2] It is also stated that these texts are a means of access to the Veda, therefore, they are intermediaries, if not intercessors.[3]

The Cosmogony is built upon the hymn to Puruṣa, the major source of cosmogonic thought in ancient India. This is how we learn about a primitive Veda, coming out of *brahmán* (masculine) or *bráhman* (neuter)—which comes to the same thing;— to be more specific, the Vedas make one whole with (the) *brahmán* which is the course of their manifestation; it is in making use of the words of the Veda, as primary matter, that *brahmán* made the world.[4] The Veda or the Vedas are identified with the Cow, the Devī, the Sun; they are considered as the divinity incarnate.[5]

Less explicit are the data on the manner in which the Veda was transmitted to the first ṛṣis, who received a visual revelation,[6] then to those who received an auditive revelation (the *śrutarṣi*); one gets the feeling of a long evolution, starting from an original Veda which was progressively reduced and, we are told, had not less than a hundred thousand stanzas.[7] This evolution is part of Cosmic destiny. The Veda disappears at each *pralaya* to reappear afterwards.[8] And as this destiny itself serves as a prototype of human prospective, one finds as a corolarry, the idea that in the *Kali Age*, men are going to forget the Veda and neglect its teachings.[9] Transposed into events of the recent past, this data envisaged a troubled epoch (pre-*Gupta*) when the Barbarian principalities were dominant, where prevailed the beliefs of the *pāṣanḍas* and other people "strangers to the Veda."[10] But everything ends well: the saviour Kalki will come to aid in the resurgence of the Veda, restoring the solemn sacrifices.[11]

A more frequently treated theme is the one concerning the quadripartition of the primitive Veda, a theme described in many variants to which is attached the narrative of the schism having given birth to the White Yajurveda.[12]

§9. Some Purāṇas enter into more details. Some of them, moreover, are distantly conected with the Vedic schools: thus the Agni, the manual of the *agnihotrin* of Yajurveda.[1] Now it is the *Agni* which describes for us the rites or properly enumerates the *mantras* and *sūktas* from each of the four *Saṃhitās*, all the elements being capable of use, with or without accompanying oblations, for personal ends, for more or less magic activities.[2] Other texts present hymns of a make-up which is vaguely similar to Vedic eulogies, to say nothing of the linguistic archaisms, so remarkable in a text as late as the Bhāgavata, and presenting a striking contrast with the sectarian doctrine and the semi-*kāvya* style of this text.[3] The Bhāgvata itself reveals, so to speak, the syncretism to which it submits itself, when it proclaims that "triple is my ceremonial, Vedic, Tantric and Mixed."[4]

The difficulty arises when one tries to specify the "Vedism" according to the practices described in the Purāṇas[5] : sometimes the ancient rites are simply juxta-posed; more often they are blended in new combinations, or even absorbed to the point of becoming unrecognizable.[6] The situation is, as in Grammar, where in appearance nothing is changed between the Aṣṭādhyāyī and the Kaumudīs, and where the repeated rearrangements have truly, upturned the ancient edifice. In any case, that which can be pointed out and which is common to all the post-Vedic formulae, is that the link between the *mantra* and the rite, however thin, however indirect it might sometimes have been in the ancient times, is from now onwards broken; there is hardly any longer a gesture or an act which sets off an appropriate *mantra*; the *mantra*, the *sūkta* are globally and anonymously attached to a group of rites.

As in the Smṛti, it would be interesting to see how the de-Vedisation of Purāṇic ritual was brought about. Already the pariśiṣṭas annexed to several domestic Sūtras, present side by side new *mantras* (often corrupted) and the ancient *mantras*, the rites remaining "Vedic".[7] But the most important initiatives appear in the texts adapted to the needs of the *āśramas*: it is the Āraṇyakas or more generally, the "forest" attributions, the proper needs of the hermits of diverse shades, that have probably produced the first escape from the Vedic world: the Vaikhānasas[8] who are at the same time a school of the current type and a centre of ascetic practices, complete their Gṛhyasūtras by the Visnuite *mantras* corresponding to a liturgy preserved in a text, clearly post-Vedic, namely,—the Ānandasaṃhitā. According to this ceremonial Viṣṇu is adored in five forms, of which four are the four Vedas incarnating the fifth form, that is to say Viṣṇu himself, simultaneously (as often happens) all and part of all.[9]

§10. The (authentic) Purāṇas do not take us very far down in time. In order to appreciate the survival of Vedism during the present millenary, we have at our disposal first, nothing more than the Smṛtis, and then the a-Vedic, if not anti-Vedic manuals, that is to say, the Āgamas of diverse obediences. We are thus not in a happy position for following in every detail the decline of the ancient practices.[1] One can of course, have recourse to epigraphy, which would have the advantage of providing us with dated and localised information; but epigraphy takes no note of survivals, and what it comprises, counts for little, save for the names of schools and solemn ceremonies (§. 13).

One, therefore, has the impression of discovering concrete facts when, for the first time in the meridional inscriptions of the Xth century, one hears of Vedic studies, even of Vedic colleges,[2] with the mention of texts making up part of a course, of fixed honoraria and of the number of students inscribed in each discipline. Such precise details are more than welcome after so many centuries of silence.[3]

As to the enormous literature which from age to age pursues the savant activity around the Veda, it shows the persistence of interest that schools and groups bore for the Veda, but it proves nothing of what, at this moment, we desire to know most viz., the vitality of the beliefs; it is the simple matter of erudition.

§11. Iconography[1] is adjusted to the level of the Purāṇas. Here can be clearly noted the passage from an ancient figuration, that is to say, one deriving its inspiration from Vedic themes, to a new figuration, basing itself on Purāṇic mythography. But the Veda being (in appearance, at least) anti-iconic, there is hardly any firm point of comparison; at the very most one can note the withdrawal or progressive alteration of certain divine forms without being able to state exactly what Vedic attributes remain in the more recent conceptions. Apparently, these attributes are best preserved from the side of Brahmaṇ : the image of Brahman,[2] we are told, is made up "according to Vedic rites": this is not surprising, since this image was, so to speak, available in regard to Viṣṇu, Śiva and their accompaniments, who were directly involved in the Purāṇic representation.

In short, iconography cannot furnish evidence on the question of the survival of Vedism. At the most there can be perceived such curious details as the existence of "Vedic" mudrās, deriving from the gestures executed by the priests in chanting the Veda.[3] But is it not infinitely probable that the absence of all plastic art in the very epoch of the Veda has contributed to the general decline of Vedic representations in the succeeding epochs ?

§.12. Today[1], the practices that one can (without much risk) call "Vedic", subsist less in the prayers at the temple than in private prayer. The *mantras* of the Sanskrit language are, in part, of Vedic origin. Among the most orthodox rites, figure the *sandhyā* (always impregnated with āgamic elements), many *saṃskāras*, among them marriage and funeral; the *homa* also combines oblation in fire with alien elements. Even in the most favourable cases there is something attenuated in these forms of the cult; the social, the "perfunctory" prevails over the liturgical; there is the snobbery of the "Vedic" marriage. Similiarly, where the face-saving is managed, the spirit is changed. The manuals, whence the ceremonial (portions) are drawn, are modern adaptations, evidently the neighbours of primitive sources, but which nonetheless, are adaptations.[2]

A fact which, from an early date, reduced the part left to the Veda, is that the old *mantras* were limited to the twice-born; to the *Śūdras*,[3] as also to women[4] could be attributed only the purāṇic or tāntric verses. Here we have one aspect of that fundamental division according to which the Veda belonged first of all to the Brahmins, then, but only partially to the *kṣatriyas*[5] and to the *Vaiśyas*; even among the Brahmins more to those who were officiating priests, reciters or teachers, than to those who stood outside these activities; including hermits and those who had renounced the world; for to the extent of renouncing the world, one also renounced the Veda, or at least the *karmakāṇḍa*. The Veda is thus found to reflect a *varṇāśramadharma*, although originally the texts ignored the *varṇas* as also the '*āśramas*'. The very situation rendered it more fragile, from the day when the status of the Brahmins was weakened, when the sects began to be open to all, to demand an undifferentiated *dharma*, from the day, above all, when Tāntrism arrived to teach religious equality, the sole difference henceforth arising from individual qualification. The contribution of the Brahmins in preserving the Veda was all the more notable as they alone had charge of recitation and teaching; as to the rites, they had always to be under the jurisdiction of specialists (the *yājñikas*) strangers to secular life.[6]

We have already pointed out the detachment which occurred between the formula and the act; here is one of the sensitive points of the tradition. We should add that the ancient *mantras* tend to be progressively relegated in personal usage, thus assuming a predominantly magic usage.[7] The phenomenon climbs high into the past: does not one see the Ṛgvidhāna enumerate a mass of formulas or hymns with magical use? The utilisation of the *sāmans* in this sense is well known.[8] Thus is accredited the idea of a link between the Vedic *mantra* and magic, and in popular usage, the *mantra*, whatever may have been its origin, is before all else, an abracadabra.

§13. Whoever thinks about the Veda, in the order of the praxis, he thinks first of all about the solemn ritual. This is the spectacular Veda, of which India apparently retains some nostalgia, if it is true that nothing in the Hindu ceremonies in the temple or at the places of pilgrimage attains the severe grandeur, the reified abstraction of these Vedic manifestations.[1]

It can be noted that the *śrauta*[2] rites had been more numerous during the time of the Guptas. It does not necessarily follow that there had been then, a real reviviscence; but only that the non-Buddhist (and non-Jaina) epigraphy had risen to the fore in this epoch and that the new dynasties favoured Brahminism in its entirety. In fact, from the 1st century before the Christian era, an inscription of Ghosuṇḍi in Rajasthan[3], mentions an Aśvamedha offered by a Bhāgavata and celebrated moreover, not in honour of Indra, but of Saṃkarṣaṇa and of Vāsudeva. A Rājasūya is cited in the inscription of Khāravela, a Jaina prince[4]; another in that of Nāṇāghāṭ.[5] But it is certain that the references increase with the Guptas. Samudragupta is named *aśvamedhāhartṛ*, his gold coins carry the legend *aśvamedhaparākrama*. The Bhāraśiva-Nāgas of Padmāvatī celebrate ten Aśvamedhas, all the while having on their persons the emblem of Śiva, not the *yūpa* (always the effect of syncretism).[6] An inscription of Pravarasena II of the Vākāṭaka dynasty, enumerates a series of sacrifices performed by Pravarasena I. It is often said that such sacrifices fell into disuse after the Guptas.[7] In reality, atention has been drawn to them from one age to another up to the modern epoch; they have been cited in Moghul times.[8] The question pertains almost exclusively to royal rites, first Aśvamedha, then Rājasūya:[9] not that more simple ceremonies were lacking, rather to the contrary, but that they had not been named in official inscriptions. In the

XIXth century, such manifestations tend to have an archeological character.[10]

§.14. Among the conventional themes in which the literature abounds, figures the enumeration of the sciences: the sciences making up a part of the theoretical education of the prince[1], of the poet[2] or of this or that specialist.[3] The Veda figures there quite constantly. At the beginning of the *Kauṭilīya*, the Trayī is mentioned among the fundamental disciplines[4]; however, the author notes that the Bārhaspatyas—a school of strict *artha*, with materialist tendencies—omit its mention considering that the Trayī is a "cover" (*saṃvaraṇa*)[5] for one who knows the ways of the worsld"; the Auśanasas also discard the Veda.

A large amount of literary and erudite learning, quotes the Veda as an authority. The Mahābhārata, like the Purāṇic ensemble, is called a fifth Veda.[6] The old series of the Vedāṅgas enriches itself, little by little, with new "members", such as Poetics.[7] The Bhāratīya opens with a Vedic scene, containing many allusions to primitive mythology.[8] There is a cosmology of the Vedic type in the *Sūryasiddhānta*.[9] The most constant links are those found in the two Mīmāṃsās, in Grammar, and, most unexpectedly, in Medecine[10]: to the many links that modern scholarship finds between medical theses and the ancient substratum, are added the links established by tradition: is Medicine not called "the Veda of the duration of life" ? It is true that many fields of learning carry the name of Veda. One talks of the literature of *nava* or *abhinava vedas*, of the Tamil Veda, of the Veda of the Sikhs, etc. Keshab Chandra Sen gives to his message the name of Jīvan Veda.[11]

§.15. The allusions to the Veda (outside the Smṛtis) become more rare as the texts become more profane: the texts of Artha, for example, like the Pañcatantra or the Daśakumāra: the texts of Kāma[1] or of the kāvya with "erotic" tendencies. More faithful is the edifying "dhārmic" *kāvya* of Bhartṛhari-type.[2] The reminiscences are relatively ample in Bhavabhūti[3], a learned author, voluntarily tending to be archaic, moreover attached to strict *dharma*. But it is above all the *kāvya* elaborated in the more recent Epics which will be cited here: thus the Naiṣadhīya, which abounds in references to recitation (of course a rather banal theme) and which—an exceptional fact in this genre of literature—was emboldened to transcribe an old *mantra.*[4] Kālidāsa has only insignificant allusions if one neglects the supposedly Vedic verse (*ṛkchandas*) of Śakuntalā[5]. More explicit on this point than Bhāravi, Māgha is very much at ease in Vedic mythology and recalls that Dattātreya had founded a *Śrutisampradāya* in order to preserve the Vedas threatened with oblivion.[6] Kādambarī many times mentions the recitations and the chantings with a magic import.[7] In Harṣacarita, the description of the military expedition contains a mixture of pure rites and idolatry; in the prologue the author assures us that he himself comes from a family where the sacrificial tradition had been maintained without interruption.[8] Adherence to the Veda takes the place of a (supplementary) title to nobility.

Here would be the place to recall the use that the *kāvya*, and this right from Aśvaghoṣa[9], makes of certain words and, more often, of certain secondary meanings derived from the old hymns.[10] Without doubt it is not easy to measure that which is due to a desire of archaism and that which is transmitted by an underground route, of which the first stake would be the symbolic semantics of the Nighaṇṭus.[11] Moreover, one must make a distinction between what is borrowed from the texts, from the Grammarians, themselves depositaries of archaic terms. Nonetheless, it is undeniable that tracing back the normal evolution of language, the later *kāvya* has recourse, as if for play, to Vedic semantics, sometimes farthest from common usage.

Poetics, however alien it may appear to religious preoccupations, undoubtedly draws inspiration from meanings applicable in the context of the *mantras*, such as the *upamā*, the *śleṣa*, the *dhvani*. But the classic treatises mention the Veda only incidentally to point out certain obsolete terms, certain phrases which should be avoided being obscure or pedantic: this, more than elsewhere, in the Kāvyaprakāśa. Ruyyaka still knows the Vedic accent.[12] Only one text cares to go further: it is the Kāvyamīmāṃsā, a text, full of archaisms, even up to its style where one senses the desire to imitate the *sūtra-bhāṣya* mixture. This is why one finds therein[13] the well-known verse of the *Ṛgveda* on the Two Birds, the symbol of the "double meaning" serving here to illustrate the thesis—profound besides, more perhaps than the author himself realised—that it is Poetics which enables (one) to understand the Veda.[14]

§16. Without really being a Canon, that is to say a codified, completed thing,[1] the Veda is, nevertheless, analogous to a Canon, in the sense that it presents itself as an indivisible whole for public adoration.[2] But it is well known that its constituent elements have been elaborated in different times and in different places to respond to distinct needs ; there have collaborated therein, also, men of the most diverse vocations. Within the Saṃhitās (a term which, itself, covers the composite data), there are sometimes hymns or prayers, sometimes grouped formulae (Sāmaveda) or scattered formulae (Yajurveda): this second aspect of the Vedic speech, divided and cut into verses, *pādas* and *pratīkas*, has been, at bottom, the most long-lived, having been best upheld by the rites.[3] There was a time when the old Saṃhitās were doubled by a similar body of writings, far less protected against alteration, reattached to domestic ritual. As to the Brāhmaṇas, whose genre is prolonged by certain Āraṇyakas and certain Upaniṣads, they are also composite; many of them, at least in the Sāmavedic tradition, are something quite other than continuous prose; inversely the Śrautasūtras of the *pravacana* type are written in "*Brāhmaṇa*" style. The Vedāṅga marks the accession of the Smṛti[4] to the heart of Vedism; it is at the same time without and within the Veda; at any rate, from the Indian point of view, it is a line of rigorous division, so much so that the Mīmāṃsā, which has to do with the normative Veda, nearly ignores the Kalpa,[5] which to us, however, appears far more normative than the Brāhmaṇas. Therein lies a question of dignity, as with everything touching things Vedic.[6] The Smṛti (which goes beyond the Veda as the classic Dharmaśāstra) introduces a direct formulation, which could be called a rational thought, consisting of erudite texts or (pre-) scientific texts; the Śruti, quite to the contrary is essentially symbolic, basing itself on an indirect and "second"[7] semantic.

With the exception of the two Mīmāṃsās whose purpose is respctively *karma*—and *jñānakāṇḍa*, it can be said that literature hardly knows but a unitary and global Veda. We must try to separately locate the destiny of the diverse parts which compose it; unhappily we hardly have the means to follow this subterranean history through the centuries. Certain allusions enable us to see that the Atharvaveda for example, never had the same "moral" status as the other Saṃhitās[8]; this said, we will ignore how this fall from grace came to pass, this incapacity to attain a certain level, an incapacity again found in the Khilas[9] and probably also in the ṛcakas, early on detached from the mass.[10] One would also like to know when the Brāhmaṇas ceased to be living beings; it appears in fact, that from a very early epoch, they were hardly known any longer, as other than specialised *yājñikas*: relatively rare are the commentaries of these old texts, which were not held as equal to the Saṃhitās, by a continuous tradition of the reciters and writers orthoepists.[11]

In reality, every new part of the Veda has served to supplant the preceding ones; just as the formulae replace the hymns, the Śrautasūtras take the place of the Brāhmaṇas, as the Upaniṣads cover all the rest, in order, finally to substitute it; as in the field of technique the Śikṣās eliminate the Prātiśākhyas.[12] Finally, after Vedic times, the new manuals, strangers to the old divisions, take the place of all that preceded them and the entire Vedic praxis is carried out in the name of the *paddhatis*, *prayogas* and other guides with unifying and vulgarising tendencies.

§17. Vedic learning is, from early on, found maintained in the "schools", *śākhās* and *caraṇas*[1] whose name coincides in principle with that of a master considered the promulgator of the special Kalpa, from which arose the school in question. It is at the level of the Kalpa that these divisions are formed. What was the nature of the instruction given in these schools and were they really centres of instruction ? It appears that what we call "schools" were nearer what can conveniently be called "recensions"[2] : the specialists grouped in these centres had in trust a particular form of the Veda, a particular tradition of the ritual; it is not certain that they devoted themselves to an exposition of the Scriptures, even if we are right in thinking that the Ṛgveda (at least) from a very early period gives place to varied tendencies of explanation, some tending towards ritual, others towards speculation, still others towards mythology and legend, without taking into account the (pseudo-) semantic orientation which came to be fixed in the Nirukta.[3] From the dust of these names of promulgators no precise information can be obtained on the fecundity of post-Vedic Vedism: at most, it helps us to see the early diffusion of numerous schools all over India, even to the extreme South; what is referred to as the aryanisation of Dravidian fields may well have been, in part, the swarming of these Vedic centres. But when, in *Gupta* and *post-Gupta* epigraphy, we meet, as often happens, appellations coupled with such and such Brahmin donor, we are face to face with purely traditional designations, only a little more clear than the designation of the gotra.[4]

§18. The fragility of the *mantras* is measured by the presence, from the very earliest times, of numerous variants, often arbitrary, shown by them, in passing from one text to another.[1] That is the ransom, so to speak, for the formulary composition which prevails in the very heart of the Saṃhitās. Not only thus could one pick out groups of words, but its tenor could also be modified (phonetics, morphology, the order of words). Some of these variations being regular—the ones described by theory under the name of *ūha*—the majority being inorganic, and in extreme cases, going to the point of oral or eventually graphic corruption, pure and simple.

The adaptation of the *mantra* to the act[2] could have been a factor for preservation. It remained, unfortunately, too floating: more precisely it appears in the magic context where was required a type of literal conformity, pushed sometimes to the point of mimetism.[3] Elsewhere, if the domestic rites have well adapted formulae, the solemn rites in revenge, offer only approximative correlations. Taking a relatively clear text, like the Aitareya Brāhmaṇa, one can clearly see that the adaptation of the *mantra* hardly goes beyond the key-word *liṅga*; further, it is based on symbolic values rather tha on the literal sense. Without doubt, in places, there is an insistence on the *rūpasampannatva*, that is to say, on the formal coincidence between *mantra* and rite, but this phenomenon, rather rare, only further accentuates the vague, often imperceptible, character of the relation existing in the great majority of cases.[4]

Adaptation does not replace exposition: with the exception of isolated words, there are no commentaries on the *mantra* in the literature of the ancient Brāhmaṇas (or the *Brāhmaṇa* portions of the Saṃhitās). The formulae therein are of alien composition; cited besides by *pratīka* (at least when they belong to the same school from which comes the text in which they figure), they have a simple reference value, an anonymous aspect which must have contributed to diminishing their importance.[5] What was to happen to the Mīmāṃsā can already be felt and is previsible in the Brāhmaṇas.

§19. Things change quite clearly in the Śatapatha Brāhmaṇa. In a portion at least of this vast 'ensemble' of brāhmaṇas, one finds elements of interpretation applicable to the *mantras*, elements still incomplete, and from our point of view, often awkward, which always come exceptionally close to constituting a real commentary; thus, the *Ṛgveda*, hymn X, 95, dealt with in Śatapatha Brāhmaṇa, XII, 5, 1; admittedly this is an *ākhyāna* hymn, not at all a text with a ritual conditioning. In any case, the formulae in the Śatapatha Brāhmaṇa are felt as "*tirohita*" elements; they voluntarily recall the recourse to these artifices of symbolising semantics to which we have already drawn attention (§. 16).

Whatever may have been their value, these attempts at commentary disappear quite rapidly after the Śatapatha Brāhmaṇa. The *brahmodyas*[1] which flourish in certain portions of this text and in certain Upaniṣads influenced by the 'Śatapathian' milieu, should normally have furnished the occasion to show up to where went the philological knowledge of the Brahmins or *Kṣatriyas* who had taken up the challenge. But it is clear that the proofs of these contests are without relation to any textual problem, they suppose a familiarity with the rites in general, more particularly with a certain meta-ritual esoterism, the same which, (if one may say so) brings out the Āraṇyakas and the "āraṇyaka" portions of the Upaniṣads.

§20. Continuing the Āraṇyakas as well as Śatapatha Brāhmaṇa-Xth Book, the first Upaniṣads, hardly disengaged from servitude to ritual thought, propose themes with new reflections. To this change in foundation, corresponds a change in form: the archaic phraseology is reduced, then disappears; the Vedic attachment, adherence to a determinate school, hardly goes beyond honorary mention a few times; the allusions to the Veda, the citations of the *mantra*, become far more rare.

Let us take the most obvious case, that of the quotations.

It is quite remarkable that the Chāndogya Upaniṣad does not cite even one *mantra*; no more (which can be better understood) does the Māṇḍūkya, the Kena and the Maitrī. In the Taittirīya, the preliminary invocation, out of alignment, is inspired, by the *Ṛgveda*, I, 90, 9. In the Kaṭha, a verse (IV, 8) is borrowed from the *Ṛgveda*, III, 29, 2; another (IV, 9), from AV., IX, 8, 16; finally (V, 2), from the *Ṛgveda*, IV, 40, 5. Nominally entitled *Ṛgvedin*, the Aitareya however only once (IV, 5) cites a text of the *Ṛgveda*, IV, 27, 1—(an esoteric text). The Kauṣītaki is a little better favoured, with two *mantras* from the *Ṛgveda* cited, II, 8 and two others II, 11, amongst a compact group of quotations with a magic significance. The Praśna, which belongs to the AV., does not contain a single quotation, only a few terms evoking Atharvanic surroundings (besides, II, 7 resembles AV. XI, 4, 19). The Muṇḍaka has only one quotation (I, 1). The Vedic link is better preserved in the Bṛhadāraṇyaka, which accords well with the other archaic characteristics that can be picked out in this text: verses on the "Vedic" doctrine of *madhu*, quotations II, 5, 16 and 17, belong to the *Ṛgveda*, I, 116, 12 and 117, 22; further, II, 5, 19=RV, VI, 47, 18; V, 15, 4 (a prayer at the end of the *adhyāya*)=RV, I, 189, 1; VI, 3, 6 reproduces the celebrated *gāyatrī* (and RV, I, 90, 6-8); the terminal sections (in VI, 4) contain many small extracts from the *Ṛgveda*, although to a great extent, altered. The whole remains outside of the primary argumentation of the Upaniṣad, being formulated in the guise of an annexe and leaving no room for any commentary. The Yajurvedic text, the BĀU, does not have even a literal remembrance of its own Saṃhitā.[1]

§21. From disaffection for the Veda, one arrives by a detour to an imitation. Such is the character of the Bāṣkalamantra Upaniṣad, which purporting to fabricate a hymn, ends up, in fact in a "Vedic hybrid."[1] Similarly, the Chāgaleya imitates, rather savagely, the diction of the Brāhmaṇas.[2]

In any case, contrary to what happens in the Smṛti, the quotations from the Veda are not limited to the Upaniṣads of Vedic date; they are to be found in the most diverse small works, such as in Prāṇāgnihotra, Nādabindu, Saṃnyāsa, Kaṇṭhaśruti, Jābāla and Atharvaśiras.[3] The frame of the BĀU is reproduced in the Yogayājñavalkya.[4] The Nīlarudra is no other than the Śatarudriya, that is to say, Vājasaneyī Saṃhitā, XVI. The Cūlikā enumerates the *liṅgas* from the idea of *brahman* (neuter) as much as they can be extracted from the speculative hymns of the Atharvaveda. The Nṛsimhatāpanīya mixes Vedic and Tāntric verses, dressed up with a *mantrarāja* and four *aṅgamantras*. "Omnibus" formulae, like the *gāyatrī* or the *tad viṣṇoh paramaṃ padam* (*Ṛgveda*, I, 22, 20-21)[5] keep on floating a little everywhere.

The imitations of the Veda are continued outside of the Upaniṣads; there is a hymn to the Aśvins at the beginning of the *Mahābhārata* (§. 7, above); less accentuated imitations are found in many panegyrics of the Purāṇas; there is the case of the Suparṇākhyāna,—which ancient Indology has long studied.[6] One is surprised to discover even in a medical treatise like the the Kāśyapasaṃhitā (of Kathmandu) passages in the "Brāhmaṇa" style[7], including the typical locution *ya evam veda*[8], and entries in matters such as *prajāpatir vai khalu smaika evedam sarvam āsīt*, with an accumulation of particles.[9]

§22. Going back, it will be recalled that a rough interpretation of the Saṃhitās though not explicitly stated, was at least implicit in the *padapāṭha*, which must have been written at a time neighbouring that of the Śatapatha Brāhmaṇa epoch. It is true that the object of the *padapāṭha* was not only that; these texts simply aimed at assuring the integrity of the tenor and further, in aiding, indirectly, in the mnemotechnical effort. But doing this, they analyse the compounds, they specify the original form of the finals, in short, they give indications that we can translate as exegesis.[1] The lesson which can be drawn from this teaching has been profitably used in the Prātiśākhyas: the latter also concentrate on the problems of form, of phonic fidelity, of recitation; never do they make any allusion to the sense, even where they could have been utilised, for example, to enable one to decide between the homonyms.[2] Nevertheless, as with the *padapāṭhas*, what they teach can have an incidence on the interpretation, without their having so intended. If we do not have semantic *prātiśākhyas*, it is more because since Vedic times, formal preoccupations have considerably carried them away on to relative problems of content: in this regard, the Prātiśākhyas, like the Śikṣās, which continue the genre,[3] have warned us of the preponderant rôle played from a very early date in the tradition of the *mantras*, by orthoepy and diascevase.

§23. In short, the unique evidence of ancient date, of an activity regarding the interpretation is represented by the Nirukta of Yāska. This text is thus a happy accident. Besides, it only reflects a small part of the theoretically possible teachings, since it limits itself to etymological data (*adhy.* 1-6) or mythological data (adhy. 7-12; equally with an etymological sub-structure). The Nirukta is concerned as a commentary on the Nighaṇṭus, that is to say, on the lists of words of the Ṛgveda, classed into three categories, the *naighaṇṭuka*, properly called,[1] where semantic affinities prevailed; the *naigama*, made up of isolated words, and finally the *daivata* consisting of divine names. Valuable as they are, the Nighaṇṭus and the Nirukta, give us precious little information on the direct acceptance of the words of which they treat. Above all, they shed light on the "second" resonances to which Yāska gives the support of etymological analysis. Never has etymology been more destructive of real values, and more suggestive in contrast, in figured and symbolic values.[2]

Do the problems of semantics have a better outlet in the Bṛhaddevatā ? This text, almost straight off (II, 117) poses a new principle, *arthāt padam*, "the word (as form) is derived from the meaning", a principle quite contrary to the common thought of the *Vaidikas*.[3] But this text, after some useful preliminary reflections, engages itself on the path of a simple repertory where questions of the meaning have hardly any role. In short, it lacks a *mīmāṃsā* which would have the *mantra* as axis, as would later be the case with a *mīmāṃsā* having the act as the axis, or rather—but with Tāntric usage—a *mantraśāstra* (§.5). The commentators, about whom we are going to say a word, live on the plane of *pedetentim*; from whence for one part, comes their defeat; for in India only the systematic becomes vigorous.

§24. One has to await the epoch of Vijayanagara, that ephemeral springtide of Vedic culture, to see a flowering of commentators on the Vedas, with Sāyaṇa and Mādhava at their head.[1] We know today that Sāyaṇa had his predecessors;[2] would it not be unlikely that in the XIVth century, he was the first to write a continuous paraphase of the Saṁhitās ? There is, however, a considerable hiatus between the Nirukta and the most ancient noticeable *bhāṣyakṛts*—none of the latter seems to arise prior to the Xth century.

This long period is not lacking in erudite works, devoted to the Veda. Since the *pariśiṣṭa* of the Kalpa and the Śikṣās, the last shoots of the creative epoch, an uninterrupted continuation of minor works encumbers the catalogues of manuscripts; Vedism here ends up in a dust of works, which lacking any other merit, have the one merit of attesting to a certain productivity of schools of specialists. Literary manuals hardly notice them; before future manuals can record them, these abundant monographs must be set in order, province by province.[3] Let us take, at random, the catalogue of A.B. Keith for the India Office Library.[4] Outside of the commentaries bearing on the great articulations (*saṃhitās*, *Brāhmaṇas*, *Sūtras*, Upaniṣads), and the innumerable elucidations (*vivaraṇa* or *vivṛti*, *dīpikā*, *ṭippaṇa*, *vyākhyāna*, *kārikā*), there are to be found collections of hymns or verses established according to different principles (notably collections of *khilas*) of *paribhāṣās*, of *anukramaṇīs*, of *lakṣaṇas* and other repertories, with index or statistics as the base; the greater part is concerned with petty questions of accentuation or orthoepy. To which are added the practical manuals for the use of officiating priests, arranged either by schools (Hairaṇyakeśa, Baudhāyana, etc.) or according to liturgical function (such as Hautra, Ādhavaryava) or according to the ceremony. Finally, are to be found treatises on the *prāyaścitta*, on the *Śānti*, on one or other *vidhi*, works on the methods of building the altar (together with the ancient Śulbasūtras), etc. Rare are the works which have had the benefit of more than one edition, still rarer are those which were the object of critical work or translation.[5]

§25. For long preserved and passed down orally (the written thing only coming in subsidiary support), the essential part of the Veda—that is to say, the Saṃhitās—have been subjected to techniques of recitation. At all times, recitation constituted the principal, if not the exclusive, object of Vedic teaching,[1] the same as today, where in many parts of India, the oral exercises applied to the Veda are quite vivacious and the schools of recitation (*pāṭhaśālās*) numerous whilst the interpretation of the texts is treated as a poor relation: very few institutions concern themselves with it, outside of the training colleges (themselves rare) of the universities. We have every reason to believe that the situation was the same in antiquity,[2] primarily when one compares the insignificant number of semantic data with the mass of texts treating of phonic matters. Whether one looks in the Prātiśakhyas (where in ṚkPr., 15, figures quite a lively scene of the Vedic "class") or one has recourse to the Gṛhyasūtras (which are richer in information on the svādhyāya)[3], one is always led finally to recitation, to mnemonics; it is a question of meaning only in very vague and very general terms, which can, moreover, if they aspire to a concrete reality, be applied to ritual or more globally to the Vedāṅga, leaving the field clear for all that is *saṃhitā* and *mantra.*

The very fact that the *vedapāṭhakas* have such a bad reputation in literature, emphasises the understanding of their activity. They are dubbed almost (as much) as men "ignorant of the Veda"; they are stigmatised with the name of *vedavikrayin,* "the sellers of the Veda", because they offer their paid services. One text ranges the *śrotriyas,* that is to say, "the connoisseurs of the (oral) Veda", at the side of actors, astrologers and doctors, all those of whom it is said that "if they did not have this refuge, where then would the gazelle—barbarisms graze when frightened by the grammarian—lion ?"[4] This mockery of reciters perhaps dates from Vedic times, if it is admitted that the Frog hymn (RV, VII, 103) had a satirical intention, which is, however, uncertain, but ibid, X, 82, 7 speaks of the reciters of hymns (*ukthaśas*) who cover themselves in clouds and gossip, *nīhāreṇ a prāvṛtā jalpyā ca*; the text qualifies them as *asutṛp,* whice can, by a play of words, signify on the one hand "insatiables", and on the other "those who steal the breath" (with reference to the efforts of learned recitation of the other).[5] Classical literature has only followed a traditional theme.[6] The extolling from which originally the *svādhyāya*[7] profited, was little by little transformed into indifference if not disapprobation.[8] In any case, criticised or disapproved of, the activity of the *pāṭhakas* has been the only one to hold its own: as P.V. Kane says: "it appears that from the beginning the Veda was confined to memory and that the majority of men versed in the Vedas cared little to know its meaning.[9]

§26. With regard to this situation, however, allusions are not lacking from which it would appear that despite appearances, interpretation was not entirely lost sight of. Side by side with the reciters, was not there place also for the *Yājñikas* yoked to ritual, the *Vaidikas* of all types of whom some, despite everything, kept up some elements of real knowledge. Only the *mantras* were taught and retained to the letter; perhaps also some pieces of prose. When Śaṅkara threatened with grave dangers, the Brahmin using formulae of which he knew not the *ārṣa* appurtenance, the metre, the divinity nor the usage (*brāhmaṇa*, otherwise called *viniyoga*,)[1] he touched upon elements which already came near to what we term interpretation. One also knows the verse of the Nirukta calling down curses on "him who does not know the meaning of the Veda".[2] The Dakṣasmṛti enumerates the successive approaches to the traditional study; the fact of appropriating (the text, *svīkaraṇa*), of discussing it (*vicāra*), of studying it (*abhyasana*), of reciting it (*japa*).[3] It is true that here, as so often happens, one ignores which portion of the Veda is being discussed. Understanding the meaning of the Veda, affirms Yājñavalkya, renders a man fit to obtain deliverance[4] : there exists therefore, however feebly recognised it may be, an access to *mokṣa* byt he attention paid to the content of the old texts. Doubtless, one can say that in these and similar other allusions, it is a question of advice and of proverbs practically ineffective. But does the Vaikhānasa[5] not point out among the different types of students, the *prājāpatya* who meditates on the meaning of the Veda ? It is true that this text mainly describes the circles of ascetics, passably indifferent to the usual occupations. In the domestic Sūtras of the current type, the term of the time of study is noted by the expressions, *grahaṇāntam* or *yāvad grahaṇam*, ambiguous expressions which can refer to the *artha* or to the *pada*, but which are made a little clearer by the variant *chandasy arthān buddhvā*[6], if such a rendering of this formula can be permitted: "once that one has understood the meaning (which is contained) in the versified portion of the Veda." It cannot, therefore, be said with absolute truth, that the traditional teaching had excluded, even for the *mantras*, all recourse to meaning.[7] But the meaning, in relation to the form, had only a minor importance. This is, over and above everything, quite Indian.[8]

As to the oral transmission of the Veda[9], this is almost certain: not only is there a negative argument, absence of all ancient reference to writing,[10] but there are positive arguments: the insistence with which they deal with the questions of accent, of euphony, the cutting up of texts into mechanical sections super-imposed on the cutting up resulting from the internal logic, finally the presence of modified types (*vikṛti*) of recitation, whose sole[11] object is the guaranteeing of an oral text sheltered from all alteration.

§27. Before coming to the disciplines which claim to maintain the tradition, it will not be without use to consider briefly those which are situated on the margin or outside it.

On the Cārvākas and other materialists or sceptics of various shades, one can be brief. They reject the Veda in the same measure that they impugn everything outside of sensation and direct experience, as they reject the supremacy of the Brahmins: they are the *vedanindakas* mentioned by Manu, the *nāstikas*, understood as "those who do not believe in reality (of that which is taught in the Veda, and therefore, mediately, who do not believe in the Veda)".[1] A passage, often cited from the Sarvadarśanasaṃgraha[2] specifies a little the accusations which they make against the Veda: "the Veda has the views of error, of internal contradiction, of tautology;[3] the imposters who call themselves the specialists of the Veda destroy each other, the authority of the *jñānakāṇḍa* being reversed by the upholders of the authority of the *karmakāṇḍa* and vice-versa; the three Vedas themselves being nothing more than the incoherent rhapsodies of rascals" : there is cited thereafter an anti-Vedic maxim of Bṛhaspati, that chief of a school of pure *artha* (not mixed with *dharma*), from whom Mādhava, at the end of the same chapter quotes other diatribes against the sacrifices, the *śrāddha*, the obscure rites of the Veda, the unintelligible words which it contains, etc.[4]

§28. Of greater significance are the criticisms of the Jainas and Buddhists. Whilst upholding the verbal evidence (*śabda*) as a valid instrument of knowledge, the Jainas also reject the authority of the Veda.[1] In point of fact, they have replaced the Veda with their own Scriptures, whose composition they attribute to men gifted with exceptional merits (they are thus not "eternal" texts as is claimed for the Veda). These Scriptures are the *ārya Vedas*, the "true" Vedas, founded by Bharata, transmitted by the *Tirthaṅkaras*, as opposed to the *anārya Vedas* of Brahmanic tradition. The transcendent (apauruṣeya) character of the Vedas is particularly the butt of attacks from the philosophers. But the non-phliosophical texts (as the Cārvākas) also attack the sacrifices, the practice in its ent'rety. "The Vedas being the cause of transgression, cannot know how to save the transgressor", affirms the Uttarādhyayana.[2] They are the work of a demon called Kālāsura or Mahākāla. It is a work of the Xth century, the Yaśastilaka of Somadeva, which most carefully develops the criticism against the sacrifices (which shows, if there is need to show, that sacrifices were not entirely out of use). Thus ends a whole literary tradition which aimed at discrediting Vedism in the name of *ahiṃsā*.[3] One finds here, along with well-documented facts, exaggerations and misunderstandings; Somadeva considers, or pretends to consider that *Puruṣamedha* was really a human sacrifice, that the *gosava* aimed at sanctioning incest, etc. The same text which quotes in one passage (in an inexact manner) a mantric series of the Vājasaneyī Saṃhitā,[4] also attacks Vedic authority in general, because of the immoral precepts that these old monuments are supposed to contain : the Vedic injunctions would flatter the inclinations of the people; the miserable *cārvāka*, who professed atheism, is worth more than Jaimini, the demon disguised as an ascetic, who quotes the Veda.[5] The dialogue between Yaśodhara, newly converted to Jainism, and his mother Candramatī, who holds to the Brahmanic faith, abounds in glimpses of their beliefs,[6] far more vivid (and more tendencious also) than what the frozen controversy of the philosophers[7] enables one to divine.

§29. The situation in Buddhist literature is varied. The canonic texts make allusion, here and there, to the old ritual, to Vedic things, sometimes without making a value-judgement; when they talk of a Brahmin or treat of education, but more often, in order to criticise,[1] as in the *suttanta* "of the Three Vedas" of the Dīghanikāya, where the Buddha compares the Brahmin anchored in literal observance and the man with a care for ethics; thus also in the Kūṭadanta of the same collection, where, in the manner of a *brahmodya*, a demand is made of the Buddha to teach the manner of sacrifice, the necessary instruments, the disposition of the altar. The reply is the expected one: the real sacrifice is the one which makes a demand on all the personal qualifications of the participants, the co-operation of all people, the spiritual condition and the intention of giving.

The accusations are more vivid in the post-canonic texts; they cast aside all the legendary halo. Recall the well-known case of the Vajrasūci,[2] fulminating against the pretensions of the Brahmins, disserting upon the authority of the Veda and appealing to the Ṛgveda, hymn X, 90. The Abhidharmakośa[3] stigmatises the "lying chatter" (*asatpralāpa*) of the Veda. The Śārdulakarṇāvadāna,[4] arguing on some circumstance against the system of castes, insists on the variations contained in the Vedic texts, and what it calls the "changing character of the Veda"[5] : on the way, it outlines a sketch, not free of fantasy, of the schools, sacrifices, divinities. Ṛgvedic verses are quoted, with many corruptions.[6]

In the philosophical texts, the controversy is bitter over the Brahmanic Nyāya and the Mīmāṃsā; it is not surprising that the Veda can be taken to task, through the Upaniṣads, or globally.[7] It is without doubt the Tattvasaṃgraha which displays the most stubborn efforts in its offensive against the Mīmāṃsā. According to Śāntarakṣita, the Veda is not an authoritative document: denuded of significance by itself, it calls for being interpreted; it is further stated, the meaning there is uncertain, subject to varying explanations; its form itself is vague, "comparable to thick shadows", its content full of errors. A purely human work, its authority can only originate in an omniscient individual: it is this being therefore, that one must first look for, if one wishes to have a clear idea of the Veda. The author further compares the *Buddha* and the *Śrotriyas*[8] to the immeasurable benefit of the former. These attacks, however, are no more than a piece in the concerted offensive against the thesis relating to the eternity of the word, to the eternity of the connection between the word and the meaning. This thesis is contrary to the Buddhist thesis of temporality. It is, therefore, to be rejected on all points: and thus also we find rejected, to boot, the thesis relating to the eternity of the Veda, which in the Mīmāṃsā is the corollary of the former. In a much vaster cadre, the Buddhist author holds that the *vidhis* (the Vedic injunctions) do not constitute a valid means of knowledge for understanding the *dharma*. This is ardent polemic which denotes a mass of information on Indian dialectic in its entirety, though little original. Is it not inspired by the content of the *pūrvapakṣas* that the Mīmāṃsā, beginning with Śabara, itself used to refute point by point ?

§30. We could rapidly dispose of the Greco-Roman evidence, if we limited ourselves to stating that the Veda is not mentioned here, that Megasthenes for example, at a date relatively near to the end of Vedic times, speaking of religious habits does not mention anything that can specifically be related to the Veda.[1] But this would be to speak too quickly. We know today[2] that Hippolytus of Rome, in the IIIrd century A.D., possessed fairly concrete information on the Upaniṣads, which leads one to say that behind the exposition he made of Indian doctrines, lay some specific texts. Once one has this fact, one is encouraged to try to trace back the possible influence of the Upaniṣads on neo-Platonician thought, on Plotinus in particular.[3] The Upaniṣadic doctrines have been systematised, it is true, in the Brahmasūtras, near the beginning of the Christian era, but it is hardly plausible that these *sūtras* had been known to Plotinus or Hippolytus, in view of their inexportable character, at least if one does not wish to have recourse to the gratuitous hypothesis of a commentary which would have served as a go-between.[4]

The Chinese pilgrims were, in an incidental way, curious about non-Buddhist things: thus Yi-tsing mentions the Veda of a hundred thousand verses (cf. above para 8), a Veda not consigned to writing, but known entirely by heart by the Brahmins, of whom the Chinese historian affirms to have met many.[5] As to Hiuan-tsang, his description has noted the names of the four Vedas, but makes a mistake about that of the first, the content of the third, and concludes that "the masters explain the general sense, and teach the minutiae."[6]

In the Arab field, the essential evidence is that of al-Biruni.[7] This penetrating observer describes the Aśvamedha, adding the interesting note that "few sacrifices remain in practice in our days" (Chap. 65); he mentions the study of the Veda and Vedic interpretation (Chap. 63) and more explicitly he notes (in Chap. 12) that "the Brahmins recite the Veda without understanding it, and learn it from one another"; that "few among them learn the explanations and fewer still is the number of those who master its content and interpretation to the point of being able to hold out in a controversy (*brahmodya*)." The Arab historian recalls that the Veda is not written, but only recited according to certain inflexions; "the pen would engender errors", he finely notes; "from this it comes about that it has many times been forgotten and lost"—this evokes the cosmic *pralayas*, of which the Purāṇas speak (Para. §. 8); it was a certain Vasukra of Kashmir, who, seeingt he degradation of human conditions, recently put it down in writing so as to prevent its again falling into oblivion.[8] During the period when there arose the question of the relations between the Hindu and Persian thought of India, one obviously could not ascribe to the Vedic antiquities the concord to be seen between the Vedānta and Sufism.[9] At most, certain reminiscences could be noted. But on the decidedly more fruitful plane of scholarly research, it should be remembered that the Atharva-veda was translated under Akbar, by Badauni; that in the same epoch, translations into Persian of fiftytwo Upaniṣads (among which, of course, were all the Upaniṣads called "Vedic") were executed under the direction of Dara Shikuh, as well as a (complete ?) translation of the Vedas and a study on this literature. Dara however, considered the Veda as only a simple commentary on the Koran.[10]

In Cambodia, an inscription of Aṅkor Thom speaks of a Brahmin who arrived in that country, "having learned that it was full of excellent scholars of the Veda;[11] a Thai king of the XIVth century flattered himself on his knowledge of the Veda.[12]

As to the Vedic texts preserved at Bali[13] they are clearly only minor texts, particularly of the Atharvaśiras Upaniṣad, considered as the Balinese "*caturveda*" (as if it was the Upaniṣads which improperly passed as the Veda); but the data are embodied in a series of survivals, which merit study.[14]

§31. From one to the other *darśana*, the discussions wherein the Veda is directly or indirectly brought in, bear a certain correlation, the arguments, tacit or expressed, answer one another. We can deal first with the *darśanas*, whose general tendencies separate them the most from Vedic questions. This is the case with the Sāṃkhya and Yoga.

The Sāṃkhy acounts evidence (*āgama*) among the three instruments of knowledge; it is not a question of just any kind of evidence but of an "obtained enunciation" (understood by intrinsic appropriation, Vijñānabhikṣu; or by revealed teaching, Aniruddha), *āptopadeśaḥ śabdaḥ*, *Sāṃkhyapravacana*, I, 101: therefore, spontaneously valid, self-evident, free of doubt, contradiction and irrationality (the opposite of Buddhist evidence, which is not upheld by any authority). These characteristic apply, par excellence, to the Veda, the collection of revealed texts embodying supra-sensory truths. The Veda is not the work, either of God, or of the liberated souls, or of human beings (*na pauruṣeyatvam*, ibid., V. 46): it is the uncreated impersonal, yet non-eternal (*na nityatvam*, ibid., V. 45). Here can be seen the crucial points by which such teaching is different from that of the Mīmāṃsā, which serves, so to speak, as the norm for everything pertaining to the Vedic authority.[1] It is enough if we mark the link which the Sāṃkhya[2] provides between the Veda and evidence; in fact it only recognises as *pramāṇa* the Vedic evidence, the "laukika" *evidence* not being an independent source of knowledge since it rests on perception and inference. "Speech" is authoritative in the measure that it merges with the Veda.[3]

In the Yoga, conforming to the theist tendencies of this system, the Vedas are an instrument of eminent knowledge (in the category of valid evidence) by virtue of the fact that they have been revealed by God.[4]

§32. The ancient Vaiśeṣika, that is to say, before its confluence with the Nyāya, does not directly discuss the subject of the eternity of the Veda. However, a passage from the *Sūtras*, putting forward the proposition that "in the Veda, the creation of propositions has been preceded by intellectual activity, *buddhipūrvā vākyākṛtir vede*[1] implies the rejection of the Mimamsist thesis pronouncing in favour of this eternity. "Evidence" is not counted among the valid instruments of knowledge[2]; the sūtras, from the outset, limit themselves to teaching that the authority of the Veda results from the fact that it expresses the *dharma*, *tadvacanādāmnāyasya prāmāṇyam*,[3] a passage where the theist commentaries imagine that "tad" signifies not *dharmasya*, but *īśvarasya*. Finally, here and there the Vaiśeṣika takes note of Vedic ideas, even, in its theory of atoms. But whatever it has to say of greater clarity on this subject, emanates from the Nyāya.

The position of the Nyāya is very clear. Like the Sāṃkhya, it admits the evidence (*āgama*) among the *pramāṇas*, this "evidence" being preferentially conceived[1] as the Veda. Whence comes the Vedic authority, this authority which, from the Indian point of view, is precisely merged with promotion to the rank of "instrument of knowledge" ? From the fact that the Veda is the work of "*āpta*"[5] beings, that is, "qualified" or, what comes to the same thing, "worthy of confidence", the *āpta* par excellence, being God. One of the proofs of the existence of God is the Veda, which postulates the prime mover. All knowledge emanating from the Veda is valid by definition, since the Veda itself emanates from God.[6]

Further, the sūtras II, 1, 57ff, occupy themselves with refuting three points on which the Veda is traditionally censured—erroneous declarations (*anṛta*), internal contradiction (*vyāghāta*), tautology (*paunarukta*) : the first and second of these points result from extrinsic considerations, namely, from an inaptitude on the part of the observing subject, the third is more a quality than a defect, for the repetition is a profitable thing in itself.

These data occupy a minor place in the general perspective of the Nyāya; they have hardly any significance outside of the school, for they confirm the attempt to integrate the Veda into a theist system which is something fundamentally repugnant to Indian thought. They derive from this only small importance on, so to speak, the comparative plane, for they proffer the divergence of essential views which separate the Mīmāṃsā and the Nyāya, the two doctrines which, at the heart of Brahmanism, continuously confront each other.[7]

§33. Regarding Grammar, the situation is relatively clear. Here again we find a trace of the paradox pointed out at the begining of this study. Broaching the subject, the Mahābhāṣya holds that grammatical teachings bear on Vedic forms as well as on the given forms of usage (*laukika*): in another circumstance it is a datum comparable to that of the texts on *dharma*, where the rules are supposed to embody *śruti* and *smṛti*. The Grammar, itself a *darśana*, thus exhibits the same unifying and conciliatory tendency, as the other *darśanas*.[1]

Consequently, one would expect to see the two series *vaidika-laukika* treated on parallel lines. indeed, in allowing to the Veda the precedence which naturally falls to it. This is precisely what is at first produced: Patañjali enumerates among the fundamental motivations (*prayojana*)[2] of the Grammar, the care of "preserving" (*rakṣā*), meaning to preserve the Vedic forms whose immutability is essential : then "to modify" (*ūha*), meaning: to modify these same forms according to the needs of the liturgical context. Hence, two purely Vedic motivations, to which is added a third, the *āgama*, that is (the study of) Tradition".[3] Soon after, the text mentions thirteen more accessory motivations, which are all Vedic, and all (save one) are accompanied by derived citations, either from the Ṛgveda or from some Brāhmaṇa,[4] citations aimed at giving title of nobility to the *prayojana*: thus, when they recommend one—on the plane of "visible" objectives—not to commit the fault of language, or where they invite one—on the ground of "invisible" objectives—to enter into communion with the great God, or again, to behave in such a way that speech may reveal itself.[5] Here then, is a great grammatical text, which resolutely places Vedic values to the fore, which expressly refers to the, speculative passages of the Veda, but which subsequently when it comes to positive teaching, disinterests itself with the Veda, ignores the greater part of the Vedic *sūtras* of Pāṇini and only cites the uses of "chandasi" in a sporadic and, so to speak, lateral manner ![6]

This state of affairs enables one to anticipate the degradation of the Vedic teachings among the later Pāṇineans[7]—their complete or semi—complete effacement, whether in the Bhāṣā-vṛtti (a text which deliberately eliminates the Vedic facts and accents), or in the totality of the non-Pāṇineans.[8]

§34. But what of Pāṇini himself? Under the influence of Whitney[1] and according to first impressions, it was for long considered that the Vedic teaching of Pāṇini was incomplete, unwarranted and more or less arbitrary. Mr. P. Thieme has devoted a whole long study[2] to show that a climbing down is necessary. It certainly remains true that the Vedic facts have not been seized upon by the Indian grammarian in all their totality (how could it have been otherwise ?), nor, from our point of view, in their true meaning. The language of the

Brāhmaṇas is hardly touched. But we must first take into consideration what Pāṇini had intended to accomplish : to choose singular facts, whether typical by themselves, or pedagogically useful, forming by virtue of their link with common usage, a sort of demarcation, a landmark. From this it comes about that the described forms are sometimes fragmentary (too fragmentary), sometimes general (too general). The very manner in which the Manual enunciates them, tempts one to find therein some kinds of supplements, of counter-rules in relation to theory[3] although the bulk of the Grammar is standard, the Vedic forms are subjected to the indistinct choice (*bahulam*), to the situation of fact (*dṛśyate*), to the non-analytical position (*nipātana*). Mr. Thieme holds, above all, that Pāṇini could neglect Vedic things only under pain of letting them pass for *apa-śabdas*, no more than he could treat them in a fundamental fashion without risking disorganising his whole system. Whatever may be the merits of the Pāṇinean *vaidikaśāstra*, one clearly sees a certain deterioration in the grammatical vision which he transmits, such as a contemporary of Brāhmaṇas might well have had, and marks a loss of speed in relation to the rising theory—that of the *laukika*.[4]

It would be convenient to say a word here on the philosophers of language, whose speculations, it is known have their roots in the most ancient Veda.[5] The famous verse in *catvāri vāk parimitā padāni*, *RV*, II, 164, 45, corroborated on the vivid register by the *catvāri śṛṅgā* of *RV*, IV, 58, 3, is, so to speak, the charter of this philosophy. As Mr. Ruegg points out (*Phil.ling.*, p. 27), it is instructive to see that Bhartṛhari seeks in the Veda, the point of support for the theses dividing the advocates of this philosophy in regard to the unity of the word; the Mimāṃsa has no more the monopoly of linking Vedic authority and the problem of language. Following those who admit that the word is changeable (the *śabdabhedavādin*), the same *mantra* can be dressed in different forms according to the ritual context : a fact which derives from the technique of the *ūha*, developed by Mīmāṃsā (as to the *mantras* without context—a minor category—they have a form necessarily imitable; they are *svarūpārtha*).[6] According to those who believe in the immutability of the word, the *śabdābhedapakṣin*, on the contrary, the *mantra* never varies, but is affected by different potentialities (*bhin-*

naśakti), according to whether it is connected on the individual level (*adhyātmam*), the cosmic level (*adhidaivam*), or the ritual level (*adhi-kratu*); the words which compose it are thus eminently subject to being dressed in indirect meanings (*gauṇārtha*)[7]: all the irrational polysemy of the Veda is justified thereby.

§35. We must stop here an instant, at two fields supplementary to the Grammar, namely, Metrics and Lexicography. The classical metrics ignores the Veda, which, however, has given rise to an ubridled speculation on the metres, the symbols attached to the metres, etc. Only the basic manual, making up part of the Vedāṅga, the Chandaḥ-sūtra of Piṅgala, takes it into account; one even perceives here an organisation which has no parallel elsewhere (unless in the later Kaumudīs of the Grammar), namely, the juxtaposition of a Vedic teaching and a *laukika* teaching, placed on the same plane.[1] Of course, this co-existence is the product of two successive stages; it is no less remarkable than the disappearance of Vedic theory in the later manuals.[2]

In lexicography, following the Nighaṇṭus which, in a barely rational arrangement, collect Ṛgvedic words (and others)[3], one has to jump many centuries to arrive at the rich classical compilation which inaugurates the Amarasimḥa glossary. The words of the *mantra* are preserved here and there in the lexicons, more in the Trikāṇḍaśeṣa than in the Amarakośa itself, still more often in the Vaijayantī.[4] Is it a question of archaisms, felt as such ? Where is then the evidence of this latent survival of ancient vocabulary which comes to end up in the Vedism or pseudo-Vedism of the later Kāvyas ?[5] In any case, these words make up no part of the object of a class apart, and the commentaries rarely take the trouble to point out their character.

§36. The Vedānta leans on the speculative portion of the Veda, the *jñānakāṇḍa*, just as Mīmāṃsā has in view the *karmakāṇḍa*, the active "portion". There has existed a parallelism between the two systems, (the one and the other receiving the appellation of "mīmāṃsā") and both of them aim at giving a *pāribhāṣika* teaching, that is to say, to constitute a hermeneutic bearing on portions of the Veda, on which they confer a privileged role, the normative portions (*vidhāyaka*) in the Mīmāṃsā, the declarative portions (*abhidhāyka*) in the Vedānta, relegating to the second place the descriptive or qualifying aspects, including here the *mantras*. There is thus, in this choice and in the exposition of the motives which inspire it, a certain philological base. The Vedānta (to consider it first) refers to the Upaniṣads of the Vedic type;[1] the few citations, which the Brahmasūtras contain, are strictly Upaniṣadic, and Śaṅkara, commenting on the *Sūtras*, fully uses the Upaniṣads, that is, more precisely (for here too, there is a choice) the portions serving to establish the nature of *brahman*. Unfortunately, there does not exist for the Vedānta, the equivalent of what Śabara represents for the Mīmāṃsā; that is to say, a commentary—criticism of an objective character, little or not at all polemical, formally descended from the ancient *sūtrabhāṣya* type, (a type illustrated by the Kauṭilīya and the Kāmasūtra), as are still, on their side, the great *bhāṣyas*, assignable to the Nyāya and the Vaiśeṣika. One would see here a very close tussle with the basic *sūtras*.

Coming later, Śaṅkara is less a commentator (I mean: in the Śārīrikabhāṣya) than a "sectarian" (this may be said without pejorative intention), who utilises the *sūtras* as a weapon of war to nourish his personal theses. Similarly Rāmānuja. Both place themselves at the level of Kumārila, not of Śabara.

The manner in which Śaṅkara cites the Veda[2] shows the care which he took to concentrate on the *jñānakāṇḍa* : the continual references to the Upaniṣads, the rarest references to the *mantras*—only thirteen to the Ṛgveda (borrowed above all from the *maṇḍala* 10, and then from the speculative portions).[3] These quotations serve to clarify the meaning of a particular word (*yoni* in the sense of "sojourn", I, 4, 27, the synonyms of *ākāśa* in the sense of *brahman*, I, 1, 22, *pañcajana* to designate "the created beings" in general, I, 4, 12, the word "cow" used in the sense of "milk", I, 4, 2, the value of the term *vaiśvānara* (I, 2, 24 and 26), or else to give a detail on the fringe of an argument, to follow up an example taken from some Upaniṣads; many quotations aim anonymously, so to speak, at an entire hymn (I, 1, 26; II, 4, 8; III, 3, 56). The greater part figures, of course, in the more strictly philological portions of the great commentary.

§37. Rare are the passages where the commentator of the Brahmasūtras deals with the *mantras*; yet the information which he gives comes entirely from Mīmāmsā. Thus, on I, 3, 32, Śaṅkara puts into the mouth of the *pūrvapakṣin* the thesis whereby the *mantras* have for their sole objective, the expressing of something which is related to an act, so much so that they do not set up a manner of autonomous "semantic" knowledge.[1] This opinion, it is true, would be refuted under the *sūtra* 33, all the same, without Śāṅkara taking the trouble of arguing on the special case of the *mantras*. Elsewhere, he recalls the principle that the *mantras* have the same general value as the *brāhmaṇas* (which correspond to them, according to the Mīmāṃsist perspective) and that there can be no conflict between the first and the second.[2] Consequently, is not one justified (we may ask) in passing over in silence the mantric evidence ?

There is always the same disparity between theoretical affirmations and the factual situation. We are told that all the declarations of the Veda are authoritative (III, 2, 15) and consequently, have a meaning of their own (it is, therefore, illegitimate to reject one of them in arguing that it is devoid of meaning). But one also sees that the *mantras* are treated as a quasi-accessory element. Jayatīrtha has been able to speak the truth when he presented the *advaita* point of view in this manner : "although the *mantras* and the *Brāhmaṇas* (these texts), which were not made to know the (absolute) truth, and are in the domain of the ignorant, can support dualism, the *Upaniṣads* can base themselves only on non-dualism".[3] For us the essential in the Vedic message would be relegated by the Śaṅkarians to the field of error and ignorance.

Perhaps, by the very excess of these figurative resources, the *mantras* put paid to the Śaṅkarian principle of first of all envisaging the primary meaning of words. No matter how much one may tell us that the *mantras* (like the *arthavādas* besides) can be understood in a secondary meaning (*anyaparā*, II, 1, 13, G. Thibaut) there where, for one reason or another, their first meaning is closed, it seems rather that they are shattering the strict body of the *advaitavāda*, which already has enough troubles with Upaniṣadic allegories. But even this principle of *mukhyārthatva*[4] is not coherently led into Śaṅkarian practice, which is far more nuanced: it establishes an essential hierarchy within the *Śruti*, in distinguishing between major and minor declarations. These latter have in view practical truths and accommodate very well the figured terms and secondary usages. As to the major declarations, the direct meaning is limited to empirical concepts, the indirect meaning being valid for the terms which refer to the *brahman* (non-qualified)[5]; how without that, could one compel so many words to sink (*pracyāvayati*) to their own acceptance in order to assume the sense of *brahman* ? Thus the notional unification realised with a rigour, unparalleled for the Advaita, is effected, in short, at the expense of language; the privileged instrument of this semantic is the *lakṣaṇā*[6] with everything that it implies of linguistic arbitrariness. Thought or language; one cannot simultaneously win on both fronts.[7]

§.38. The Viśiṣṭādvaita in general, Rāmānuja in particular, have vis-à-vis the Veda, this same understanding attitude, of all-inclusive welcome, which it has in other fields.[1] The entire Veda, all the *śrutis*, are equally authoritative and that too, across all the "branches" in which it manifests itself. There is no difference between major declarations and minor declarations, no more also on the semantic plane between primary values and secondary values; and an end to manoeuvring with the technique of the *lakṣaṇā*. The doctrine partakes of the Mīmāṃsā in as much as it holds the Vedas eternal and impersonal, of the Nyāya in so far as it considers them as revealed by divinity.

One could thus have expected Rāmānuja to make a less miserly use of the *mantras* than Śaṅkara, if only in order to illustrate, what should have been easy for him, namely his animated conception of the *brahman*. But, in fact, at least in the Śrībhāṣya, the quotations are still more rare than in Śaṅkara, and are in part, the same, bearing on the same points of the commentary. In a passage of the Ṛgveda, (VI, 47, 18), the Śrībhāṣya (on I, 1, 1) finds a prop to uphold the non-existence of a *māyā* conceived as a principle of illusion.

The Vedārthasaṃgraha[2] gives us a favourable opportunity to appreciate what Rāmānuja understands by "the sense of the Veda". The Veda in question here, is theoretically the *śruti* in its generality; but since it is a question here of precise reference, it is almost the Upaniṣad alone which is concerned.[3] After having refuted the rival *Vedantic* views—notably those of the Advaita, to which a generous place is given in the polemic—and since, contrary to the evidence of the Scriptures, the work constructs its own thesis on the *brahmaṇ* in so far as it is the "cause", on the *brahmaṇ* in so far as it is the *Śarīriṇ* (in contrast to the cosmos which is *śarīra*), it is pure Vedānta. The author insists however, on the necessity of a harmonious exegesis obtained without sacrificing the primary meaning[4], including the totality of the Scriptures and responding in a quasi-liebnitzian manner to the spiritual harmony, which leads to God and to deliverance by means of *bhakti*. In order to show the field which opens up before this vision, Rāmānuja has recourse not only to the Upaniṣads (reinforced by the Taittirīya Āraṇyaka) but also to the Epics, the Purāṇas and to the Smṛtis in general. He teaches that the *mantras* (and the *arthavādas*) are no less necessary than the *vidhis* whilst conceding that they serve simply as a complement (*śeṣatā*) to these latter. The authority of the Veda rests on a postulate of semantic origin, the innateness of the word to its meaning.[5] It is specified that the trans-human, eternal character of the Vedas comes from the fact that now-a-days they are enunciated according to an exact order, wherein mental impressions have transmitted them in a chain going back indefinitely.[6] As for secular vocabulary, it has been extracted[7] from the vocabulary of the Veda: "all the words, finally significant (in so far as they are elements) are Vedic."[8] This is an allusion to the well-known Mīmāṃsist thesis on the identity of the two vocabularies, itself a corollary to the thesis on the *nityatva* of the language.

§.39. A trait, common to the majority of Indian doctrines, is that Salvation, their ultimate objective, cannot be obtained by the simple practice of the "Vedic duties" : the path of access by ritual (whatever, besides, may be the nature of this ritual) is considered secondary, if not even useless. This is what has put the Veda into the shade, from which the Vedic ideal has suffered. Already foreseeable in the Upaniṣads, the decline of ritual manifests itself through all the forms of the Vedānta especially in the theist forms which carry the *bhakti* to the first rank of their pre-occupations.[1] An outstanding testimony to the passing over from ritualistic religion to devotional religion is the Bhagavadgītā under the guise of an unconditional fidelity to tradition, this text in fact disposes of practical Vedism by showing that the fulfilment of duties aims only at the satisfaction of egoistical desires, and can never constitute a true path to liberation.

But on the speculative plane, the positions of the Veda remain intact. Madhva[2] takes Vedic authority as the principal source of knowledge, the Veda being, as with Rāmānuja, irreproducible, eternal, a revelation, valid and sufficient by itself (*Svataḥ-pramāṇa*). He denies that the Veda has as its unique object, the deed-to-be-done (*vidhi* or *kārya*); unless, he adds, this act itself may be identified with God, the supreme end of all the Vedas. From which it follows that the deed-to-be-done is no more than a means to attain an outstanding goal which goes beyond the former. The spirit emanating from God, manifests itself to men "in making an offering to the Spirits of the text of the Veda." In short, Madhva rejects the idea of limiting the Veda to *karmakāṇḍa*; the two *kāṇḍas* should be put on the same plane, or rather their differences should be abolished, transferring to the general interpretation of the Veda, the principle of the *ekavākyatā* that Mīmāṃsā had set up for the specific cases.[3] It was, therefore, only after having gone beyond the Mīmāṃsā that the Vedantin Doctor could feel himself in a position to re-establish the full authority of the Veda; an authority which pre-supposes that of language (*śabdasya prāmāṇyam*). In affirming the eternal relation between the word and its meaning, between the meaning of the word and the meaning of the sentence, the way is opened for Vedic authority. On the absolute plane, the scriptural evidence blends with the verbal evidence.[4] In short, Madhva and his successors utilise to the full, the resources of the Mīmāṃsā and going beyond Mimāṃsist reasoning, flatter themselves that they have rediscovered the broad outlines of a theist Vedānta, integrating the deed into a superior whole, which in fact abolishes its autonomy in the name of raising it. Since then the Veda has had no more than one meaning, namely, "to indicate the ultimate aim of all activity, as of all knowledge, that is-to-say, God".[5] It has become the instrument, the intermediary of *bhakti*.[6]

§.40. It would be convenient to concentrate a little or more on Mīmāṃsā.[1] Mīmāṃsā, in effect, retains the Veda as its fundamental object, it is an interpretation of the Veda. To be sure, it does not sum up the latter; like the other *darśanas* it sets itself up little by little as a general philosophy and, as elsewhere, the Vedic problems are blurred to the extent that one descends to a lower epoch. But they are never lost sight of, and even if they are no longer formulated, they still dominate the imposing edifice. On the other hand, the Veda is not utilised for ends which go beyond it. It is an end in itself.

The question for us, therefore, is not so much to know in what way Mīmāṃsā escapes from Vedic obedience or acts as a counterweight to the authority of the Veda as to know how it represents the Veda, what fate it reserves for its constituent elements and particularly for the *mantras*.

In fact, Mīmāṃsā takes care not to treat the Veda as an indistinct whole or as an aggregate of equipollent parts. It deals with the *Śruti*; the Vedic elements of the *Smṛti* have a secondary authority, like the rest of the *Smṛti* There remain, therefore, the *mantras* and the *brāhmaṇas* (the Upaniṣads being irrelevant). But Mīmāṃsā whose purpose is to systematise the injunctions and classify the acts, bears primarily on the *brāhmaṇas*, more precisely, on the injunctive parts of the *brāhmaṇas*. Whatever is not injunctive, but simply declarative, whether or not it is qualifying, is only the Veda of the second zone. This also includes certain sections of the *brāhmaṇa* (called the *Arthavādas*)[2]—in fact, they are numerically dominant—as well as the totality of the *mantras*, even those, which from our view point embody an injunction. As for the hymns, their notion is totally obliterated. Mīmāṃsā manoeuvres with the fragments, with the Vedic dust.

Let us take the commentary of Śabara (*Svāmin*), the most ancient accessible and a reflection itself, it could be thought, of the thought of Jaimini. The quotations in it are limited in number: fortysix only for the Ṛgvedic *mantras*[3] (often shared with other sources). These passages are interesting for points outside of those which make up the object proper of the ritualistic Mīmāṃsā. The majority of them figure in the debate on the *ānarthakya* (see below §.45) or other preliminary themes which deal with the Vedic concept in its totality; many of them help to show well that the Ṛgveda is the source of the rules of *smṛti* (the title of nobility for the Dharmaśāstra, whose sentimental attachment to Mīmāṃsā is known). One group refers to a discussion on the nature of the divinities;[4] others accompany etymological questions; more rarely, ritual problems. There are extremely few quotations which could provide literal commentaries.[5]

This recalls the situation in the Vedānta. There is absolutely no point in rushing to the conclusion that the *mantras* in general play only an episodic role in Mīmāṃsā. One can find in it an abundance of quotations (and commentaries) with regard to ritual, notably of the *mantras* and *yajuṣ* of the *Taittirīya* school.[6] The discredit, if discredit there is, attaches to the Ṛgveda and confirms the impression gathered elsewhere, *viz.*, that the Ṛgveda (like the Sāma- and Atharva-vedas, which Śabara quotes nowhere) is outside the Vedic cult, a stranger as a consequence to the strictly practical argumentation of the doctors of Mīmāṃsā.

§.41. What then does Mīmāṃsā teach on the *mantras* ? Firstly, the banal classification in *ṛc*, *sāman* and *yajuṣ* (*nigada*). Negatively, all that is not *brāhmaṇa*, is called *mantras*, *śeṣo mantraḥ*, as mentioned in the *paribhāṣā-sūtras* of Āpastamba, no. 24, which corresponds to Jaimini's *śeṣe brāhmaṇaśabdaḥ*.[1] Twelve types of *mantras* are known,[2] distributed sometimes according to formal criteria, sometimes according to the general intention of the text (precatory, descriptive, interrogative *mantras*)[3]: the list is by no means exhaustive[4], for as supplementary, Śabara adds many subdivisions, and the later Mīmāṃsā articulates so much matter as to have, for the *ṛc* alone, two hundred and seventy three varieties.[5] Sāyaṇa records the difficulty that arises in defining the *mantras* : the differentiation from the *brāhmaṇa*, says he, is incumbent on the ritualists (*yājñika*), on the specialists (*abhiyukta*), on the traditionalists (*sampradāyavid*).[6] Jaimini gives the name of *mantra* to the texts which start (*codaka*) an enunciation (*abhidhāna*).[7] This is an important point of view in the doctrine; which in effect considers the *mantras* as declarative (*abhidhāyaka*), whatever be their content, never as injunctive (*avidhāyaka*) In this they are comparable to the *arthavādas*[8] where theory recognises the auxiliaries of the *vidhi*[9]—the comparison is superficial, for the *mantra* does not recommend an action to be undertaken, does not turn upon an action to be avoided—the outstanding trait of the *arthavāda*. Further, a certain text[10] teaches that the *mantra* has primacy over the *arthavāda* , even to the point where the *liṅga* (an argument drawn from an indirect connotation), prevails over the *vākya* (an argument drawn from the syntactic link).

But is not the *mantra* in normal contact with a precise act[11], in the sense that it could be considered as taking part in the injunctive nature of this act ? The position of Mīmāṃsā is as follows: taken by itself the *mantra* enjoins nothing, the injunction being the fact of the *brāhmaṇa*; it evokes the *brāhmaṇa*, "recalls" it (*smārayati*); [12] the inverse is unthinkable in view of the preponderance of the injunctive elements in the *brāhmaṇa*, which alone is susceptible of presenting a verb in the optative.[13] But the *mantra-brāhmaṇa* relation can be put more precisely in another way: the *mantra* helps to form part of the "supplementary members" (*aṅga* or *śeṣa*—this last term is rather Vedantic). It is the second of the six permanent *aṅgas*, or as it is said later on, "direct"[14] *aṅgas*, those which help the act in the nearest manner (*samnipattyopakāraka*), in contrast to the distant auxiliaries (*ārādupakāraka*). In the series of *aṅgas*, the *mantra* is classed under the name of *guṇa* "property" : it is in fact thanks to it that one can distinguish one substance from another. But it does not produce a separate *apūrva*; it participates, through the intervention of the act which it serves, in the general *apūrva*. It is, therefore, outside of this metaphysical trajectory which relates the Vedic act to its distant effect. It is not a reality of the same importance as the *brāhmaṇa* which is the very expression of *vidhi*.

§.42. How then to determine that one element is the *aṅga* of another ? Here Mīmāṃsā intervenes with six criteria or *pramāṇas*,[1] ranged, as always, in a descending hierarchy, in order to avoid insoluble conflicts (something which Mīmāṃsā, equally with the Dharmaśāstras and Grammar, dreads): at the head comes the direct-statement (*śruti*), then the indirect-statement (*liṅga*), the (*vākya*) or the syntactic connection, the (*prakaraṇa*) or context, the (*krama*) or (*sthāna*) "order of sequence", and lastly the *samākhyā* or denomination. These criteria do not necessarily concern the *mantras*, or in any case, the *mantras* alone, but they do occupy an important place there. The conflict in general lies between the *mantra* and *brāhmaṇa*, but also between two *mantras* or within one and the same *mantra*, to which two criteria were equally applicable. The *liṅga* ought specially to hold our attention, because it opens the path to symnbolic values as soon as one tries to state precisely the relations between the act and the word. Thus the sūtra III, 2, 1 poses the question of knowing whether the *mantras* (it is in fact, a question of the *mantras* provided with a *liṅga*) are used according to their primary or literal sense (*mukhya*), or whether according to a secondary or metaphorical sense (*gauṇa* or *jaghanya*).[2] As elsewhere, it is the primary interpretation which prevails,[3] contrary to what is posed by the *pūrvapakṣin* always inclined to promiscuous interpretations. Thus can the *mantra*, which is primary by definition (as much as injunctive) be related to the context, although the secondary sense can only be seized through the primary sense. Other Mīmāṃsists would say further : it is only with the primary value that the liaison of the *mantra* with the act is permanent.

But these are positions of principle; in fact Mīmāṃsā admits that certain *mantras* may be used in a secondary sense. It is a question of a special case presented as so many exceptions. It happens for example, that according to one *brāhmaṇa* such and such a *mantra*, which accompanies it, is of value for this divinity, although words themselves of the mantra refer to another: thus[4] *niveśanaḥ saṃgamano vasūnām* (the *aindrī ṛc*) primarily applicable to Indra, is transferred to Agni, because of the correlative *brāhmaṇa* which directly expresses this relationship. The *mantra* gives way before the *brāhmaṇa*. From this one sees at the same time, that it is less a question of the internal semantics than of the syntactic : the transference of an epithet to its external relationship. Mīmāṃsā does no more than skim over the inexhaustible field of the Vedic secondariness.

What must, in any case, be avoided is the choice, otherwise called the option (*vikalpa*)[5], repugnant to Mīmāṃsā even more than to Grammar, since in this system, rationalisation and convention have precedence over experience which would often lead it to reject the rule and allow free choice.

§.43. If the *mantras* are only slightly affected by the *vikalpa* they are very much affected by the technique of the *ūha*. This complex technique—a modification of the divine name, in the mantric term, under pressure of the concomitant act—is already known from the *paribhāṣā sūtras* of the Vedic epoch,[1] whose links with Mīmāṃsā are known, but it is the latter which gives it its true fullness. The *pūrvapakṣin* brushes aside the *ūha* in the name of a major principle, the preservation of the Scriptures.[2] The siddhāntin makes the most of the practical point of view: the word *agni* cannot serve to signify *sūrya* (under pain of vainly multiplying secondary acceptances); if the act demands a reference to *sūrya* in the ectype, it would be better to change *agni* into *sūrya*. The ritual propriety has a bearing here on the sacred character of the *mantra*, which would impose preservation (would not an error of enunciation entail the necessity of an expiatory rite ?). Let us add, that the part of the *mantra* thus modified ceases to be a mantra (II, 1, 9); similarly the *padapāṭha*, which isolates words and restores the absolute end-syllables of the words, ceases to be a "Vedic" text (in the strict sense)[3]; similarly in Grammar, the substitute of a suffix or a root ceases to be a suffix or a root.[4]

Some axioms of interpretation concerning the *mantras*: the *ekavākyatā* (II, 1, *adhikar*. 14) or the principle of the unity of proposition has its application in the *yajuṣ*, where no exterior index signifies the end of the proposition (which is indicated in the *mantras* towards the conclusion of the *pāda*), *arthaikatvād ekam vākyam* (*sūtra* 46) "from the fact that there is a unity of meaning, there exists a unique proposition", with the counter-proof (ibid.) *sākāṅkṣam ced vibhāge syāt*" "if (the aforesaid proposition) requires (some other thing, this element) is placed before the division (is adopted)." In other words, it is a question of knowing with which portion of the *yajuṣ* the act coincides; the *yajuṣ* is a conglomerate, an indiscriminate mass; it is the role of Mīmāṃsā to individualise it. The principle of *vākyabheda* (*sūtra* 47) can also bear on the *yajuṣ*: two enunciations whose ritual use is distinct must be treated in distinct phrases.[5] A third principle is the corollary of the preceding ones: it is the *anuṣaṅga* or "the linking of an earlier element with a later element",[6] ending by removing from a subsequent part of the *mantra*, an element which completes the portion remaining deficient without the same, the element with which the *mantra* begins: an extremely indirect method of recognising the role of the ellipsis in the mantric structure.

All this confirms that Mīmāṃsā is far less occupied with the words than with the sentences: is not the sentence the matrix of the *vidhi* ? This doctrine is a *vākyamīmāṃsā* by the same virtue that Grammar is a *padamīmāṃsā*.[7]

§.44. It now remains to consider the preliminary discussions of Mīmāṃsā, and amongst them, those which deal with the *mantras*. It is a question of the true *paribhāṣās* which command the general interpretation of the system and command each other.[1] Let us recall that Mīmāṃsā claims to make known the *dharma*; but *dharma* can only be known by injunction; the injunction obviously consists of words; in order to be valid, the words must be non-products, but innate[2]; not only the words taken as forms, but also the significance attributed to them.[3] And as the injunction truly consists not in isolated words, but in sentences[4], the sentence must also make known the *dharma*. For however, "innate" they may be, the words in the sentence could be *avacana*, "denuded of the faculty of expressing (what one wishes them to express)".[5] This is when the *Siddhāntin* (I, 1. 25) proposes, that the sentenee cannot possess a meaning which can be independent of its constituent words, *nānapekṣya padārthān pārthagarthyena vākyam* (Śabara), the meaning of the sentence being motivated by that of the words, *arthasya tannimittatvāt* (Jaimini). Śabara (26) summarises the point: if the meaning of the word is apprehended, this results from the words themselves, but as to the meaning of the phrase, it results from the meaning of the words (and from nothing else).

These principles which are related to language, are, however, formulated with regard to the Veda and at the threshold of a text which legislates on the Veda: it is sufficient to say that the epistemology of language and that of the Veda, are one. They are good for the total (*samasta*) Veda; it seems therefore that the *mantras* as also the injunctive prose belong thereto.

However, an autonomous development became necessary (I, 2, *adhikar*. 4) to situate the *mantras* in this argumentation. It was precisely because the mantras were strangers to the *vidhi* character (theoretically, even to the *arthavāda* character, which is complementary to the *vidhi*), that one could be tempted to conclude that they were insignificant (inexpressive).[6] It was necessary to demonstrate the contrary. This demonstration confirms to what point the *mantras* were felt as peculiar inside the Vedic complex.

§.45. The development on the *ānarthakya* of the *mantras* (I, 2, *adhikar.* 4=*sūtras* 31-45)[1] takes up an old scheme of the Nirukta (I, 15-16), as has been observed since long.[2] It is what the specialists of the Nirukta call the controversy of Kautsa, Kautsa as a matter of fact being the name of the partisan of the insignificance of the *mantras*, whose arguments are subsequently combatted by Yāska. It is not without interest to know that to this same personage was attributed a Prātiśākhya, and particularly a Prātiśākhya of the Atharva-veda, if at least it is permissible to identify it with the author of this sort of (Atharva) Vedic grammar, known under the name of *Caturādhyāyikā* and which was taken to be, up to the discovery of the text edited by Mr. Surya Kanta, for the veritable Prātiśākhya of the Atharvaveda.[3] This will be an extremely instructive link between the fourth Veda and the *ānarthakyavādin*: is not magic the field in which the *mantras* have the least inherent meaning?

§.46. In the Nirukta, after the initial *anarthakā mantrāḥ* position (in the form of a *sūtra*-rubric), the motifs are given, to the number six (or seven), each (except the first) depending on quotations from the Ṛgveda. There are at least two quotations for each topic, four (in the form of isolated words) for the last. The refutation takes place point by point, and, a notable thing, without quotations. In the ancient manner, as that of the Upaniṣadic debates, or of the latent controversy of the Mahābhāṣya, there is no conclusion. A maxim (in prose) takes the place of the finale. A rudimentary frame, but well balanced. In the central charnel house a *sūtra* "in the case", *śabdasāmānyāt*, which could pass for the number one argument of refutation, but is rather a prejudicial axiom: "(the question raised on the significance of the *mantras* has its *raison d'être*) because the Vedic forms are similar (to the profane forms, which are significant by nature)."[1] Thus we have here the first trace of this thesis on the identity of Vedic and and non-Vedic words, a thesis which is subjacent in Grammar,[2] which will be taken up by Mīmāṃsā, II, 3, 30: the *pūrvapakṣa* included in the *sūtra* 30 (according to Śabara) and which here (as often) in the language of reason, denies this identity, alleging Vedic examples and depending on arguments of form and significance. The *siddhānta* gives due weight to this necessary identity, being the only one able to explain the phenomenon of injunction. Quite cleverly, the person arguing contests the alleged cases of divergence, which, according to him are the result of a misunderstanding: when a *brāhmaṇa* presents the juxtaposition *madhu ghṛta*, it does not desire it to be understood that *ghṛta* has the sense of *madhu* (a "Vedic" sense, different from its usual sense); it does not enunciate predicative judgement ("the *ghṛta* is the *madhu*"): a remark which goes quite far for the intelligence of the Veda ! The *siddhānta* further adds that if the meaning of the *mantras* differed from that of ordinary language, one would not be able to understand them. Finally, it rejects the preliminary view, already refuted elsewhere, that the *mantras* would be denuded of meaning. In fact, to admit two distinct semantics, is to make nonsense of a major principle of Mīmāṃsā on the perenniality of the word.

§.47. In Mīmāṃsā the discussion, according to the usual forms, takes place between a *pūrvapakṣa* (*sūtras* 31 to 39) to which the *siddhānta* (40 to 50) replies[1]; the disputed affirmation (*mantrānarthakyam*) figures, not at the head but at the juncture (*sūtra* 39) like certain rubrics of Grammar. Nine reasons are given in support of the *ānarthakya* and formulated into a single proposition; nine rejections in separate phrases. Finally, three new reasons (*śūtras* 51-53). As in the Nirukta or the Mahābhāṣya, there is no express conclusion The examples are at first the same as those in Yāska, then reinforced by others.[2]

The foremost argument is the same as one would expect from a text on ritual, *tadarthaśāstrāt* (31) "the *mantras* are denuded of sense) because the teaching on the meaning (emanates) from the (concomitant *brāhmaṇa*), or in other words: the *mantra* being accompanied by a *vidhi*; if it were to be admitted that *mantras* have a meaning, there would then be double employment; since the *vidhi* is by nature meaningful, it should follow therefore that the *mantra* is put there for its mere elecutory value, *uccāraṇamātreṇa*. It is clearly the contact between the *mantra* and *brāhmaṇa* in the liturgy which leads Jaimini to open the 'dossier' on the significance of the *mantras*—it does not arise from the nature of these latter.[3]

Even the notion of *anarthaka* corroborates this intention[4]: Śabara comments on *avivakṣitavacana*, the question being to know, not whether the *mantras*, on a theoretical plane, have meaning, but rather whether they are placed there with a view to expressing the meaning that they possess. Kumārila proposes another interpretation of 31: admitting that the *mantras* may be meaningful, at all events, their meaning does not in any way bear upon the sacrifice; the *stuti*, the *vidhi*, the *smṛti* are communicable by other means; there remains then only the elocutory value of the *mantra*.

Could it be said however, that the *brāhmaṇa* enjoins and the *mantra* "declares" (see above, §.41) ? No, for here, only a declarative character is possible for an element which complements (*vākyaśeṣa*) an injunction: but the injunction (*prathayati*, in the case taken up as an example, *uru prathasva* : *iti puroḍāśam prathayati*, "spread thyself widely ; so saying he spreads the cake") has no need to be completed. From two other examples subsequently quoted, it becomes equally clear, that there is a double 'employment'. without our seeing one of these two propositions adding to the other or qualifying it. What the *Siddhāntin*, without directly replying, objects to is the axiom on the identity of meaning between Vedic and non-Vedic forms, when this axiom, once admitted, would enable a useful pursuance of the debate.

§.48. The objector states that the words of common use serve to designate objects, thanks to which one accomplishes acts, whilst the Vedic words (read—the words of the *mantra*) are denuded of this utility. Whereat the *Siddhāntin* answers that they serve to make known the *aṅgas* of the act (see above §. 42). This reply exempts one from refuting the following objection: foreseeing that, if all "visible" justification is denied to the *mantras*, an "invisible"[1] justification could be invoked in their favour, the objector brushes aside this argument by posing that such a *raison d'être* could already be deduced from the "elocutory" *mantra* (non-significative).

A new objection : if the *mantra* serves for anything, is there not a risk that the *brāhmaṇa* would become useless ? In order to reply to this, the *siddhānta* takes up again the examples previously quoted and shows that the *brāhmaṇa* serves sometimes to specify (*guṇa*, 41), sometimes to exclude (*parisaṁkhyā*, 42) some operation, otherwise vague or abusive, that one can get from the *mantra*; or lastly that it expresses an *arthavāda* (43).[2] But if the *brāhmaṇa* is an *arthavāda*, is there not a risk that the assignable *mantra* may be a *vidhi* ? No, because the *brāhmaṇa* eulogises the act, not the *mantra*; the example quoted above (*uru prathasva*) implies the following interpretation: "the action (of spreading the cake) is praiseworthy (*praśasta*) enough to be accomplished with the help of a *mantra*, itself having a form (as praiseworthy as, "Spread thyself widely !").

§.49 This point established, there follow one by one the refutations of the motives advanced in favour of the *ānarthakya*. It has been said (*sūtra* 32) that the *mantras* were denuded of meaning because the order of the words in the sentence was subject to restriction, *vākyaniyama*[1]; that if the *mantras* had meaning, the order of the words therein would be free (*Kāmacāra, yathākāmam*). The *siddhānta* (44) saves itself the trouble of discussing this allegation, for the latter is not incompatible (*aviruddha*) with the fact that the *mantras* may be meaningful.[2]

The first motive meriting discussion is that of the sūtra 33: the *mantras* teach something already known (*buddha*)[3], that is to say, something that the officiating person (the user of the *mantras*) knows professionally. An unexpected objection to which the *sūtra* 45 replies : it is a question of committing to memory (*āmnāna*)[4] what he has to do in order to assure perfect realisation (*saṁskāratva*) of the act.

It has been said (*sūtra* 34) that the *mantras* speak of non-existent things (*avidyamāna*)[5], thus in the verse on the Four Horns. Reply (46): the mantras serve to install a secondary value (*gauṇa*) so that, at the same time they lose their injunctive potential. The reply is inserted in the body of discussions on the primary and secondary values of words. It has a special value here, on the historical plane, because Śabara reconciles this mantric secondariness with that in a text of the *kāvya* where a river finds itself described in the same terms one would use to describe a young girl : the specialists of the Veda have thus quite strongly siezed the link existing between the Vedic metaphor and that of the kāvya.[6]

It has been said (*sūtra* 35) that the *mantras* interrogate inanimate things (*acetana*). The reply (also in *sūtra* 46:) for the ends of sacrifice, the inanimate are also considered similar to the animate. Again, it is the secondary value, which without being expressly enunciated here, is at issue.[7]

It has been said (36) that the *mantras* were contradictory between themselves (*arthavipratiṣedha*).[8] The same reply (under 47:) secondary value.

Again it is said (37) that the significance imputable to the *mantras* was not expressed (*avacana*) in liturgical use, any more than in free study (*svādhyāya*), so much so, adds Śabara, that the *mantras* need to have no other than elocutory value. It seems, if we have understood properly, that here Jaimini only skims over the vast problems of relations between the word and the act: there is no evident link between the one and the other, neither in the ceremonial use of the formulae, nor in the scholastic recitation: just as, according to Śabara, when one beats the wheat with the flail, one does not recite *mantras* regarding the beating, with a view to bringing out the idea of beating, similarly, when one sacrifices, the *mantras* recited do not serve to bring out some idea linked to the sacrifice, but they serve purely and simply to accompany the act of a recitation.[9]

The reply (48) is double: a) (according to Jaimini) if the meaning is not expressed, it is because the *mantra* quoted as an example is not in relation to the sacrifice, (*ayajñasaṁyogāt*, Śabara), an instructive avowal from which one could deduce, in generalising it, that not one of the links so patiently established by the Mīmāṃsists (not to talk of the Moderns) between the *mantra* and *brāhmaṇa* concerns the meaning itself of the *mantras*: b) (with Śabara and Kumārila) if the recitation pure and simple is taught, it is because its apprenticeship is not easy, although the (semantic) explanation of the *mantras* is an easy thing: a homage rendered in passing to the technique—superhuman, in truth—of the reciters.[10]

It has been said further (38) that the *mantras* were unintelligible (*avijñeya*).[11] Reply (49:) one understands them thanks to the quotations (*nigama*), to the analysis with etymological ends (*nirukti*), finally to grammar (*vyākaraṇa*) starting from verbal roots. In other words, it is our ignorance which must stand accused (*avijñāna*, Jaimini).[12] This is not the place to recall how much of defeat, from the modern point, of view is implied in this recourse to etymology (above all by way of primary derivation) and to grammar for a text such as that of the Saṃhitās. On the contrary, the path of the *nigama* avers itself to be fruitful.

Finally it is said (39) that the *mantras* were related to impermanent things (*anitya*)[13], such as the designation of men and localities. The reply (50): it is a question here of words phonetically (*śrutisāmānya*) resembling others, which, themselves, note permanent things.[14] We can lay aside the bad interpretation in having recourse to etymology as in the preceding case. It should be noted that here is a new variant of the principle of *gauṇatva*.

§.50. There follow three independent arguments, which operate in favour of a meaning for the *mantras*.

In *sūtra* 51 : if a certain *brāhmaṇa* enjoins the recitation of a *mantra* "*āgneyī*" (*ṛc*)—then from a *mantra* to *liṅga*—this can only be explained if the *mantra* has meaning: in other words, the *mantra* must serve to give, like the *prayojana* of the ritual act, not just the letters; *a-g-n-i*, but the divine name that these letters evoke.[1]

In *sūtra* 52 : the *ūha* (see above §. 43) is only conceivable if the *mantra* has a meaning : what necessity would there be to modify an inexpressive term.[2]

In *sūtra* 53 : certain *brāhmaṇas* refer to the *mantras* in such a way that they necessarily understand that the latter have a meaning—thus when the *Śatapatha Brāhmaṇa* glosses the expression *śatam himaḥ* by *śatam varṣāṇi*.[3]

From all this it emerges that Mīmāṃsā (like the *Nirukta*), without expressly enunciating it,[4] rallies to the thesis of *arthavattva*. To do otherwise would have been not only to ruin the postulate on the uniformity of the vocabulary, but to compromise the dignity of the Veda. But it is permissible to state that the nature of the objections, the manner in which they are refuted, shows the mediocre interest taken, if not in the *mantras*, at least in their profound essence; they explain enough the danger which threatens them, from the interior of the system, the better to protect them.[5]

§.51. Thus, behind all the exterior marks which are, very generally, ones of homage, India in reality, has known diverse behaviours in face of this unusual phenomenon that is the Veda. The popular beliefs alone, or again those which are not primarily concerned with the Veda, consider it as an indivisible whole, and revere it in indistinct fashion, most often in vague terms behind which one does not arrive at grasping whatever concrete reality the authors had in view. The two Mimāṃsās, by contrast, address themselves to a small part of the Vedic mass: the Vedānta, to the Upaniṣad (rather to selected propositions); Mīmāṃsā properly speaking, to the injunctive portions of the *brāhmaṇa*, subsidiarily to the accompanying *mantras*. This splitting up[1] goes along with the unifying interpretations, therefore, partial, the Upaniṣad being cited with a view to seeking equivalences to the notion of *brahmaṇ*; the *brāhmaṇa* with a view to defining the structure of the injunction and establishing, beyond, the bases of a ritual *dharma*. It was evidently the Mīmāṃsā which encountered most durably and intimately Vedic thought, but what does Mīmāṃsā represent in the general vitality of India ?

In any case, if there is enrichment of some privileged aspects, there is a loss for the whole.

Without seeking to separate here what results from the Indian appreciation,[2] and what we moderns would put in the balance, one can try to define the causes of this loss, causes of surely unequal importance: the difficulty of the style and language, (at least as regards the *mantras*), joined to a certain esoterism of Vedic thought (an esoterism in which a spirit not warned beforehand, would see, above all, inanity),[3] the disposal in time and space of the series of Vedic texts, groups and schools; the cutting up of old hymns into formulae or even into fragments, becoming inert bodies in the liturgical web which receives them; the emphasis placed on pronunciation, on recitation[4] to the detriment of the interpretation of the texts; the rarity of commentaries, their insufficiency (at least as regards the *mantras*), their etymological prejudice[5]; the fact, above all, that Vedic representations had, early on, ceased to be a ferment of Indian religiosity, that it no longer recognised itself even where it remained faithful to them.[6] Briefly, the Vedic world, whose essential had passed, while transforming itself, into the very flesh of Hindu practices and speculations, was no more than a distant object, exposed to the hazards of an adoration stripped of its textual substance.

This however, is the oft-repeated fate of great sacred texts,[7] the founders of religions ("sacred, they are...") ; What one can say is that the tendency where it arises has, as with so many others, been pushed in India, further perhaps, than elsewhere.[8]

ADDENDA

§: *I and 6 and passim*: On the authority of the Veda in the *Smṛti*, see now the important work of U. N. Ghoshal, *A History of Indian Political Ideas* (Index, under *Vedas*, p. 581). The same also regarding the periodic creation of the Veda by the gods and the sages (our §. 8).

§. 25: On Vedic education and recitation, add now Ram Gopal, *India of Vedic Kalpasūtras*, p. 321 and passim and note p. 393. Note also that the Jainas distinguish two kinds of masters, the *Uddeśanācāryas*, who teach the meaning, and the *Vācanācāryas*, who teach the tenor; S. B. Deo, *Jaina Monachism*, p. 315. (It appears also that the *upādhyāya* had been the name of the master of recitation, in opposition to the *ācārya*, the master of interpretation). Cf. the same for the difference between *sūtra*-and *artha-pauruṣī*, p. 354, 425.

Sṛṅgāraprakāśa (quoted on para 25, note 7) is to be studied along with *Kāvyaprakāśa*, I, after the kārikā 2, which also speaks of the Veda as *śabdapradhāna*, as opposed to the Purāṇa being *arthapradhāna*, and which compares the attitude of the listener vis-à-vis the Veda, to that (of the servitor) vis-à-vis his master, his attitude vis-à-vis the Purāṇas to that which one has vis-à-vis a friend, his attitude finally vis-à-vis a *kāvya*, to that one has vis-à-vis a beloved woman.

§. 29. : *first line* : on the references to Vedic sacrifices in the canonic literature of Buddhism, see A Hillebrandt, *Ritual Literatur*, p. 18 : a statement to which one could add much today. One can well feel to what point the Vedic environment had been present in the spirit of the contemporaries of the Buddha.

NOTES

NOTES

Paragraph 1

1. The Mīmāṃsā-sūtras are cited under the numeration that they have in the translation of *Sabarasvāmin bhāṣya* by G. Jha, a more rational numeration than that in the edition of Ānandāśrama Sanskrit series—abundant though it may appear, our bibliography has no intention—nor possibility—of being complete.

2. Attention has recently (February and March 1959) been drawn to this paradox by Mr. J. Filliozat writing on the Vedas in modern India, and Mlle. M. Biardeau on the Vedas according to the Mīmāṃsā, in their communications to the Asiatic Society, Paris.

3. Cf. the mass of documents collected of old by J. Muir, *Sanskrit Texts*, volume 3, 2nd edition, which could easily be inflated still more. The traditional point of view of Medhātithi on Manu II, 6; In Sāyaṇa, *Introduction to his Commentary on the Ṛgveda*, Muir 3, 2nd edn., p. 57; H. Oertel, *Apologetik*, passim; in Mādhava, Introduction to his commentary on the TS, Muir, ib. p. 66. Cf. also with some effort at modernism, the *Niruktālocana* of Satyavrata Sāmaśramī, analysis in A. Barth, *Oeuvres*, Vol. II, p. 94. A condensed formula (unexpected in this place) is that of *A. V. Prāt.*, IV-101 : *vedādhyayanaṃ dharmaḥ*, "The Study of the Veda is dharma". —The thesis of the eternal, supra-human Veda is, as we will recall later, that of the Mīmāṃsā (and of the Vedanta); it is the "savant" thesis, but is also that which corresponds to the most general sentiment in India, the one enunciated in the Epics and the Purāṇas.

4. We are not evoking here the theme of Vyāsa, "the supposed arranger" of the Vedas and of many other texts: simple superstructure. Cf. the latest on this theme, S. K. Chatterji in *Philosophy of Radhakrishnan*, p. 494.

5. The formula comes to resound secondarily in the beginning of the Buddhist *sūtras*, *evaṃ mayā śrutam*, cf. the remark of J. Brough, BSOAS, 13, p. 425.

6. *Mbh.*, I, 62, 33, Poona, Citing this passage. C. Sankararama Sastri, *Fictions in Law Texts*, p. 46, pertinently adds, "The fundamental fictions on which reposes the entire edifice of Hindu theology and philosophy, are the theories of the omniscience, infallibility and eternity of the Vedas". One should, therefore, be able to speak of a myth of the Veda as one speaks of the myth of Rimbaud and more generally of the myth proper of every text originally sacral or secondarily sacralised.

7. Cf. infra, §.28.

8. A. L. Basham, *The Ājīvikas*, p. 199 recalls that a doctor of this sect is represented as triumphant in a controversy with a champion of the eternity of the Vedas.

9. Infra, §. 29.

10. Cf. R. C. Hazra, *Purāṇic Records*, p. 193, with a view, a little sum-

marised, but exact and eloquent, concerning the Vedico-Purāṇic equilibrium, then the Purāṇo-Tantric equilibrium, in the course of the first millennium of our era. Amongst the Smṛtis, the *Tantravārttika* (translated by G. Jhā, p. 165) distinguishes in diminishing value, according to the gradual weakening of their links with the Veda, (a) the "orthodox" texts (Smṛti properly speaking); (b) the Buddhist and other texts; (c) the magic texts, lightly tinged with Vedism and using "certain *mantras*" and (d) the texts for the *mlecchas*, complete strangers to the Veda (*bāhyatara*).

11. Ths has already been noted by H. Th. Colebrooke (*On the Vedas, On the Philosophy of the Hindus*), cited by Hegel, *Gesch. der Philos.*, (p. 260 of the French translation). The word *āstikya* aims at first, to be sure, at belief in the existence of another world (probably emanating from the negative term *nāstika-nāstikya*), but afterwards—and without any doubt more profoundly—belief in the reality of the Veda, that is to say, in its absolute validity; S. N. Das Gupta, *History of Philosophy*, Vol. III, p. 62, 518. The question of the *astitva* of the gods—and, therefore, indirectly that of the Veda—was already established in the eyes of certain *ṛṣis*, cf. R. V. , II, 12-5, *utem āhur naiṣo astīty enam*, an oft-cited passage, most recently by W. Rüben, *Beginn der Philos.*, p. 20.

12. In the commentary on the TU cited by Muir, Vol. III, 2nd edn., page 191. The share of intra-*Darśanic* polemics is considerable in Śaṅkara and not justified by the place that presumably the *Brahmasūtras* allocated to it.—Indian orthodoxy, therefore, is a secondary harmonisation, as that of which Madhusūdana (*Prasthānabheda*) makes himself the herald and which resulted in the well-balanced equilibium of the Six Darśanas, or rather of the Three pairs of Darśanas. Muir, op. cit., p. 203 pointed out, with reason that the modern pandits believe with Madhusūdana and Vijñānabhikṣu, in the ultimate coincidence between all these doctrines; he refers to J. R. Ballantyane, *Synopsis*, p. IV.

13. The reference to "Vedic Religion", "Vedic Duties" by modern scholars, is often fallacious, the vedic character of the alleged doctrine being indeterminable, or at best, involved in an undifferentiated Hinduistic whole. This confusion is already to be seen in antiquity, there where one encounters without any other specification the mention of of *Vede śrutam*, *āmnāyasya* or (the vaguest term of all) *āga nasya*. Thus it is that A. K. Coomaraswamy, *Hinduism and Buddhism*, p. 5, defines the *Bhagwad Gītā* as "the compendium of all Vedic doctrines: in effect, this Krishnaite text, profoundly "oriented", greatly reflects a certain global conception of Vedism. Hence the moderns feel justified in seeing in the Veda as much the point of departure of all Hinduism, the origin of all its theory and practice, (a view commonly held throughout India) as on the contrary to recognise in it a monument from which India has, later on, resolutely turned itself away, "*der Veda schlägt dem Dharma des Hinduismus geradezu ins Gesicht*", Max Weber, *Hinduismus und Buddhismus* p. 29. Still more useful remarks, Th. Goldstücker, *Literary Remains*, Vol. II, p. 50 ("The Inspired Writings of Hinduism").

Cf. Recently, J. Gonda, "*Veda und älterer Buddhismus*", 1960, p. 349.

Paragraph 2

1. M. R. Sakhare, *Lingayat Religion*, p. 266, decided, not without having shown the futility of discussions on this subject, in favour of the antinomy between the Āgamas in general (See infra §. 4) and the Veda. As to the Vīraśaivas in particular, there is at least a "pure" category (*śuddha*) which practises the recitation of the Vedas, ERE, Vol. VIII, p. 72; Sakhare, p. 663. One of the basic texts, the *Liṅgadhāraṇacandrikā*, rich in Vedic citations, does its utmost to enquire into the mantric sources of the *Vīraśaiva* rites, and is preoccupied with remaining in consonance with the Veda. It is here that one distinguishes, for all time to come, between praxis and theory.

On the Lingāyats, cf. recently J. Gonda, *Der jüngere Hinduismus*, 1963, p. 243.

2. V. Rangacharya in *Cultural Heritage*, 2nd edn., Vol. IV, p. 177. A proable result, among the Tengalai of a progressive reflection on *Bhakti* and on social liberalisation.

3. S. Das Gupta, *Obscure Religious Cults*, p. 62. On the upanishadic ingredient of the Bāuls—besides heterodox,—ibid., p. 207.

4. From the French translation in *Psaumes du Pélerin*, by G.—A. Deleury, p. 17, 49.

5. French Translation of *Granthāvalī* by Ch. Vadeville, p. 18, 34; cf also Y. Husain, *Mystical India*, p. 56, citing (p. 61) a passage where Kabir mentions "the nine Vedas" (sic) by the side of the Koran; it is besides common ground to set the scriptures back to back, under the pretence of *juxtaposing* them. More violent citations of Kabir ("The Vedas, Cloaks of Falsehood"), identical with certain abuses emanating from the Cārvākas, in F. E. Keay, *Kabir*, p. 4, 74 or S. C. K. Handoo in *Cultural Heritage*, 2nd Edn., Vol. IV, p. 385 (on Rajjab).—Among the Sikhs who live on the fringe of Hinduism, Nanak admits of the juxtaposition of the Veda, Koran, but the *Daśama Grantha* teaches the rejection of the Vedas, considered at the most as a transitory *mārga*: verses cited by L. Rama Krishna, *Les Sikhs*, p. XIV. The Sikh texts, besides, refer quite often to the Vedas, without pejorative undertones, and it is known that the internal arrangement of the *Ādigrantha* approaches that of the Ṛgveda, F. Pincott, JRAS, 1886, p. 437 (the name itself of *Daśama Grantha* evokes the *daśama maṇḍala*).

6. French translation (*L'enseignement de Rāmakrishna*), p. 467, no. 1240. Elsewhere, Ramakrishna is more moderate, or let us say, indifferent.

7. All the same, passages are not lacking where Vivekananda speaks like Ramakrishna; thus in the *Practical Yogas*, p. 211, French translation, where noting that, according to certain Indian sects, "the Book becomes God" and "that God Himself must conform to the Vedas", he adds, "in India...if I take certain passages of the Vedas, and if I juggle with the text and give it the most impossible meaning...all the imbeciles will follow me in a crowd".

8. Ch. Vaudeville in her French translation of Ayodhyākāṇḍa, p. 15, 153.

Tulsidas understands by "nigama" (an old term of the *Nirukta* and of Pāṇini) the "revelation" in its entirety, including the Purāṇas. This confusion is found at the very basis of his belief : he is himself *advaitin* and, at the same time, a fervent adept of *bhakti*.

9. Cf. *Autobiography*, p. 199, French translation; *La Jeune Inde*, p. 280, French translation.—One could also quote Rāmānanda, cf. Ksh. Sen in *Cultural Heritage*, 2nd edn. Vol. IV, p. 379 ("They all seek Thee in Vain among the Vedas"). *Dādū* (ib., p. 384), preaching "Do not consume your life reading the Vedas" (cf. on Dādū, W. G. Orr, *A Sixteenth-century Indian Mystic*, p. 62, 77, 132, 166). Also Dharam Dās, "the false Pandits, in reciting the Vedas, deceive the world", etc. More explicable is the anti-Vedic attitude of the founders of Sikhism (see above, fn. 5, as also Nanak proclaiming the uselessness of the Veda, Husain, op. cit. p. 106, 112.

10. The title of a useful book of D. S. Sharma where will be found numerous indications on the subjective liaison between the Veda and the speculative Hinduism of modern epoch. Cf. also *Contemporary Indian Philosophy*. 1952, 2nd edition, passim, (a collective work).

11. On Tagore and the influence of the Upaniṣads on his thought (apart from the classic work of E. Thompson) M. J. Dave, *Poésie de Tagore*, p. 50. As for the Veda proper, it is hardly more than a distant souvenir, like the one noted by André Gide between certain poems of the *Gītāñjali* and certain hymns of the *Ṛgveda* (French translation of the *Gītāñjali*, p. XV). On Radhakrishnan there is much more to be said, consult passim, *Philosophy of Sarvapalli Radhakrishnan*, 1952, joint work, see index under Upaniṣads.

12. Cf. *Satyārthaprakāśa*, Chap. "God and the Vedas" and passim : Pt. Chamupati in *Cultural Heritage*, 2nd edn, Vol. IV, p. 634; ERE, II, p. 59.

13. Cf. notably his book (not exempt from pretention), *New Approach to the Vedas*.

14. G. E. Monod-Herzen, *Shri Aurobindo*, p. 284. Out of curiosity one can consult *The Secret of the Vedas* by Aurobindo, for whom the "the real sense of the Veda" lies in the symbolic expression of "the struggle between the spiritual powers of Light and Darkness, between Truth and False Belief, Knowledge and Ignorance" (p. 210 of the French translation). How much more open is the attitude of J. Nehru (*Discovery of India*, p. 54) who, the better to admire the Vedas, refuses to see in them a revealed text, but sees them as purely human stories, "a wonderful flowering of a richly endowed imagination, full of human lessons".

15. Cf. Sharma, op. cit., p. 96;—Debendra Nath Tagore had all the same studied the Vedas, Kalidas Nāg in *Cultural Heritage*, 2nd edn. Vol. IV, p. 626.—One must refer also to B. C. Tilak, the visionary politician, author of studies at once inspired and absurd on the Vedas.

Paragraph 3

1. On the sinuous relations between Shaivism and the Veda, cf. the brief remarks of K. C. Pandey (on the doctrinal plane) *Bhāskarī*,

III, p. V. as also all the historians of primitive Shaivism and notably J. N. Banerjea, *Iconography*, 2nd edn., p. 450 (who proposes the name of Vedāntaśaiva's).

2. On the Pāśupatas, see recently J. Gonda, *Der jüngere Hinduismus*, 1963, p. 213 (where are to be found other references); cf. Pandey, op. cit., p. CXII-CXVI recalling that certain amongst them, apparently the Lakulīśas, lay claim to the five *anuvākas* (in the form of *mantras*) of the *Taittirīya Āraṇyaka*—hence to the esoteric fragments of Vedism, as often happens in Hinduism,—whose significance, moreover, they 'Shivaise'.—For Medhātithi, on Manu, II-6, the Purāṇas have no ties with the Veda, no more besides than the Pāñcarātras (see infra, foot note 9) and the Bhojakas. (?)

3. Notably by the *Nirukta* and by Śabarasvāmin.

4. Cf. *Paramārthasāra*—French translation by L. Silburn, p. 5. K. C. Pandey, *Abhinavagupta*, 2nd edition, 1963, p. 160.

5. Cf. infra, foot note 12.

6. On the link between Vishnuism and the Veda, see C. R. Hazra, *Upapurāṇas*, p. 267; J. N. Banerjea. *Iconography*, 2nd edn., p. 301, cf. also infra, foot note 13.

7. S. K. De, *Vaiṣṇava Faith*, 2nd edition, 1961, p. 479, refers to the *Haribhaktivilāsa*; ib. again p. 514, on diverse reminiscences, notably on the use of Vedic *mantras*.

8. Hazra, *Purāṇic Records*, p. 199.

9. Cf. S. L. De, *Pañcarātra and the Upaniṣads*, IHQ, IX, p. 648. The Pāñcarātras present in fact a typical case. The true formula is found by S. N. Das Gupta, *History of Indian Philosophy*, III, p. 57: they are of a double nature, Vedic and Tantric. Orthodoxy according to the *Skandapurāṇa* (cited in *Śaivadarśanasaṃgraha*: translation, p. 101: *Śāstra* as opposed to *Kuvartman*) would include, apart from the four Vedas, the Epics and the Purāṇas. According to Yāmuna (cited by Das Gupta, op. cit., III, p. 14), the Purāṇas are not in disagreement with the Veda, their texts originate from the same source and have the same validity: thus there is already a feeling of distance, if not of difference, an ancient sentiment, because the episode of Nārāyaṇīya (Mbh., XII) designates the *śāstra* of the Purāṇas as being commensurable (*saṃmita*) with the Veda. K. Aiyangar, IHQ, IX, p. 465, picks up the numerous borrowings of the Upaniṣads. The inverse attitue is more often noted: Hazra, op. cit., p. 222, recalls that the Purāṇas have only a superficial acquaintance with the Veda. According to F. O. Schrader, *Introduction to Pañcarātra*, p. 97, the Purāṇas treat the (*Vaidikas*) as detractors of the supreme divinity, "those who plunge into the Veda do not realise that Īśvara is transcendant (*para*)". Cf. again a citation of *Viṣvakasenasaṃhitā*, ib., note 2 and Das Gupta, op. cit., III, p. 43, n.: criticism by the Purāṇas of men who follow the Vedic ritual. The attitude of the Mīmāṃsā, that is to say of orthodoxy par excellence, is very clear: the Purāṇas form part (with the Pāśupatas, Sāṃkhyas and Yaugikas as also along with the Bauddhas) of the Smṛtis, which "are not honoured by those who know the Vedas", having a certain dosage of Vedic ideas in a mass of

things unrelated to the Veda (*Tantravārttika*, translation of G. Jhā, p. 165). Altogether different is the attitude of a text like the *Dīpikā* of Śrīnivāsa (translated by R. Otto, p. 20), which accepts everything which is not in flagrant contradiction with the Smṛti.

10. Thus the *Kūrmapurāṇa*—Hazra, op. cit., p. 67. It is also said (Hazra, *Upapurāṇas*, p. 93) that their texts, like these of the Vaikhānasas and Bhāgavatas are written for men" "fallen from the Veda" (*vedabhraṣṭa*): an episode of this pessimistic prospective so common in the Purāṇas.

11. *Paramasaṃhitā*, ed. by S. K. Aiyangar, p. 23.

12. The word *ekāyana* comes from the Chāndogya Upaniṣad, where it designates sometimes a certain science (indeterminable) and at others (at the end of a compound) something "with a unique path or a final end...".

13. On the Vaikhānasas, cf. below §. 9 and the indication given in J. Gonda, *Aspects of early Viṣṇuism*, p. 241, concerning the mixture which they make of the Veda and Vishnuism, a mixture more interesting since it concerns the point of departure of a Vedic school, a little removed, it is true, in the smārta perspective, at least in respect of other schools. The attitude of the philosophers is similar: Madhva considers the Veda as exclusively Vishnuite and interprets all the words of the Veda in the light of Vishnuism, S. Siauve, *Noms védiques de Viṣṇu*, p. VI and passim.

Paragraph 4

1. Without wishing to enter here into the details of sectarian habits—the sects are moreover singularly little expansive in their judgements on the Veda,—we will mention only some of the data emanating from the Tamil Shivaites. The references to the Veda, usually conjoined with the Āgamas, are far more numerous than one would have expected. Homage is rendered to the Veda in the *Tillaivāḷāntaṇar-purāṇa* (included in the *Periyapurāṇa*), German trans. by H. W. Schomerus, *Sivait. Heiligenlegenden*, p. 70, which points out, ib., p. 162, a school of "*Vaidika-Śaiva's*". One of the hymns of Māṇikkavasagar, without besides containing anything important, is entitled "*On the four ancient Vedas*" (trans. of Schomerous, p. 187). On the Vedic sources of Nammāḷvār, cf. V. Rangacharya in *Cultural Heritage*, 2nd edn., IV, p. 167; similarly on the Āḷvāras, the *Tiruviruttam* is said to contain the essence of the Ṛgveda. Cf. again F. Kingsbury and G. E. Phillips, *Hymns of the Tamil Śaivite Saints*, p. 57 where figures the known theme "Why recite the Vedas ?" which is also used by Kabir and by the Maratha mystics. On the other hand, the Shivaite doctrines of the South, (the *Śaivasiddhānta*) do not seem to contain specific references to the Veda, to judge by the analysis of Schomerus. Equally nothing remarkable for the North in Rāmānanda (ERE, X, p. 570): the *bhakti* exigence has smothered the *Śrīvaiṣṇava* conditioning. About the Ekadasīs, we learn only that they read the Veda, G. W. Briggs, *Gorakhnāth* p. 52. As to the sect of Caitanya, although carried to the extremes of *bhakti*, it maintained the appearance of orthodoxy to reject the same in practice, M. T.

Kennedy, *Caitanya Movement*, p. 40, 101, 119. In glancing through E. Carpenter, *Theism* or J. N. Farquhar, *Outline of the Religious Literature of India* (such a precious book in other respects), one sees the little that these authors retain of Vedic data, besides erudite connections. Useful remarks on the equilibrium of doctrines in H. Nakamura in *Symbol and Values*, 1954, p. 701.

On the real import of the Āgamas, see now J. Filliozat, Introduction to the *Rauravāgama*, ed. by N. R. Bhatt, 1961.

2. This is derived in great part according to C. R. Hazra, *Purāṇic Records*, p. 103. Many traits go to form the sombre picture of the *Kali* age, such as the much-deplored predominance of the śūdra and the sudrification" of the Brahmins (ib., p. 209, 235) who have been able in effect, to contribute to the decline of Vedism.

3. Already there has been much discussion following R. Garbe, on the "*Kṣatriyism*" of the Upaniṣads and tendencies have been exaggerated which, moreover, were already presented in the Brāhmaṇas, notably in Bock 10 of the ŚB. The latest author on this question, La Vallée Poussin, *Les Indo-Européens*, p. 271, n. 2.

4. The latest on this "renaissance"—a thesis of Max Müller—see V. Fisani, ZDMG, 105, p. 319.

5. J. N. Farquhar, *Outline*, p. 145 and Passim.

6. Sometimes modern authors consider that the "Purāṇic religion" has absorbed Tantrism, thus Hazra, op. cit., p. 260, while at another and more often (thus A. Avalon, passim) feel that Tantrism has absorbed Purāṇism. A kind of equilibrium must have been established. Important is the remark of Śrīkaṇṭha (cited by S. N. Das Gupta, *History of Indian Philosophy*, Vol. V. p. 71) whereby there exist two sorts of sacred texts (*the āgamas*,) ones for the usage of the three upper social classes and others for the fourth class, having no access to the Veda. It happens also, for example in the *Kulārṇava Tantra* that the "Vedic approach" (*vedācāra*) may be considered as the first of the "steps" in the Tantric path. According to E. A. Payne, *The Śāktas*, p. 27, the sādhaka (that is to say the *paśu* aspiring to become a *vīra*) must execute the prescriptions of the Veda, at least those which are compatible with the *Kali* Age (for the *Kali* Age requires that one replace, even in the situation of the *paśu*, the greater part of the Vedic prescriptions by Āgamic prescriptions): they are proper, in effect to the initial stage of the *sādhaka*. According to the *Ma hānirvāṇa Tantra*, II, p. 15) : "Vedic things which were efficacious in the early ages, have become powerless in the *Kali* Age, they are like serpents deprived of their venom, like skeletons", *nirvīryāḥ śrautajātiyā, viṣahīnoragā iva, satyādau saphalā āsan kalau te mṛtakā iva*. Cf. also *Kulār. Tāntra*, Vol, 1, p. 79—Among the more recent studies, *Cultural Heritage*, 2nd edn., p. 211 (different authors) and *History of the Indian Pepole*, IV, p. 314; V; p. 400 (different authors). As for Vedic reminiscences in the *Soma-śambhupaddhati*, see the Introduction to an edited translation of that text by H. Brunner, 1963, p. V. As for the same in *Rauravāgama*, see J. Varenne, J. A., 1962; p. 185.

7. Hazra, loc. cit.—A curious thing, the attitude of the Tantras vis-à-vis the Veda is more respectful than that of the Vaishnava and Shaiva sects (non-Tantric). This is no hindrance to the fact that it is Tantrism which, is responsible for India breaking with Hinduism of Vedic implications.—Cf. amongst others P. C. Bagchi in *Cultural Heritage* (cited above); Chintaharan Chakravarti, IHQ, VI, p. 114; B. L. Mukerji in *Shakti* a. *Shakta*, p. 92, 3rd Edition, 1928, p. 95 (and ib., Appendix 2 by the author of the book, A. Avalon); S. N. Das Gupta in *Asutosh Mookerjee Comm. Vol.*, Vol. III-1, p. 253, etc.

Paragraph 5

1. Cf. the preceding note. The extreme thesis—that of a perfect consonance between the Tantra and the Veda—has been upheld by T. V. Kapali Sastry, *The Veda and Tantra* 1951, p. 159.—The Tantra utilises the Puruṣasūkta for human sacrifice with the evidence of Guṇaviṣṇu *ad* Chānd. Br. ed. by D. M. Bhattacharyya, p. 118. For the ritual of the Āgamas in general, L. Ravi Sarma in *Cultural Heritage*, 2nd edn., IV, p. 455, points out the quite striking resemblance between the Āgamic temple and the Vedic *yāgaśālā*. The *Sadācārasmṛti*, a work attributable to Madhva, says that one must adore Viṣṇu "*vedatantroktamārgataḥ*", A. Chatterjee, IHQ, XXXIII, p. 338.

2. On the *Mantraśāstra*, A. Avalon, passim, notably *Principles of Tantras*, p. 174, *Shakti*, p. 225, *Serpent Power*, p. 83 and other references in Mr. Eliade, *Yoga*, 2nd edn., pp. 216, 391; for relations with the AV. see N. K. Venkatesan, *J. Myth Soc.*, 1936, n. 2; for the relations with the TĀ (*pratīkopāsanā*) S. N. Das Gupta cited p. 10, n. 2 (p. 271). One has a clear feeling of the difference between the Vedic-Purāṇic *mantras* on one hand and the *Saiddhāntikas* (that is to say *śāktas*) on the other, as in the *Śṛṅgāraprakāśa* analysed by V. Raghavan, I, p. 52, a text which adds as third the *laukika mantras* which are the *mantras* of magic.—On the operations which are effected in order to "engender" the Tantric *mantra*, to imbue it with life, etc., treating it in short, exactly as an idol for *pūjā*, cf. the text of *Śāradātilaka* cited in *Sarvardarśanasaṅgraha* in the chapter on Yoga.

Equally important is the role played by the *mantra* in the third vehicle of the Buddhists, often called *mantrayāna*, cf. among others (one of the most recent references) M. Eliade (op. cit.); H. V. Glasenapp, *Buddhist Mysteries* (Fr. trans.), p. 93; Sh. Das Gupta, *Obscure Cults*, p. 21; P. H. Pott, *Yoga en Tantra*, p. 114; S. B. Das Gupta, *Tantric Buddhism*, p. 66; E Conze, *Buddhism*, p. 181. Matters reach their culminating point in Far-Eastern Buddhism: *The Mahāvairocana* (R. Tajima, p. 117) speaks of four stages of recitation ': contemplative (itself sub-divided into visual), auditive, "semantic" and respiratory); concomitant with the preliminary offering; with the real offering; finally the recitation of the "spiritual realisation" (*siddhi*). The sense is symbolic and is obtained as well from an explicit formula as from "semences" or (fictive) autonomous "syllables": the fundamental *mantra* is *a* (*ṃ*), called the "king of mantras" from which emanate the "hundred syllables" whose "wheel", the divine radiance, is meditated upon (p. 130), a little like one says in the Vedic that the *mantras* were all contained in the syllable *oṃ*. The *Mahāvairocana* teaches the manner of reciting the *mantras* during six months, syllable by syllable, with the *mudrās*, the *maṇḍalas* and diverse observations as the point of support from without (p. 127). Finally, are distinguished an esoteric recitation, which embodies a worldly method ("respiratory" recitation) and a supra-worldly recitation (mental recitation, with concentration on the divinity so as to identify oneself with it) (p. 139). Thanks to the terminal *mantra* of the *Mahāprajñāpāramitā*, "the supreme illumination becomes a great positive fact of spiritual experience", according to D. T. Suzuki, *Essays*, III, p. 217. With this symbolic extellation accords very well the absence of literal meaning (*Bodhisattvabhūmi*, ed. U. Wogihara, p. 272), the degradation of the *mantra* into *dhāraṇī*, the resorption of language into silence ("destruction of the language by indefinite repetition", Eliade, p. 220); in actual fact, the Tantric *japa* ends up in silence (*ajapa jap* of Kabir), Ch. Vaudeville, *Granthāvalī*, p. XVIII.—Cf. again the Mantric play described in the Śivaite texts, the *Paramārthasāra* of Abhinavagupta, French translation by L. Silburn, p. 47 and passim; A. Zieseniss, *Śaiva-Systematik*, p. 73; D. S. Ruegg, *Philosophie linguistique*, p. 107. See also A. Padoux, *Symbolique de la parole dans certains textes tantriques*, Paris, 1963, passim.

3. *Vīramitrodaya*, cited by R. C. Hazra, *The Upapurāṇas*, p. 93.

4. 7, 39, 28 and following, where this teaching is put in the mouth of Devī, the inspirer of an ultra—sectarian doctrine ! The Āgamas are there said to be of five species, *Śaiva*, *Vaiṣṇava*, *Saura*, *Śākta*, *gāṇapatya*, their other generic name being Tantra. Also described there is the *Tāntrikīpūjā*, as opposed to Hindu *pūjā*, commonly called *Vaidikī pūjā*.

Paragraph 6

1. References to the Veda in the Smṛti in J. Muir, III, passim. More recently, P. V. Kane, *History of the Dharmaśāstras*, I, p. 4 and V, p. 1152 and JBORAS, XXVI (1922), p. 57 (Vedic sources of dharma); K. V. Rangaswamy Aiyangar, *Economic Thought*, p. 175 or *Rājadharma*, p. 30, 80, 94, etc. Among the ancient authors, the *Nyāyamālāvistara*, cited by Muir, III, 3rd ed., p. 179, Kullūka on Manu I.1 (ibid p. 180). Another point of view comes from A. K. Coomaraswamy, *Spiritual Authority* (Vedic bases of temporal power in India). In brief, a large portion of what the commentators of Smṛti have in the nature of Vedic souvenirs emanates from the Mīmāṃsā.

2. Notably Kumārila in the *Tantravārttika*, I 3, 1, and passim (résumé in Kane, III, p. 838 and V, p. 1179) which distinguishes the passage of Smṛti based directly on the Veda, and those derived from experience (translation of G. Jha, p. 119 and by the same author, *Pūrva-Mīmāṃsā*, p. 220). The first tendency (with Śabarasvāmin) was to consider as authoritative only those texts which were in accord with the Veda, but the effort of Kumārila, in conformity with the known tendency, is to reconcile everything, arguing that the conflict is only apparent, that it can arise as a result of some unpublished source, that it easily resolves itself in option (*vikalpa*), etc. To

the point where one starts presenting each Smṛti (orthodox) as authoritative whether it is based on the Veda or rather on experience, whether it implies a visible or invisible motive. There remain alone, as in Grammar, the *bādhās* or "impediments": one type of Smṛti being "hampered" by another whose authority is superior. Numerous Vedic allusions in Uśanas, J. Jolly, *Recht und Sitte*, p. 8 and ibid, in Hārīta. In Manu, translated by G. Bühler, p. LXIV; Viṣṇu, translated by Jolly, p. XIX; quotations of *mantra* in Āpastamba, translation of Bühler, p. XXVI; Gautama, ibid., p. LXI; *Vasiṣṭha*, ibid., p. XVII; Baudhāyana, ibid, p. XL; nothing in Nārada and Bṛhaspati. On the possible attachments of post-Vedic texts to ancient Schools, cf. § 17, fn. 4.

3. In the *Viṣṇumṛti* is found a full *mantra*, 86, 16, several Ṛgvedic *pratīkas* (archaic use !) here and there, but above all, quotations (in *triṣṭubh*) resembling *mantras* without being so, such as 29.9 and 30.47, passages which lean on *Nirukta* II, 4, or on *Saṃhitopaniṣad Brāhmaṇa*, III, p. 29 (the discourse of Vidyā to a Brahmin). One could say that the text intended to evoke the ancient structure and "climate" without caring to reproduce, nor even to imitate witn servility. The de-Vedisation of *dharma* has gone forward on an even tenor in form and in content. On the decadence of the old schools in the Dharmasūtras, see G. Bühler's translation of Manu, p. XLVI, a work always useful to read.

4. B. K. Ghosh, IHQ, III, p. 607, referring to J. J. Meyer, *Gesetzbücher*. For a contrary opinion see, W. Gampert. *Sühnezeremonion*, p. 10; now see Kane, *History*, I, p. V.

5. From the postulate according to which all the Smṛtis are founded on the Veda, flows the necessity, in order to explain certain badly determinable rules, of resorting to the artifice of *utsannavāda*, *pracchannavāda*, combining themselves with *pratyakṣavāda*, cf. *Tantravārttika*, English translation, p. 84, 151, 161. C. Sankararama Sastri, *Fictions in Law Texts*, p. 70, gives examples of juridical rules supposedly drawn from the Veda. It is this same postulate which has entailed the extremely frequent recourse to Mīmāṃsā, for overcoming objections and reconciling the irreconcilable.

Paragraph 7

1. For references to the Veda in the Mahābhārata, since A. Holtzmann (IV, p. 5), cf. C. V. Vaidya, *Sanskrit Literature*, I, p. 183. and above all E. W. Hopkins, *Epics*, p. 23, JAOS XXII, p. 380; a full list of passages in the index of S. Sörensen under the word "Veda". On the debuts of the Vedic myth, which concretises itself precisely in the Epics, see S. K. Das, *Educational System*, p. 433. A discussion on the notion of the epic "Vedism" (that is to say of archaism) between A. B. Keith. (who tends to restrict its application), JRAS, 1920, p. 1321 and T. Michelson, JAOS, XXV, p. 89 (with regard to the Rāmāyaṇa), finally Keith, JRAS, 1911, p. 169, 177. Numerous Vedic details in the *brahmodya* of Aṣṭāvakra (presented by the king Janaka, already the hero of the "Upaniṣadic" *brahmodyas*), *Mahābhārata*, III, 132-134 vulg.

2. Re. the quotations see Hopkins, op. cit. : they are less typical than the imitations, conscious or not, of Vedic style, whose culminating point is the hymn to the Aśvins, in "hybrid Vedic" (or hyper-Vedic ?); *F. W. Thomas Comm. Volume*, 1939 p. 177.

3. Numerous sacrifices mentioned in the *Rāmāyaṇa*, S. N. Vyas, *Journal of the Oriental Institute*, Baroda, IV, p. 303. The *Yogavāsiṣṭha*, has merely Upaniṣadic resonances but has no quotations, H. Von Glasenapp, *Zwei philosophischen Rāmāyaṇa's*, p. 23. Nothing of note in *Adhyātma Rāmāyaṇa*. The *Harivaṃśa*, on the contrary, on the Purāṇic level, is the most traditional.

Paragraph 8

1. Cf. in general the fragments cited by Muir, III, 2nd edn., p. 27. On the "Vedic" character of thist radition, see V. C. Bhattacharyya, *J. G. Jha Institute*, XV (1958), no. 3 and for an ancient source, *Śaṅkarabhāṣya*, I. 3, 32 (which admits the autonomous value of the Purāṇas, thus going farther than Mīmāṃsa which only concedes them a secondary authority; passage cited in Muir, op. cit., p. 182). For the Vishnuite evidence of the link between the Vedas and Purāṇas, see S. K. De, *Vaiṣṇava Faith*, p. 197, 2nd edition, p. 260. The Purāṇas are an integral part of the Vedas according to Śaṅkara (in the comments on *Bṛhadāraṇyaka Upa.*) quoted by Muir, p. 205. Cf. also F. E. Pargiter, passim (résumé ERE, X, p. p. 448).

2. Thus, *Bṛhd. Ār. Upa.*, 2. 4, 10.

3. These passages, moreover, have analogies in the Epics and in Manu, and antecedents in *Śatapatha Brāhmaṇa* (Book 11), in *Bṛh. Āraṇ. Up.* or *Chān. Upa.*; similarly even in AV (X. 7, etc.). Cf. *Mark. Purāṇa*, chapter 102, *Viṣṇupur.*, 3, chapter 3 and 1, chapter 5, *Matsyapur.*, cited by A. Hohenberger, *Flutsage*, p. 43, etc.—Quite a different account in the *Agni Purāṇa* : the Vedas form part of the *aparā vidyā*, Hazra, *Records*, p. 135, cf. §25, fn. 6.

4. By the authority of the Vedas, Brahmaṇ determines the names, the forms and the functions of all the beings, *Viṣṇu*, 1, chapter 5; cf. according to Manu I, 21, Brahmàṇ who originally, fabricated the names, etc. from the words of the Vedas : the counterpart of this identity between Vedic names and worldly names, of which the philosophers speak, see below §33. The Vedas are anterior to the Veda, according to Matsya Purāṇa (cf. V. S. Agrawala, *Matsya Purāṇa*, p. 31. The Veda, however, according to the same text, 2. 10, is a boat that cannot be submerged.

5. Cf. *Mark.*, Chapters 29, 78, 84, 104 and passim.

6. These are the *sākṣāddharmāṇa ṛṣayaḥ* of *Nir*, I. 20.

7. *Viṣṇupur.*, 3, Chapter 4; the figure of a hundred thousand and the idea that the literary works are little by little abridged, in passing from one generation (or from one cosmic age) to the other, constitutes a common theme in ancient India.

8. In the Viṣṇuite Purāṇas, it is Viṣṇu-Fish who saves the Vedas from the *Pralaya*.

9. Hazra, *Upapurāṇas*, p. 148, basing himself on the *Viṣṇudharmottara.*; E. Abegg, *Messias-glaube*, p. 28 (according to many texts).

Inversely it is said that one will see the *śūdra* kings celebrating Aśvamedha, *Matsyapur.*, 144. 43.

10. Hazra, op. cit, p. 129. The strict meaning of *pāṣaṇḍa* is "sect, religious doctrine", as we have the word namely in Asokan epigraphy (and as it has been accordingly translated in the Greek version of Asoka.) Comparatively, *tīrthika* is not primarily a heretic but only "the follower of a sect," cf. K. K. Handiqui, trans. of Naiṣadhacar., p. 558.

11. Abegg, op. cit, p. 69, 88.

12. Muir, III, 2nd edn., p. 36. Our *Ecoles védiques*, p. 215 and passim. The philosophical substratum is always the same to show unity in diversity.

Paragraph 9

1. Hazra, *Upapurāṇaṣ*, p. 139. The *Agnipur.* is not the only Purāṇa which had links with an ancient school; W. Caland, *Ahnencult*, p. 79, 200 (also *Totenverehrung*, p. 8) had noted that the *śrāddha* of certain Purāṇas goes back to that of some Vedic *Caraṇa*. One would like very much to know if this fact is found outside of the *śrāddha* and above all if it is a question of a real continuation or of a borrowed phenomenon. On the Vedic reminiscences in Agni Purāṇa, cf. S. D. Gyani, *Agni-purāṇa*, p. 207 and passim.

2. The "magic" finality of ancient rites emerges not only from the usages noted in the domestic sūtras beginning from the *Kauśika*, but also from the "*kāmya*" values which are from place to place inscribed in the course of a solemn ritual, cf. W. Caland, *Altind.-Zauberei*: Darstellung d. altind. "Wunschopfer".—For the Agnipurāṇa, cf. chapter 259 and following; ibid., chapter 25, on the *nyāsas* adapted to Vedic data.

3. Cf. F. J. Meier, *Zeitschrift f. Indology u. Iranistik*, 8, p. 33 (also J. Wackernagel, *Introduction* to *Altindische Grammatik*, 2nd edition, p. 29 and related notes) on the archaism, truly speaking of ambiguous interpretation, of the Bhāgvata.

4. 11. 27, 7 *Vaidikās tāntriko miśra iti me trividho makhaḥ.*—Hymn to the Sun in the *Saura Upappurāṇa*, p. 41, 63. Hymns with a tendency to archaism in the Mārk., as in Chapter 106. The Vedic quotations in the *Brahma*, P. V. Kane, *Kunhan Raja Comm. Vol.*, p. 5; as for Vedic survivals in Saura Purāṇa, cf. W. Jahn, *Saura Purāṇa*, p. VII.

5. Hazra, *Purāṇic Records*, p. 226, defines the Purāṇic ritual as *vyāmiśra*, before even the arrival of Tantrism; he notes further that (*Upapurāṇa*, p. 112, attempts to reconcile the two systems, Vedic and Sectarian. There is obviously something arbitrary in wishing to distinguish at any cost the Vedic from the Purāṇic: the one and the other include a part of beliefs or elementary practices.

6. The refashioning of the ancient *pūjā* into Tantric *pūjā* in the *Nirṇayasindhu*, cited by P. Harting, in his study on *Baudh. Pariśiṣṭa*, p. XXIII.

7. Harting, op. cit., p. XVII; G. Bühler, translation of *Āpastamba Dharmas.*, p. XXXII. One finds in this pariśiṣṭa, a minority of Purāṇic *mantras* along with Vedic *mantras*, sometimes of Upaniṣadic origin.

8. Cf. the edition of *Atrisaṁhitā* by Raghunatha C. Bhattacharya and

Ramakrishna Kavi, p. VII; a mixed homage, entirely Vedic practices (inherited from the Vedic Vaikhānasas ?), the text distinguishes the ancient cult called *amūrta*, from the new cult of images, called *Samūrta*.

9. Cf. Gonda cited above, §3, note 13.—Another type of mixing: Tamil hymns and the Veda recited side by side in the temples of the South, K. A. Nilkanta Sastri, *The Colas*, II, p. 480. Such and such a Brahmin, at Vijayanagara, "studied the Vedas and understood them with the help of Śivaite Scriptures", Nellore Inscription, edited by Butterworth-Chetty, I, p. 16: the Āgamas help to understand the Veda.

Paragraph 10

1. It may be observed as to how little is said of Vedic survivals (apart from the connections sought to be shown by scholars) in manuals such as *Cultural Heritage* or *History and Culture of the Indian People.* Only A. Barth (*Oeuvres*, I, p. 86) had devoted an entire chapter, remarkable for the period to what he called the "decline" (of ancient Brahmanism). The same lack of interest is shown for the survivals of Buddhism in India.

2. Cf. Nilakanta Sastri, op. cit., II, p. 466 (under Rajendra I) 468 (under Vīrarājendra; also *Epic India*, XXI, pp. 222, 249); R. K. Mookerji, *Education*, p. 368: given as types are the colleges of Tirumukkūḍal and Eṇṇāyiram, attesting to a rich educational deployment. For the Pallavas, C. Minakshi, *The Pallavas*, p. 193, draws attention to the Vedic studies in the *ghaṭikā* of Kāñcī.

3. On the Nambudiri brahmins, or at least on their remarkable habits of Vedic recitation, see now the penetrating study of J. F. Staal, *Nambudiri Veda Recitation*, 1961. On the Rarhi Brahmins (Bengal) cf. *Imperial Gazetteer*, p. 319; on the "Vaidic" Brahmins of Tanjore, F. R. Hemingway, *Gaz. of Tanjore*, 1906, I, p. 67.

Paragraph 11

1. The best guide is J. N. Banerjee, *Hindu Iconography*, 2nd edn., passim.

2. According to *Bṛhatsaṁhitā* and commentaries cited by Banerjee, pp. 230, 567; on the Vedic attributes of Brahmaṇ, ibid., pp. 516, 572.

3. Ibid., p. 248 where the author refers to R. K. Poduval, *Report of the Archeological Department of Travancore*, 1107, M. E. On the gestures punctuating the recitation, see A. W. Weber's edition of *Pratijñāsū.*, p. 110.

Paragraph 12

1. On modern practices viewed under Vedic incidence, H. V. Glasenapp, *Hinduismus*, p. 187 (earlier, Monier Williams, *Hinduism*, passim); V. Raghavan in *Religion of the Hindus*, 1953, p. 275; Sivaprasad Bhattacharyya, ibid, p. 169; L. A. Ravi Sarma in *Cultural Heritage*, 2nd edn., IV, p. 446. We should here recall the "mantra evenings" (*mantra-jargars* or *jāgars*), organised by the rich—with the paid services of reciters or officiating priests.—In ancient times, re. private rites in Gujarat, see A. Barth, *Oeuvres*, I., p. 95 note; Raghunandana (XVth

century) talks of obsolete rites. See D. M. Bhattacharyya's edition of *Chāndogya Brāhmaṇa*, p. XXIII.

2. This is what A. Bourquin (Barth, I., p. 374) has failed to notice—this is otherwise a very useful book to consult. The *Brāhmaṇa-Sarvasva* of Halāyudha (a Bengali work, under Lakṣamaṇasena) is one of the best of these neo-Vedic manuals. The Br.—Sarvasva has been newly edited by D. M. Bhattacharyya, 1960 : ritualistic interpretations of Vedic mantras, ibid., p. XXVI.

3. On the non-qualification of the *Sūdras*, see Śaṃkara *ad* Brahmasūtras, I. 3. 34 and subsequently. It is known that the *Chāndogya upa.* presents a Śūdra as also a young man whose father was not known. On the *Śūdras* (and their actual participation in certain rites), see R. S. Sharma, *Śūdras in Ancient India*, p. 170 and passim.

4. On the role of women in the great ritual, see D. R. Bhandarkar, *B. C. Law Comm. Vol.*, p. 159 and Volume of the 12th session of the All India Or. Conference, p. 345. It is known that the *Bṛhadāraṇyaka Upa.* has a woman participate in a theological controversy.

5. On the participation of the *kṣatriyas* in the study of the Veda, see D. R. Patel, *Vāyu Purāṇa*, p. 145; P. V. Kane, *History of Dharmaśāstra*, II, p. 363; A. S. Altekar, *Education*, p. 163; W. Rüben, *Philosophen der Upanishaden*, s. u. *Konig*; earlier references in Renou, *Bibliographie védique*, 136, nos. 23-31. On the *Vaiśyas*, the literature is exiguous; apparently, they had a sacrifice in its own right, the Gosava.

6. On the possible Vedic rites to be noticed in Sanskritised Hinduism, see M. N. Srinivas, *Coorgs of South India*, p. 220, 225, 244, 246. It may be recalled that Manu forbade Brahmins from ministering in temples and to idols, and officiating at popular ceremonies.

7. Here is, if one wishes, degradation; it also, affirms Max Weber, *Hinduism*, p. 28, a chance for the *Mantras* to have been thus preserved from all attempts at purification.

8. The big problem : cf. the remarks of Sten Konow in his translation of the *Sāmavidhāna*, p. 32 and A. Barth, *Oeuvres*, III, p. 70. On the *Ṛgvidhāna*. now see the translation of J. Gonda, particularly p. 3. The case of Kauśika is well known as also that of the Adbhuta (omina et portenta). The *Ṛgvidhāna*, V, 2, 4 calls the Ṛgveda the "receptacle of the Āyurveda", having regard to the links betwen magic and medicine; here is proclaimed in an unexpected manner, the orthodoxy of medicine.

Paragraph 13

1. *Sanskrit and Culture*, p. 26—pamphlet was published in 1957 on a Vājapeya recently performed at Poona, in an exemplary manner. (Report of the Vājapeya performance Committee).

2. References in the manuals and notably P. V. Kane, *History, II*, p. 1238 and III, p. 70 (mention is made of numerous Aśvemedhas; ibid., III, p. 962, these rites form part of the *Kalivarjya* !); cf. also J. F. Fleet, *Corpus*, p. 28, 241, 248 (ubi alia) : K. A. Nilkanta, Sastri, *Age of the Nandas and Mauryas*, p. 287; K. K. Handiqui, *Yaśastilaka*, p. 377. According

to the *Nyāyakusumāñjali* II, 159 the great sacrifices "are interrupted (*samuchidyamāna*) no longer being performed at present."

3. *Ep. India*, XVI, p. 25 and XXII, p. 198.

4. *Ep. India*, XX, p. 79 and other references in D.C. Sircar, *Select Inscriptions*, p. 206. On two Aśvamedhas celebrated by Puṣyamitra (the first dated ones for a historic monarch), see latterly A.K. Narain, *Indo-Greeks*, p. 9, 83.

5. *Archeological Survey of Western India*, V, p. 60.

6. Nilkanta Sastri, *History of India*, I. p. 161.

7. A. S. Altekar in *Vākāṭaka-Gupta Age*, p. 368.

8. For the Aśvamedhas in Kerala, see K. Kunjunni Raja, *Contribution of Kerala to Sanskrit Literature*, p. 170; in Assam (by a Viṣṇuite), K. G. Goswami, IHQ, XXXI, p. 129; for an animal sacrifice of the Vedic for type in modern Assam, See B. K. Barua, *Cultural History of Assam*, p. 8; for various pieces of epigraphic evidence, see Barth, *Oeuvres*, I, p. 95, n.—A controversy has been going on whether the *Aśvamedhas* could be celebrated by feudal princes. Cf. on this subject (and on other details regarding the sacrifices) D. C. Sircar, *Successors of the Sātavāhanas*, p. 343; IHQ, XXI, p. 143; *Indian Culture*, I, p. 311, II, p. 789, referring back in part to A. K. Sur and D. R. Bhandarkar, *Indian Culture*, I, p. 114; J.C. Ghosh, ibid., II, p. 140 and III, No. 3 and N.K. Bhattasali, IHQ, XXI, p. 19 which concerns an Aśvamedha performed by a rajah of Amber in the 18th century. Cf. finally, P. K. Gode, *Journal of Indian History*, XV, p. 364, *Poona Orientalist*, II, p. 166, the same also in *Indian Literary History*, II, p. 288, 292, 307.—Reference to H. H. Wilson, translation of the *Ṛgveda*, II, p. XIII.

9. On the Rājasūyas, U. N. Ghoshal, IHQ, XIX, p. 255. On the *abhiṣeka* (above all according to the Epics), T. Goldstücker, *Dictionary*, s. u., p. 279; F. W. Thomas, ERE, I, p. 20.

10. The question of honorarium paid to officiating priests is treated, after the Śrautasūtras, in the Smṛtis and in the Purāṇas (Chapter on *dāna*), thus Rangaswami Aiyangar, *Introduction to Kṛtyakalpataru*, p. 52.

Paragraph 14

1. P.V. Kane, *History*, III, p. 48: this education comprised the study of the Veda, even in such a Hedonist novel as the *Daśakumāracarita* (Chap. 8)—the king Śūdraka (in spite of his name) knew both the Vedas, according to the beginning of the *Mṛcchakaṭika*.

2. S. K. De, *Sanskrit Literature*, p. 26, n.

3. Thus the architect, *Mānasāra*, 41, 2, whose knowledge was also based on the Veda (42, 79); even the assistants to the architect had to know the Vedic literature (2, 32 and onwards). Regarding music, cf. D.R. Patel, *Vāyu Purāṇa*, p. 96.

4. Tendentious, H. G. Narahari, *Bhārat. Vidyā*, 10, p. 49, on the Kauṭilīya and the Veda. Notes only the presence of a verse supposedly Vedic in the Kauṭilīya, 10. 3—The links between the Kauṭilīya and the Smṛti (including the Vedic Dharmasūtras) do not prove a direct continuity

between the Kauṭilīya and the Veda; cf. R.K. Mookerji *Chandragupta Maurya* 1943, p. 315.

5. The interpretation of the word *Saṁvaraṇa* is in dispute; a pretext which the *lokayātrika* uses ? "obscuration" for his intelligence (Kane) ? a method of "veiled" access to the truth ?

6. Madhva (H. V. Glasenapp, *Madhva's Philosophie*, p. 25) gives the name of Fifth Veda to the totality of the Epics, Purāṇas and Viṣṇuite Āgamas (prepared by Viṣṇu-Vyāsa for the inferior castes). Other references for the fifth Veda in V. Raghavan, *Śṛṅgāra-Prakāśa*, p. 614

7. *Kāvya-mīmāṃsā*, cited below, §15, note 13.

8. Ibid. (6. 12), it is a question of *nirukta*, a term employed by Bharata in a different sense to that normally used by him, but he defines it exactly as has done Yāska, K. M. Varma, *Seven Words in Bharata*, p. 69.

9. 12. 16

10. The connection between medicine and the Veda has been definitively established (after many earlier attempts) by J. Filliozat, *The Classical Doctrine of Indian Medicine*, English translation, notably on page 1 and 80. On an eventual link between Caraka and the Vedic school of the same name, ibid., p. 17. Cf. again S. N. Das Gupta, *History of Indian Philosophy*, II, p. 274.

11. On the Ezour-Vedam, latterly R. Schwab, *Renaissance orientale*, p. 166.

Paragraph 15

1. The *Smaratattvaprakāśikā* bases the theory of physical love on the Upaniṣads, according to R. Schmidt, WZKM, XVIII, p. 261; cf. A. B. Keith, JRAS, 1909, p. 755.

2. Wherein, however, is to be found only classical Brahmanism, with an expression (*cinmātra*) able to recall several post-Vedic Upaniṣads; J. Filliozat , *Silver Jubilee Volume*, Kyoto University, 1954, p. 116.

3. Which does not prevent him from depicting a Tantric rite in *Mālatīmādhava*. On the Vedic allusions and the archaic forms in Bhavabhūti, relatively numerous, see A. B. Keith, JRAS, 1914, p. 725; N. Stchoupak's French translation of the *Uttararāmacarita*, p. XXXII.

4. *Naiṣadhīya*, 16. 36, *mantra* of *ĀŚV. G. S.*, *aśmeva tvaṃ sthirā bhava* reproduces, with a simple variant in the order of the words, a *mantra* of an intra-Vedic type, *sthirā tvam aśmeva bhava.*—For the list of Vedic allusions in this Kāvya, see A. N. Jani, *Naiṣadhīyacaritam*, p. 160,215, 231, (notably the facts of recitation).

5. 4. 8, vulg., in an irregular *triṣṭubh*. For Vedic allusions in Kālidāsa, see B. S. Upadhyaya, *India in Kalidasa*, p. 274, 279, 297.

6. *Śisupālavadha*, 14. 79, it is a Purāṇic idea; ibid. 69, allusion to recitation, to which are added numerous mythological allusions, more or less badly localisable.

7. Translated by C. M. Ridding, p. 39, 56.

8. Edited by K. P. Parab, 1897. In the *Kathāsaritsāgara*, there are only insignificant references, except in the learned episode of Vararuci (at the beginning); cf. again in chap. 6, the history of the *chandoga*.

9. E. H. Johnston's English translation of *Buddhacaritam*, p. XLV, affected language with scholarly pretentions.

10. J. Wackernagel, Introduction to *Altindische Grammatik*, 2nd edn., p. 26 and relevant notes, in particular JA, 1939, p. 321, 1959, p. 49, 104. The *śleṣa* proceeding from the *Kāvya* as base, has amplified the use of "Vedic" meanings and sub-meanings, a usage which already fully opens the axiom of the Mīmāṃsā and of Grammar regarding the identity between the *Vaidika* and *laukika* vocabularies. Cf. note on §33, note 1, below.

11. BEFEO, 44, p. 211: how else does one understand, if not by postulating figurative and symbolic meanings, that in a single literary text the Nighaṇṭus manage to give thirty-seven names for "river" (excluding the proper names), fifty-seven for "speech" and not less than one hundred and one for "water" ?

12. Cf. Jacobi, ZDMG, LXII, p. 420, n. Several poets make allusions to the accent, notably Śrīharṣa, but this passes under the cover of Grammar, not Veda.

13. In chap. 2; in chap. 3 there is a quotation from the *Ṛgveda*, IV, 58, 3, a highly symbolic passage; in chap. 6, quotations from Ait. Br., Śat. Br. and Rk saṃhitā; in chap. 7 the mention of many types of (shall we say) "pre-classical" languages, of which one is of the Ṛṣīkas, which is rich in various Vedic forms, *naigamair vividhaiḥ śabdair nipātabahulaṃ ca yad*; this, according to *Viṣṇudharmottara*, III, 4, 3: is an (inconsequent) attempt to sketch out a scheme of historic linguistics.

14. Will Poetics as a "*Vedāṅga*" be designated by the word *keṭubha*, as a Pali formula (thus *Dīghanikāya*, III 1, 3, and passim) inserts between *nighaṇṭu* and Grammar ?—One of the initial *paddhatis* of the *Śūktiratnahāra* is dedicated to a eulogy of the Veda (*vedastuti*); other poetic anthologies have similar items.

Paragraph 16

1. Cf. the remarks on this subject of A. Barth, *Oeuvres*, II, p. 16.

2. It is not necessary to recall that tradition sees in the indivisible Veda, a so-to-speak global expression of *dharma*; the two Mīmāṃsās proclaim the unity of teaching of all the Vedic *śākhās*, their perfect equivalence in authority; it is the *sarva-śākhāpratyaya* to which Rāmānuja refers (*Śrībhāṣya*, p. 20). "The Veda is present in each branch, as the class is in each individual" (*Tantravārttika*, English translation, p. 909).

3. All the liturgy shows it; only the *prātaranuvāka* (Caland-Henry, *Agniṣṭoma*, p. 417) includes some long sequences, recited by the *hotar*. True, it happens, that personal or magical exigencies lead to using entire hymns, but does this really imply the reading of the entire content ? Does this not refer rather to the headings ?—One can never sufficiently notice the fact thata *pāda*, even an entire verse, taken out of its context, loses part of its

proper meaning and is ready to cede to all the sollicitations of the new text utilising the same; out of this separation from its natural environment comes the weakening in meaning of which the *mantra* has been victim.

4. The moderns have, from the beginning, recognised the distinction between *Śruti* and *Smṛti*, cf. notably Max Müller, *Ancient Sanskrit Literature*, passim; in India, the *Prasthānabheda* of Madhusūdana, etc; a quotation of the *Nyāyamālāvistara* in Muir, *Sanskrit Texts*, II 2nd Edition, p. 190, insists on the fact that the Smṛti is *pauruṣeya* which, from the Indian point of view, marks an abyss with the *apauruṣeyatva* of the *Śruti*.

5. On the Smṛti in Mīmāṃsā, cf. D. V. Garge, *Citations* in *Śabara Bhāṣya*, p. 242; G. Jha, *Pūrva Mīmāṃsā*, p. 239 and *Tantravārttika* already quoted above, § 6, n. 2. In fact, Śabarasvāmin refers quite often to the Kalpa, sometimes combining a passage from the *brāhmaṇa* and a passage from *sūtra*. But, in order to carry a direct and conditional demonstration, he only knows the *śruti*, the rest is *aśabda* "(something which) is not part of (authoritative) verbal evidence." The distinctiion between *śruti* and *smṛti* has repurcussions, upto the linguistic plane, where the *Śṛṅgāraprakāśa* (analysed by V. Raghavan, p. 14) distinguishes between a) the *śrauta* style, consisting of *mantra* and *brāhmaṇa*, (b) tbe *ārṣa*, composed of *smṛti* (properly speaking) and *purāṇa*; (c) the *laukika* divided into *kāvya* and *śāstra*. At the heart itself of the (orthodox) *smṛti*, the *Tantravārttika* (trans. p. 119) distinguishes between the texts which base themselves directly on the Veda and those (of lesser authority) which have their origin in current experience, serving "some visible worldly (*laukika*) end.

6. Cf. A. Barth, *Oeuvres*, II, p. 15, with regard to the *Prolegomena* (to the Ṛgveda) of H. Oldenberg, on the (sometimes excessive) sentiment of Vedic dignity, of "a tradition which is approached only with great reverence" (by H. Oldenberg himself as we understand.)

7. It is known that the *Ṛgveda* supposes a system of correlations and homologies between the divine and the ritual world (that, which we believe, is designated by the term *ṛta*); it is no less evident, even though less often noted, that the basis of the thought of the *Brāhmaṇas-Āraṇyakas-Upaniṣads* consists in bringing out some of these similarities (those which have a justification for the understanding of the described rite or myth). This is what the Brāhmaṇas call *nidāna* or *bandhutā*. (H. Oldenberg, *Weltanschauung der Br.-Texte*, p. 117; A. Minard, *Trois énigmes*, I, p. 51), or further, occasionally, *āyatana* "place (ideal)" pratiṣṭhā, "point of support (symbolic)" (J. Gonda, *Studia Indol. Intern.*, no. 1 on this word), *saṃpad* "(numerical) congruence" (Minard, op. cit., p. 73), *ādeśa* "(correlative) indication". The very word *upaniṣad* strictly speaking signifies "the relation between two semantic planes, orientated sometimes to *ādhyātmam*, sometimes to *adhidaivatam*" (S. Schayer, *Roczn. Orj.*, III, p. 57, modified L. R., *Kunhan Raja Comm. Vol.*, p. 55), in liaison with the verbal expression *upa-ās* which itself implies an equivalence, *ātmānam upāsīta=ātmety evopā.*, as Jayatīrtha finally recognised, cf. S. Siauve, *Voie vers la connaissance de Dieu*, p. 87. Also cf. *Pratīka* in the sense of "symbol" or vidyā in the sense

of knowledge", (consisting of understanding a correlation)". Already the *Ṛgveda*, hymn X, 130 relative to the creation of the Sacrifice had put among the essential elements of the sacrifice, beside *pramā* "norm" and *pratimā* "counter-norm, rejoinder", the *nidāna*, that is to say the "link expressed or felt between the act and the object which animates it." But, nothing of what O. Lacombe. (*l'Absolu selon le Vedānta* p. 83) calls the "chains of ontological agreements" any longer subsist in the "*smārta*" portion of the Veda; the Kalpa, in particular, is exclusively technical and strictly descriptive (leaving aside the pseudo-*sutras* of the *pravacana* type) while the Brāhmaṇas have nothing of the kind.

8. It will suffice to recall the work of M. Bloomfield, *Atharva Veda* (in Grundriss) p. 21 and passim.

9. H. Oldenberg, G. G. A., 1907, p. 290.

10. L. V. Schroeder (references in our *Ecoles védiques*, p. 15).

11. On the transfer from the ancient intoned psalm to the nuanced recital, see A. Minard, *Trois énigmes*, II, p. 3. The brāhmaṇa portions of the T. S. are discussed in the Prātiśākhyas on the same footing as the *mantra* portions.

12. S Varma, *Critical Studies on the Vāj. Prātiśākhya*, p. 29.

Paragraph 17

1. We cannot, here, return to the complex question of the schools; the principal ancient source—simple nomenclature hardly articulated—is the *Caraṇavyūha* whose commentary furnishes some curious details on the expansion in India (cf. G. Bühler, translation of *Āpastamba*, p. XXXIV). On the word *caraṇa* (as distinguished from śākhā), cf. the expression 'adhyetṛṇāṃ caraṇāni', *Vākyapadīya*, 1. 5 (vṛtti).

2. The first origin of the schools is in the *pravacana* according to Madhusūdana, *Ind. Studies*, I, p. 16; they are small fragments of *Svādhyāya* (*Svādhyāyaikadeśa*), (a phrase quoted in *Ecoles védiques*, p. 220). With justification, F. Knauer said, "Vedic schools, they are the recensions of the Veda."

3. E. Sieg, *Sagenstoffe des Ṛgveda*, p. 7, has taken all that was possible from ancient sources concerning these diverse tendencies.

L. Renou, 'La place du Ṛgveda dans le ritual', J. A, 1962, p. 161.

4. Often enough, in fact, inscriptions indicate that the donor is a *śākhādhyāyin* (or some analogous expression); the longest list is one given in an inscription at Vijayanagara (*Ep. Ind.*, III, p. 255), which gives the personal name, the patronym, the school (in two forms—belonging to the *saṃhitā* and belonging to the *sūtra*), the *gotra* (some documents add the *pravara*), finally, the number of the allotted parts. In a large number of cases, the Vedic mention is limited to an epithet such as *agnihotrin*, *śrotriya*, or even *dvi*—or *tri-vedin* which appear to be honorary. The gifts of land to Vedic Brahmins (numerous under the Colas and Pallavas) are called *bhaṭṭavṛtti*, C. Minakshi, *Pallavas*, p. 199; cf. analogous references in the inscriptions of Bengal, T. N. Chakravarti, *Aspects of Religious Life of Bengal*, p. 2 and passim; on the donors of Valabhī, vide

Mémorial Sylvain Lévi, p. 228, where is mentioned the curious expression *cāturvidyāsāmānya*. On the whole matter, see *Ecoles védiques*, passim and *S. Varma Comm. Vol.*, p. 214 (one could easily extend the enquiry and specify the times and places of diffusion), and now see V. Raghavan, *Present Position of Vedic Recitation and Vedic Śākhās*, kumbhakonam, 1962. It should not be affirmed that the schools had lost all contact with the literary texts subsequent to the Vedic epoch; we have already pointed out the fact that the ancient Purāṇas have portions of instruction conforming to such and such a Vedic recension, and that it is a question of borrowing from elsewhere or a tradition pursued (§. 9). Similarly, the classical Smṛti preserves certain links: such as the *Viṣṇusmṛti*, whose link with "Kāṭhaka" had already been noted by J. Jolly, *Recht u. Sitte*, p. 7; more recently the *Yājñavalkya Smṛti*, ib., p. 21, the *Hārīta Smṛti*, ib., p. 8 (which cites the mantra *śatadāyo vīraḥ* of MS.); the great problem, still undecided, is the "mānava" appartenance of the Manusmṛti (ib, p.18 and latterly P. V. Kane, *History*, I, p. 79, which wisely abstains from conclusion) and still more recently, S. C. Banerjee, *Dharma-Sūtras*, p. 39. The *Dharmasūtras* themselves date from the epoch when the "prātiśākhyam" validity tended to cast itself into the general validity: thus the Vāsiṣṭha, which we are assured, was studied only by the Ṛgvedins, whilst enjoying at the same time an indiscriminate authority (Jolly, op. cit., p. 6). The abandoning of the Veda coincides with the generalisation of dharma, *Ecoles védiques*, p. 13.

Paragraph 18

1. We cannot here enter into the big problem of variations, the material on which has been so diligently classified and discussed by the authors of *Vedic Variants* on the basis of the *Vedic Concordance*; for some general remarks, JA, 1933, 2, p. 77 (*Ecoles véd.*, p. 33). We mention here the palpable fact that the *mantras* are not secured against modification the moment they go out of the initial text, where everything appeared concerted to assure them an absolute fixity.

2. An important question on which approach-works are lacking; study on the Śatapatha Brāhmaṇa would be, in particular, necessary (the still unpublished thesis of H. Jayasuriya, Paris, 1951 is insufficient). The incipient researches by V. M. Apte "Ṛgvedic mantras in their ritual setting in the GS", *Bulletin of Deccan College*, I, p. 14, 127, as also "Non-Ṛgvedic mantras in the Āśval. Gṛhyasūtrās", *New Ind. Ant.*, III, p. 49, 144, 171, 211 (cf. also *Kunhan Raja Comm. Vol.*, p. 233, our review in JA, 1948, p. 132 and our *Ecoles védiques*, p. 7), leading to the posing of sacramental and symbolic adaptations, etc., leave a troubled impression. Recently N. Pillai, *Non-Ṛgvedic mantras*, 1958, has studied the *mantras* relating to marriage in the totality of non-Ṛgvedic GS., developing an article of the *Bulletin of the Deccan College*, IV, p. 340, 489 and of *Sanskrit College Magazine*, Trivandrum, III, p. 1. See also V.C. Bhattacharyya, *Our Heritage*, I, No. 2 ("*Mantras* of the Ṛgveda in the AB").

3. F. Edgerton, *F. W. Thomas Comm. Volume*, p. 78, insists on the authentic or secondary pairing.

4. The expression *rūpasampanna* figures also in the *Nirukta*, I, 15 (see below § 47); it is explict in AB, I, 4, 9 and elsewhere: *etad vai yajñasya samṛddham yad rūpasamṛddham, yat karma kriyamāṇam ṛg abhivadati* "is perfect in sacrifice that which is perfect in form, that is to say, the rite, in the course of accomplishment, towards which goes the strophic enunciation."

5. Really speaking, we can see, at least for the ŚB., the complexity of the notion of *pratīka*, by the works of M. A. Minard and notably *Trois énigmes*, II, p. 2 (also *Ecoles Védiques*, p. 26).

Paragraph 19

1. JA, 1949, p. 22, where the content of the principal known *brahmodyas* is summarised. None is of philological essence, that is to say, does not put into play a precise text.

Paragraph 20

On the applicability (weak) of quotations, cf. R. E. Hume, translation of the Upaniṣads, p. 299, basing itself on the AiU, IV, 5.

Paragraph 21

1. N. Tsuji, *Miyamoto Comm. Volume*, 1954, p. 3; L. R., *Journal of Ind. a. Buddhist Studies*, III, p. 782.

2. Tsuji, *Ui-Vol.*, 1951, p. 311; from the same author, see the linguistic notes on some other arachaic Upaniṣads in *Belvalkar-Vol.*, p. 19. The Maitri is half-way between the authentically Vedic and an imitation : grammatical notes of Tsuji, *Yamaguchi Comm. Vol.*, p. 92.

3. References in P. Deussen, *Sechzig Up.*, passim.

4. Ed. P. C. Divanji, JBoRAS, 1954, p. 96.

5. Cf. again the *Bahvṛca-Upaniṣad* (in reality of Tantric content), translated by A. Daniélou, *Adyar Bulletin*, XVIII, p. 301.

6. The global study of J. Charpentier, *Suparṇasage*, for whom the suparṇākhyāna would be contemporary with the Brāhmaṇas (p. 395), on the vocabulary (chiefly of the hymnic kind) of this poem. cf. ib., p. 198, where Charpentier refers to E. Grube; a careful linguistic examination still remains a desideratum. On the *Nītimañjarī*, a Ṛgvedic authology of sorts embedded in a modernising gloss, see references in our *Bibliographie védique*, p. 100 .

7. Edition of the *Nepal Sanskrit Series*, I, p. 154, 162, 164.

8. *Etudes védiques at pāṇinéennes*, I, p. 82; A. Minard., *Trois enigmes*, I, p. 132.

9. The Khilas already do not allow the presentation of fragments that can be, from a certain angle, considered as imitations.

Paragraph 22

1. On the *padapāṭhas*, (which are *anārṣa* according to the *Ṛkprāti-*

śākhya., I, 24, etc., that is to say, are considered as a "human" text, imitating the revealed text, the *saṃhitāpāṭha*), cf. the remarks of B. Liebich, *Sb. Heidelb. Ak.*, 1919, XV, p. 20. K. Chattopadhyaya, *Poona Orientalist*, I, no. 4, p. 49, rightly says that the *padapāṭhas* serve to assure the tenor, not to interpret the sense, but A. Weber, *Ind. Studien...A. V. Prāt.*, XIII, p. 1, upholds the contrary with equal justice, taking his stand from the point of view of the effect, not desired but acquired; cf. *APr.*, IV, 107, *padādhyayanam...arthajñānārtham*, "the study of the *pada* (*pāṭha*) is meant to make known the sense."

2. *Ṛk. Prāt.*, XII, 17 and subsequently, on the categories of words, is only borrowed from the Nirukta; the word *artha* figures ib., XIII, 1, XVII, 25 in the midst of generalities.

3. Note that many Śikṣās treat of questions other than those of pure phonetics, but it cannot be affirmed that semantic problems are taken up therein. The *Pratijñāpariś.*, XXI, alludes to the times of study and the times of interpretation (*arthavelā*) in order to state that the rules of pronunciation (proper to solemn recitation) no longer apply and that the text is to enunciate *prakṛtyā*, "according to its original form" (without psalms or elocutive refinements).

Paragraph 23

1. The word *naighaṇṭuka* is derived from *nighaṇṭu* wherein has been recognised, since long, an ancient *nigrantha*; *granth*—being "to tie (by a noeud)", the evolution of the meaning can respond to that of the word *guṇa* (*gauṇa*); as this latter, *naighaṇṭuka* signified "secondary, accessory", opposed to *pradhāna* or *mukhya*. In what sense can the words enumerated in the Nigh., I, 3, be designated as "secondary"? Quite simply because the generic values attributed to them ("earth", "water", "to shine") are, for the greater number among them, the result of a figured application, cf. BEFEO, cited above, §15, note 11.—On *Nighaṇṭu* see (since A. Weber, R. Roth, etc.) S. Varma, *All India Or. Conf. Vol.*, 1919, II, p. 69.

2. Sāyaṇa (quoted by M. Müller, *Ancient Sanskrit Literature*, 1926 (Reprint, p. 80) correctly says on the subject of the Nirukta : it is a work where one cites words without seeking to connect them together in a phrase, to state what should be understood (under the said words); in other words, the "Niruktian" point of view remains narrowly phonetic (the word *nirukta* itself signifies "formal analysis" rather than "interpretation", cf. Kāśikā on VI, 3, 109; *naikapadāni nirbrūyāt*, *Nirukta*, II, 3 and 4, which signifies "one must not explain words by cutting off isolated syllables, but rather by making a complete analysis of the word"; if the general sense of a *mantra* is given to us, it is, so to speak, in addition. The last two Books of the Nirukta orientate themselves more, it is true, towards the "commentary" genre; but there it is a question of *pariśiṣṭas* which cannot be put to the credit of ancient collection. The Grammar also, is primarily an analysis of the elements of the word (*vy-ā-karaṇa*); the syntax never played more than a minor role. This is a consequence of reflexion on the Veda.

3. Axiom modified in *arthaḥ padam*, *Vāj. Prāt.*, III, 2, "is called pada (that which possesses) a meaning." The *Bṛhad-devatā* enumerates different types of *mantras* according to their content, I, 48 and ff.

Paragraph 24

1. This is not the place to discuss the value of Sāyaṇa on the subject on which no durable agreement has been arrived at between Western and Eastern learning. The judgements on his work go back to the time of Max Müller, Whitney and their close successors, (the severest and moreover unfortunately based, is that of W. D. Whitney *in Roth Comm. Vol.* , p. 89, on the commentary of AV). The least that one can say is that Sāyaṇa canalised and shortened the intentions (virtualites) of a total Vedic teaching, of the *Vyākhyādharma* which could be foreseen in the exposition of Uvaṭa, at the beginning of his Mantra-bhāṣya.

2. Several fragments of pre-Sāyaṇian commentaries (on the Ṛgv.) have been discovered, provoking a small effervescence among Indian scholars like A. Venkata-subbiah, V. M. Apte, C. Kunhan Raja (cf. notably *J. Or. Res.*, X, p. 256), L. Ravi Verma, L. Sarup, Sambasiva Sastri (cf. my review in JA, 1936, I, p. 324, 1949, p. 181); for the last twenty years, the exploitation of this, as yet little-known field, has practically ceased. Does there really exist a distinct Sāyaṇa tradition? Such is the principal problem.—On the Vedic commentaries in Bengal, in part pre-sāyaṇian, see D. M. Bhattacharyya, *Our Heritage*, I (1953), No. 2, II (1954), nos 1 and 2; also same author, Intro. to his edition of Brāhmaṇa-sarvasva (cf. J. A. 1962, p. 467.)

3. At most, some information is available in the studies concerning the Sanskrit production of Bengal, as also in D. C. Bhattacharyya, IHQ, XXII, p. 127; Chintaharan Chakravarti, ABORI, XI, p. 235; S. K. De, *Mélanges Ross*, p. 79 ('Pāla Epoch'), *Thomas Comm. Vol.*, p. 50 (Sena Epoch), *History of Bengal*, I, etc. In his conscientious work, *Contribution of Kerala to Sanskrit Literature*, Kunjunni Raja raises hardly any Vedic detail for a province, so strongly conservative (at most a *Sūktaśloka*, a collection of statistics on the Ṛgv., p. 147).

4. Cf. (No. 4212) a commentary on the Ṛgveda interpreted as a eulogy of Viṣṇu; indices of strange names like Rāvaṇabhaiṭ, No. 4248; Calākṣara, (or Chal.) (index of *gānas*), nos. 4296-99, 4317-20; a Chalaprakriyā, No. 4325; several Yajurvedic tracts like Aniṅgya, No. 4460-64, Nyāyapañcāśat, 4459, Avarṇi 4465-72, Āvarṇi, 4473-77, Uccodarki 4478, Tapara, 4480-81, Napara 4482, Vilaṅghya 4491-96, Śamāna 4497-4508, etc. Cf. *The New Cat. Cat.*, under Atharva.

5. In this field, contemporary Vedology is less active than that of earlier times, when critical works were devoted to the texts, such as the *Upalekha*, or the *Jaṭāpaṭala*, and even an Indianist like G. Thibaut did not scorn to sit down to such work. Where is the time when all Indianists held it in their hearts to start their careers by editing some Vedic document, however, modest ?

Paragraph 25

1. Cf. the material already collected by A. Weber, *Ind. Studien*, X, p. 115 and often since (also K. Glaser, ZDMG, 66, p. 1), recently by P. V. Kane, *History*, II, p. 321; V. M. Apte, *Social Life in the Gṛhya-Sūtras*, p. 168; R. K. Mookerji, *Education*, p. 162. On the role of recitation under the Colas, K. A. Nilkanta Sastri, *The Colas*, II, p. 481; an easily accessible work on the modern *pāṭhaśālās* is lacking.

2. In the XIIth century there were in Kashmir cnly four *Vaidikas* amoung thirty pandits, G. Bühler, JBoRAS, XII (extra-number), p. 50.

3. "Study for itself" (the pronoun *sva* reflecting the middle voice of the present *adhīte*), a term which is opposed to *pravacana* "Vor-trag"; the interpretation of *sva* by *Svaśākhā* (Sāyaṇa, cited by A. Minard, *Trois énigmes*, II, p. 170) is not confirmed. That the *sva* consists of recitation (what is later called the *japa*, with the loss of the psalmodic element which makes for the extraordinary charm of Vedic recitation), is felt from the fact that the Upaniṣads inversely exalt apprenticeship under a *guru*: that above all else, they think of the teaching concerning the ritual and post-ritual values, whereas before them, one aspired to learning "by heart".

4. *Subhāṣitāvali*, 2301; similar, 2333.

5. The *kīstas*, RV, VI, 67, 10 ("soothsayer" H. W. Bailey *Transactions of the Philol. Soc.*, 1955, p. 64) who "carry their word here and there", "those (who) recite in the belief of (having to deal with) the *nivids* (that is to say on the non-psalmodic tone used for simple litanies)" are probably also "bad reciters".—Hemacandra says, passim, "*etac ca śrotriyamatam ity upekṣyate*": the *śrotiyas* do nct pass for great scholars and their opinion can, without damage, be neglected.

6. The *mantravid* of Ch. Up., VII, 1,3 (opposed to *ātmavid*) deals only with the "name", not the "meaning". Hence it comes about that the Mu. Up., I, 1, 5 represents the knowledge of the Veda as being an *aparā vidyā*, the knowledge of the *akṣara* (or supreme *brahmaṇ*) as being *parā*: the first evidence of the reflection on the two levels, which later was to take on many aspects. Note that the term *akṣara* at first signified "phoneme" or "syllable" and aimed at an element of elocution (*uccāraṇa*), before being promoted to the rank of *brahmaṇ* (through the phoneme par excellence *Oṃ*), cf. P. M. Modi, *Akṣara*, p. 11 and passim. But did not the *brahmaṇ* itself, the incomparable expression of the Absolute, at first, modestly designate the formula ?

7. The decisive text of the *svādhyāyapraśaṃsā* is ŚB., XI, 5, 7, cf.again TĀ. II, 13, ĀŚvGS, III, 2, onwards, and amongst the moderns, A. Weber, *Ind. Studien*, X, p. 112; S. K. Das, *Educational System* p. 433. Cf. also W. D. Whitney, JAOS, IX, p. 420 for references concerning the praise of the teachers of the Veda.

8. The Mīmāṃsist Vāsudeva (XVIII century) says that the *Svādhyāyavidhi* deals with the tenor, not the meaning, for of what use would it be to a Brahmin to know, for example, the Rājasūya, an act which could only be accomplished by a *kṣatriya* ? This is according to V. A. Ramaswami

Sastri, editor of *Tattvabindu*, p. 142, who in any case points out that this advice contradicts that of the *bhaṭṭas* (ib., p. 49), for whom the study of the Veda aims at *arthajñāna*. There were, thus two contrary currents within the *Mīmāṃsā*: the Veda is to be studied *granthato' rthataś ca*, as teaches Uvaṭa on Vāj. Prāt., VIII, 29. But the *Śṛṅgāraprakāśa* analysed by V. Raghavan, p. 106, 111 and 693 distinguishes the Veda as *śabdapradhāna*, together with the Purāṇa, which would be "*arthapradhāna*", *the kāvya*, for its part, being *vyāpārapradhāna*, "consisting essentially of implications". On modern recitation, M. Haug, *Wed. Accent*, p. 14; W. W. Hunter, *Statistical Account of Bengal*, II, p. 109; H. Lüders, ZDMG, n. F. VIII, p. 4; *Sanskrit et culture*, p. 34; above all, the newly published work of J. F. Staal, referred to above, §. 24, note 3; also J. E. B. Gray, BSOAS, XXII, p. 86 (ubi alia). For the extreme importance of accentuation (cf. the well-known anecdote of *indraśatru* in the *Mahābhāṣya*, recounted again in Śabara on IX, 4, 21); cf. N. Sivarama Sastry, *Bulletin of Phonetic Studies*, Mysore, I, p. 23.

9. Op. cit., p. 356.— The greater part of the details given on the *svādhyāya* have dealt with recitation, hence the difference made between the exercise *vācika* (in a loud voice, and *mānasa* (in a low voice, "to pass over again"), the description of the *anadhyāya* whence it comes that the *svādhyāya* would tolerate no outward constraint; Manu II, 105, specifies that the *anadhyāyavidhi* does not apply to the auxiliary disciplines, that is to say, to the Vedāṅga which just for this reason, is not learnt by heart. Reciters are mentioned in epigraphy; under Vijayanagara, they were accorded gifts called *Khaṇḍikadharma*, B. A. Saletore, *Vij. Empire*, II, p. 339, n.; they are mentioned along with the *mahājanas*, chiefs of the *maṭhas* and *sthānas*, stewards of the temples and *pujāris*, ibid., p. 364.—AĀ, 3 is the first text to deal esoterically with phonic facts, mentioning three principal modes of *pāṭha*; *kimarthā adhyeṣyāmahe* asks the author (III, 2, 6, cf. A. B. Keith, ed. and transl., p. 257, note), '"with what intention are we going to recite the Veda ?" in terms of this development, as if he was taken up with a sudden "what's the use" ?

Paragraph 26

1. Passage cited in Kane, p. 356. According to MBh, XII, 237, 18 (vulg.), the *pravaktṛs* are superior to the other connoisseurs of the Veda: apparently these are the people who do not confine themselves to literal knowledge.

2. I, 18. But these verses, besides being interpolated, figure in the only text of the Vedic epoch which directly poses questions of semantics. They are only an advertisement in favour of the motives inspiring Yāska. These verses have been taken up by Patañjali (beginning of the Paspaśā).

3. II, 34. Cf. also *Auśanasa*, 81 and following, "do not limit yourself to reciting the Veda, but discuss the Vedanta". (here *vedānta* is practically the equivalent of *vedārtha*).

4. III, 156.

5. *Vaikh. Smārtas.*, VIII, 3.

6. Mān. GS., I, 2, 8 and cf. Kāṭh. GS., III, 1; Vār. GS, IX, 7.

7. An expression like *praviśyārthatattvam*, *carakasaṃhitā*, III, 8, 7 is extremely vague, not implying that it refers to the *mantras*. —Among the gurus figure those who study the Veda and teach its meaning, as we are told by the *Bṛhannārad. Pur.*, cited by C. R. Hazra, *Upapurāṇas*, p. 323.— The Tantric *mantras* are the object of similar recommendations: *mantre... akṣarabuddhitām* (*kurvāṇo*) *narakaṃ vrajet* "he who holds the *mantra* as (simply) letters will go to hell: *Tārābhakti-Sudhārṇava*, p. 116.

8. The method of the *pāṭhaka* is enumerative, in contrast to that of the *arthajña* who makes an appeal to reason. Thus the Prātiśākhyas, as compared to the treatises on grammar, are based on the lists of forms, on mnemotechnical developments. P. Thieme, *Indian Culture*, IV, p. 203, in a brilliant manner, finds the soul of a grammarian in Kātyāyana, very keen on concinnity when he comments on Pāṇini, but the soul of a *pāṭhaka* when he expounds on the *subrahmaṇyā* (on Pāṇ., I, 2. 37 and onwards), according to the procedures which he employs while compiling his Prātiśākhya.

9. Ancient controversy on the writing of the Veda between Max Müller (*Indien*, German translation, p. 181, amongst other references) and W. D. Whitney (*Oriental Studies*, I, p. 81 and elsewhere); also M. Haug, *Wed. Accent*, who (p. 16) admits editing only from 500 B. C. onwards. Indian scholars in general, stand for the absence of writing, such as R. C. Mookerji, *Education*, p. 211; Kane, II, p. 347. A Barth, *Oeuvres*, II, p. 15, admits of writing as an auxiliary. Restated in *Ecoles védiques*, p. 33, 222. It seems to us that the division between *Śruti* and *Smṛti* also marks the frontier between orality and editing. The entire prodigious system of the *pāṭhas*, the treatises accumulated around the Saṃhitās,—all this implies composition and oral transmission. In any case the *Vedic Variants*, II, p. 400 point out the "graphic variants" within the *mantras* in general, of the recent type.

10. The *Pāṇ. Śikṣā*, 32 (=*Yājñ. Śi.*, 198) mocks at the reciters who use a written text, the *likhitapāṭhakas* (at the same time as the *anarthajñas*); the *Nār. Śi.*, II, 8, 19 equally protests against one who reads. The *Mbh.*, XIII, 23, 72, vulg. juxtaposes the *vedānāṃ lekhakāḥ* with the corruptors (*dūṣakāḥ*) and the sellers of the Veda (*vedavikrayin*). Mookerji, op. cit., p. 27, cites a passage from Mīmāṃsā indicating that knowledge drawn from the Veda is without fruit if the Veda has not been understood or rather if it has been learnt in writing.

11. *Indo-ir. Journal*, I, p. 1.

Paragraph 27

1. Cf. see above, § 1, n. 11.

2. P. 2 and 10 of the Cowell-Gough translation. The *vaidikas* (or *vaidikammanyas*, says the text) are compared to the *dhūrtabakas*.

3. These are the same reproaches as made by Nyāya, see below §. 32.

4. With the famous evocation of the words *jarbharī turpharītu* (*RV*, X, 106, 6) which goes back to Nir., (XIII, 5), cf. below §. 49. On the anti-Vedic theses of the Cārvākas, cf. S. N. Das Gupta, *History*, III, p.

518, 549; the refutation, by Udayana, is summarised, J. N. Sinha, *History of Indian Philosophy*, I, p. 275.

On the Cārvākas, cf. recently D. P. Chattopadhyaya, *Lokāyata*, 1959, specially p. 70.

Paragraph 28

1. H. v. Glasenapp, *Jainismus*, p. 269, 472. The Vedas are the *mithyā-śrutas*, N. Tatia, *Studies in Jaina Philosophy*, p. 50 and cf. *Abhidhāna-rājendra*, VI, p. 279, under *micchāsuya*.

2. 25, 30; ibid, 25, 16 on the Agnihotra; 12, 15 on the abuses of recitation ("You carry the weight of the words without understanding their meaning, when you learn the Veda"). Other reminiscences in the same work, B. C. Law, *Jaina Canonical Sūtras*, p. 138.

3. K. K. Handiqui, *Yaśastilaka*, p. 377, which gives other references, cf. notably the *Padmacarita* of Raviṣeṇa, which also quotes (XI, 87-89), incorrectly, a *mantra* of the *Vāj. Saṃh.*

4. *Yaśast.*, VII, 30, quoted Handiqui, p. 387.

5. *Yogaśāstra*, II, 38, quoted Handiqui, p. 386.

6. Handiqui, p. 316. Cf. also the *Nyāya-viniścaya*, Chap. 3; the *Sarvadarśanasaṃgraha*, translation, p. 41.—Canonical sources, H. Nakamura, *Journal of the Oriental Institute, Baroda*, VIII, p. 148.

7. It naturally follows that the Jaina texts restrict themselves to quoting the Veda as a normal subject of studies, J. C. Jain, *Life in Ancient India*, p. 171; or that Vedic influences assert themselves in this literature, as well as on a Jaina-Purāṇa (*Triṣaṣṭilakṣaṇa*), H. v. Glasenapp, *Jacobi Comm. Vol.*, p. 399 (on the creation of the class of Brahmins).

Paragraph 29

1. Cf. S. Sarat Chandra Das, *J. Buddh. Texts*, VI, 1902, No. 3 T. W. Rhys Davids, *Dialogues of the Buddha*, II, p. 166 (introduction to Kūṭadanta).—On the so-called Vedic studies practised at Takṣaśilā, cf. R. N. Mehta, *pre-Buddhistic India*, p. 303, where one sees without surprise that technical manuals are more appreciated than the Veda.—A banal mention of the Veda in the *Jātakas* (No 497, in *gāthā*).

2. A. Weber, *Ind. Streifen*, I, p. 186.

3. Transl. by La Vallée Poussin, IV, p. 148.

4. Edited by S. K. Mukhopadhyaya, p. 27 (line 13) 35, 38, 39.

5. Ibid., (in Chinese translation), p. 37.

6. P. 46, line 1 (mention of a sāvitrī for the Śūdras !); the gāyatrī quoted p. 204, line 7.—In the *Milinda Pañho*, (I., p. 14) it is recalled that the child Nāgasena had learnt the Vedas, listening to them only once.—The remoteness of the Vedic question in the *Amitāyurdhyānasūtra*, transl. by J. Takakusu, p. 163 ("as mentioned in the *sūtra* of the discourse of the Veda.").

7. For discussion concerning the Upaniṣads and the thesis of the *ātman* in the work of Nāgārjuna and that of the first Yogācāras, etc., see H. Nakamura, *Harvard Journal*, XVIII, p. 74 (English translation of a chapter of the Japanese work, *Philosophy of the Primitive Vedānta*, 1950, p. 178).

8. These and many other points are treated in an enormous development which covers the greater part of the last three chapters. On many of these points, see H. Chatterjee, IHQ, XXXII, p. 338.—Note further (*Sū.* 2787) that the Veda is accused of containing displeasing things, allusions to the sexual act, murder of animals, untrue facts, words difficult to pronounce or understand, etc.

An interesting point is the influence that recitation and Brahmanic orthoepy have been able to exert on an archaic Buddhist text, such as the Skandhaka: a point brought out by E. Frauwallner, *Earliest Vinaya*, p. 62, drawing support from S. Lévi, JA, 1915, I, p. 401 where are evoked the passages showing a monk who recites "with intonation" and with what we would call a regional accent (*svaragupti* or *guptikā*, cf. F. Edgerton, *Dictionary*, see these words), p. 404. To this can be added the oft-discussed passage of *Cullavagga*, (see lastly E. Lamotte, *Histoire du bouddhisme*, p. 611), according to which the Buddha dissuades his disciples from "raising (the usual speech) in *chandas*", in other words of utilising Vedic intonnation. (H. Smith, *Saddanīti*, p. 1131, "keeping the Pali texts to orthoepical rules, for recitation."); S. Lévi, op. cit., p. 445, hesitates between "correction of the purists" and "Vedic intonation"; to this last meaning rallies Lamotte, with reason. But does it not result therefrom that one should render *svā niruktti* (*nirukti*) which follows by "one's own intonation" (that is to say, to each one's "natural intonation") ? Further, one does not admit the cantilene tone (affected by the Brahmins), *āyatako gītassaro*, Smith, ibid., p. 1108.

Paragraph 30

1. W. Caland, *Ontedekkingsgesch. van d. Veda*, p. 263; —*Pauly-Wissowa*, see under India (p. 1307, 1310).

2. The decisive study of J. Filliozat, *Rev. Hist. Rel.*, 1945, p. 59 taken up again in *Relations extérieures de l'Inde* (1), 1956, p. 31; the Upaniṣad the most concerned is the Maitri.

3. References, op. cit., and notably O. Lacombe, *Annuaire de l' Ecole des Hautes Etudes*, Sc. religieuses, 1950-51, p. 3; earlier, E. Bréhier, *Philosophie de Plotin*, p. 107; A. B. Keith, *Indian Culture*, II, p. 125 (the latter, against all influence). On Denys, the Areopagite and others, Filliozat, ibid., p. 27, 58. E. Benz, *Ind. Einflüsse auf d. frühchrist. Theologie* (generatities).

4. The Greek evidence (Philostrates) on the Aśvamedha, discussed by R. Goossens, JA, 1930, p. 280; O. Stein, *Archiv Or.*, VIII, p. 357 (denying any contact with India) and cf. K. A. Nilakanta Sastri, *J. Or. Res.*, Madras, VIII, p. 89, *ubi alia*.

5. Edited J. Takakusu, p. 182; cf. among others M. Müller, *Indien*, German translation, p. 185.

6. Edition of *Travels in India* by Th. Watters, I, p. 159, 160 (French-transl. by Saint-Julien, *Vie*, p. 99, 151; *Mémoires*, I, p. 71, 74). The confusion between the Ṛgveda and Āyurveda recalls what has been written in the footnote, § 12, note 8 above.

7. Translation by E. C. Sachau, I, p. 125, 126; II, p. 139; cf. J. C. Tavadia in *Al-Biruni Comm. Volume*, p. 287, A. Jeffrey, Ibid, p. 146.

8. Ibid (I, p. 126) it is said in conformity with the Purāṇas, that the Veda and all the old rites had been forgotten during the *dvāparayuga* and brought to light again by Vyāsa.—Cf. *Ain-i-Akbari*, edited by H. Blochmann, II, p. 55 and *Dabistan* edited by D. Shea and A. Troyer, II, p. 64.

9. Cf. Y. Husain, *Inde mystique*, p. 182, 194; Ch. Huart and L. Massignon ("Entretiens de Lahore") JA, 1926, 2, p. 285; M. Horten, *Ind. Strömungen in d. Islam. Mystik.*

10. Bikrama Jit Hasrat, *Dara-Skikuh, Life and Works*, p. 190, 194, 203, 270; cf. also P. K. Gode, *Indian Literary History*, II, p. 445; L. Massignon, *Rev. Monde Musulman*, 63, p. 5; Mahesh Prasad, *Modi Comm. Vol*,—p. 622.

11. L. Finot, BEFEO, XXV, p. 42.

12. G. Coedés, *Etats hindouisés*, 1964, p. 400. For Vedic survivals in the phraseology of the inscriptions in Cambodia, see by the same author, *Inscriptions*, I, p. 261.

13. S. Lévi, *Sanskrit Texts from Bali*. First data in R. Friderich, JRAS, 1876, p. 168; cf. A. Weber, *Indische Studien*, II, p. 130. Lastly, J. Gonda, in *Sanskrit in Indonesia*, evokes on p. 109 a "*Buddhastuti* Yajur-veda" (sic), which nowhere has anything Vedic and on p. 110 a *Buddhaveda*; ibid, the author studies the word *weda* in Balinese. In fact, the (pre-Upaniṣadic) Veda was known in Bali only by the *gāyatrī* and the *Yajñopavītam* formula. Souvenir of accentuated texts, ibid., p. 105.

On a so-called Veda Buddha, cf. lastly C. Hooykaas, *Āgama Tīrtha*, 1964, p. 29; on Buddha Veda, ibid., p. 39.

14. There is to be found an altered form of the Vedic homa in certain religious practices, of distantly Indian origin, in the Far East, such as in the Japanese sect of Shingon, R. Tajima, *Mahāvairocana*, p. 137; for the (pre-*Śaivasiddhānta*) Śaivism in Indonesia, see A. Zieseniss, *Śaiva-Systematik*, p. 136.

Paragraph 31

1. For Mīmāṃsā, the Veda is eternal and of non-human origin (no longer does it emanate from a superhuman being, be it a neutral *brahmaṇ* or a masculine (Īśvara). This we may say, is the orthodox position. For details, see manuals; a good summary in H. Oertel, *Apologetik*, p. 72, according to many passages of the commentary of Sāyaṇa on the Ṛgveda.

2. J. N. Sinha, *History of Indian Philosophy*, p. 227. Vijñānabhikṣu (cited by S. N. Das Gupta, *History*, III, p. 47), affirms that all the *darśanas* (including *Pañcarātra*, cf. above § 3) are founded on the Veda.

3. R. Garbe, *Sāṃkhya*, p. 98 and passim; Sinha, op. cit., II, p. 67. The *Sāṃkhya-pravacana*, I, 154, further poses that the *Sāṃkhya* thesis on the plurality of the *puruṣas* is not contradictory to the Vedic texts which enunciate the non-duality of the *puruṣa*, as it comes out of the Veda, for these texts refer to the genus (*jāti-paratvāt*).

4. With regard to "Vedic" rites, Das Gupta, I, p. 265, summarizes

the Sāṃkhya-Yoga position: these rites give happiness, but they are powerless to eradicate the roots of suffering, all the more as they incorporate the animal sacrifice.—It should be noted that the practice of the Yoga preserves no element that could be linked to a Vedic origin, even if (which is quite another matter) one could have spoken of a pre-Yoga in the Veda, along with J. W. Hauer and others.

Paragraph 32

1. VI, 1, 1 where the commentary understands by *buddhi*, "the knowledge the subject possesses, speaking of the meaning of the propositions in question," Ibid. (VI, 2, 2) the *mantras* are cited among the things having an 'invisible" aim, a thesis discussed in the Mīmāṃsā but furthermore not admitted, and one of the points which enabled Das Gupta, I, p. 282, to claim (a little abusively) that the Vaiśeṣika is an ancient school of the Mīmāṃsā, which later, under the influence of the Nyāya, entered into conflict with it, precisely on the question of the thesis on the Veda. See, below § 48, n. 1.

2. According to Das Gupta, I, p. 332 n., the Vaiśeṣika, like the other Brahmanic systems, tacitly admitted the *śabda*.

3. I, 1, 3: cf. Das Gupta, I, p. 282, n.

4. Not uniquely; by the side of this Vedic evidence, the *śabda* embodies all evidence worthy of being received with confidence, that it comes from the *ṛṣis*, the *āryas* or even the *mlecchas* (Vātsyāyana). The Nyāya introduces an appreciation diametrically opposed to Mimāṃsistor thodoxy.

5. *Āpta*—a key-word (already met in relation to Sāṃkhya, with a different resonance) difficult to render because polyvalent, like many Sanskrit terms. It is taken up again by Caraka (*sūtrasthāna*, XI 27), the "Veda draws its authority from the *āptas*", *tatrāpatāgamas tāvad vedaḥ*. In the background, is considered as *prāmāṇika*, every writing not adverse to the Veda which has been approved by the clerics. Cf. again *Sarvadarśanasaṃgraha*, translation, p. 102; H. Jacobi, *Gottesidee*, p. 47.

6. Cf. notably the *Nyāyakusumāñjali*, II, 1 and V, 1.

7. Cf. notably the *Nyāyamañjari*, Chap. 1, and its exposition of Vedic authority (summarized by H. G. Narahari, *Bulletin Deccan College*, XVIII, p. 30). In general, Jacobi, op. cit., Das Gupta, op. cit., I, p. 403; Sinha, op. cit., I, p. 682 (on the existence of God as demonstrated by the Veda and as demonstrating the Veda) and 693 (a rejection of the anti-thesis doctrines). —It is curious that the *Nyāya sūtras*, II, 1, 62 omit the *mantras* among the constitutive parts of the Veda along with the *vidhi*, *arthavāda and anuvādas* (or is *anuvāda* another term for "*mantra*", the "*mantra*" being considered as a "repetition" of the injunction announced in the *brāhmaṇas* ?); it is true that they cite the *mantras* a little further on, in a less favourable context, in a magico-medical assignment.—The whole of the brahmanic Nyāya is not pro-Vedic, in the apologia contained at the beginning of the Commentary of Sāyaṇa on the Ṛgveda (H. Oertal, *Apologetik*, p. 3), the *pūrva-pakṣa* puts forward the proposition of the non-existence of the Veda, and thinks to have demonstrated it with three arguments of the logician; refutation, p. 14, in the name of the *lokaprasiddhi* or "sensus communis".

Paragraph 33

1. In fact this desired coincidence between *vaidika* and *laukika* has a double significance: a) metaphysical—there is only one sole origin for words, in the same way as the Puruṣa created the totality of traditions—modern and Vedic, *laukika—vaidikasampradāya pravarttakāḥ*, *Sarvadarśanasaṃgraha*, translation, p. 232. This is the implicit thesis which the two Mīmāṃsās uphold. Cf. also the sūtra *loke vyutpannasya vedārthapratītiḥ*, *Sāṃkhya-pravacana*, V, 40, on the subject of why the *bhāṣya* cites the *nyāya* "*ya eva laukikās ta eva vaidikāḥ*"; (b) realistic (from the Indian point of view): Vedic words can, in a general description (*sarvatra*) be treated as that of Pāṇini, even though some vulgarisms (which are proper to the *bhāṣā*), or some archaisms (proper to the *chandas*), have to be dealt with separately and subsidiarily. Why, demands Kaiyaṭa, does Patañjali say "*vaidika*" since in any case, what is *vaidika* is included in *laukika* ? It is, he replies, in order to demarcate the primary of the *vaidika* (*pūjārtham*, a notion dear to the grammarians), as when one says "the Brahmins have come as well as Vasiṣṭha". Nāgeśa adds: if Patañjali says "*vaidika*" it is because in the Veda the vicious forms are avoided with care, although in *bhāṣā*, they are only avoided for the sacrifice.—On the *bhāṣā*, refer J. Wackernagel, *Introduction* to *Altindische Grammatik*, 2nd, edn., n. 317.

2. Passage reproduced in summary,in *Sarvadarśanasaṃgraha*, translation, p. 208 and at length in *Tantravārttika*, I, 3, *adhik.* 9 (Translation of G. Jha, p. 276 and *Pūrva-Mīmāṃsā*, I, p. 248), where the *pūrvapakṣin* separates these *prayojanas* in arguing that grammar is, a priori, *niṣprayojana*.

3. *Śabdakaustubha*, p. 11 notes that "*āgama*" has been placed in the middle of the list of *prayojanas*, not at the head or end, as one would have expected. Kaiyaṭa specifies (following Patañjali himself) that "*āgama*" is not a motivation but a motivating factor (*pravartaka*), id. *Śabdakaustubha* and *Tantravārttika*, translation, p. 280.

4. *Ānuṣaṅgika*, Kaiyaṭa.

5. These cases are equally of the *pravartakas*, *Śabdakaustubha* p. 14. It should be noted that their object is pronunciation, in no wise semantic. On the theme of "the revelation of the speech", cf. Ṛgveda, X, 71 (JA, 1941-42, p. 160).

6. On Pat. and the Veda, JA, 1953, p. 427, the rarity of Vedic details in Kātyāyana, P. Thieme, *Indian Culture*, IV, p. 203.

7. It will suffice to recall here the so frequent corruption of Vedic examples in the Kāśikā, examples moreover, ignored by Nyāsa and Padamañjarī.—A useful detail is preserved in *Siddhānta Kaumudī*, VII, 4, 38.

8. On the non-Pāṇineans, JA, 1956, p. 377.—It is strange that the *Sarvadarśanasaṃgraha*, English translation, p. 205, opposes the arbitrary "*laukika*" (*yatheṣṭam*) to the specific "*vaidika*" (*viśeoṣkti*), but the former makes allusion to Vedic immutability, taght by the Mīmāṃsā.

Paragraph 34

1. Earlier references in J. Wackernagel, *Introduction*, 2nd Edn., p. 37 and related notes.

2. *Pānini and the Veda*—in which only a selection of examples are studied. The maintenance of old positions to be found in A. B. Keith, *Indian Culture*, II, p. 735. Cf. also my review (of Thieme), JA, 1936, I, p. 333 as well as *Etudes védiques et pāṇinéennes*, I, p. 114.

3. On the place of the "*chandasi*" sūtras, their confinement in corners of the grammar, where they are least expected, seee IA, 1953, p. 423; for mention of the "*chandasi*" itself, *Etudes védiques* I, p. 106, 115.—This minor position of the Vedic *sūtras* recalls the distinction that Mīmāṃsā makes between *vidhi/arthavāda*, even that between *brāhmaṇa/mantra*, That the *nipātana* is essential to Vedic forms, is affirmed not only by Pāṇini, but by the *aikapadikas* of the Nighaṇṭus, by the mode of presentation of the Uṇādisūtras, the Phiṭsūtras, and even the Prātiśākhyas.

4. The gramatical *paribhāṣās*, his abridged Mīmāṃsā, has nothing to do with Vedic teaching, except that the *paribhāṣā* (insignificant) 35 ("all the rules are optional in the *chandas*"), being a mere putting-off, generalises the technique of the *bahulam*. No one *jñāpana* is deduced from a Vedic rule, no saṃjñāsūtra is concerned with it. These *vidhis* are complementary *vidhis*, having the allure of *apavargas*.

5. D. S. Ruegg, *Philosophie linguistique*, p. 15.

6. This formal value is equivalent in practice to the *svārtha* of the Grammarians (my *Terminologie grammaticale*, s. u.), that is to say, a neuter value which only comes to grips with reality in contact with ritual conecctions.

7. From which is follows that here also, although from a different angle, the word of the *mantra* loses its own value and becomes *svarūpa/svārtha*. Mr. Ruegg is undoubtedly right in seeing in this consequence a reflection of the Kautsa controversy, followed as we shall see, up to Mīmāṃsā.

Paragraph 35

1. The juncture is marked by *atra laukikam*, IV, 8, right in the middle of an *adhyāya*. Cf. A. Weber, *Metrik*, p. 189, which maintains this reading (one rather expects *atha laukikam*).

2. Nevertheless there is still a small "Vedic" portion, closely dependent on Piṅgala, in the *Jayadevacchandas*, H. D. Velankar, *Jayadāman*, p. 34. Poetics sometimes still evokes the *akṣaracchandas* of ancient times, opposed to the *mātrāchandas* and to the *gaṇa-chandas*. There is still a small Vedic treatise in Agni Pur., cf. S. D. Gyani *Agni-Purāṇa*, p. 117.

3. On some non-Vedic words in the Nighaṇṭus, cf. BEFEO, XXXIV, p. 216.—We would point out here that quite numerous Vedic forms, figure in the Uṇādisūtras, JA, 1956, p. 161; some of them , notably in the series—curiously conservative—of the particles, are attested to in the *Gaṇaratna-mahodadhi*, JA, 1956, p. 387.

4. Between the Nighaṇṭus and the encyclopedias of the XIXth century (which besides are weak in Vedica, whether we refer to the *Śabdakalpadruma* or the *Vācaspatya* which hardly go beyond what was given by the old kośas), one has only to cite the insignificant Vaidika kośa of Bhāskararāya,

a work of the XVIIIth century. It is hardly necessary to say that there can be no solid knowledge without a dictionary, and the decadence of Vedic things has been greatly facilitated by this lexicographic abandon.

5. Cf. Above, §. 15. On the relations between the Sāmaveda and later music, we may refer to M. Raja Rao (works quoted in Dandekar's *Vedic Bibliogr.*, II p. 175), and specially to V. Raghavan, *J. Music Academy*, Madras, 1962, p. 127. For earlier references, cf. our *Bibliogr. véd.*, p. 219.

Paragraph 36

1. The privileged role that the *Chāndogya Upaniṣad* holds in Vedanta has long been pointed out; cf. E. Windisch, *Uber d. Nyāyabhāṣya*, p. 6; G. Thibaut's translation of Śaṃkara, I, p. XLII; it is the pendant of the role that the *Taittirīya* plays in the ritualising Mīmāṃsā. But is not the *Chāndogya Upaniṣad,* which furnishes the *mahāvākya* par excellence, the perfect equation *tat tvam asi* ?

2. As to the citations of Bādarāyaṇa himself, the exceptionally closed style of the *sūtras* hardly allows the insertion (as do sometimes the Mīmāṃsā *sūtras*, more discursive) of real citations. Bādarāyaṇa limits himself to installing key-words (*liṅga*), the commentary having the aim of localising them, of animating them. They are the words introduced (without "*iti*") in the syntactical structure of the *sūtras*, like *ākāśa*, I, 1, 22; *prāṇa*, 23, *jyotiṣ* 24; often they make one think of a particular passage in the Upaniṣads, without its being literally mentioned there, like *caraṇa* ibid., 24, *abhidhyāna* 2, 3, 13; or sometimes it is a question of terms of reference, non-individualised, like *uttarebhyaḥ* I, 3, 14, *śabdābhyām* 15, *śabdāt* II, 3, 4, *śabdāntarebhyaḥ*, II, 3, 12, still more vague *asti tu* II, 3, 2; to be noted is the manner of inscribing a verbal form, *īkṣati* (*karman*) I, 3, 13, like in the Nirukta. Cf. also the isolated expression, *māntravarṇikam eva ca gīyate*, I, 1, 15 "(the-*brahmaṇ*) under reference in the *mantra* is the one that is qualitatively enunciated (in the Upaniṣads as being *ānandamaya*)" ; II, 3, 43 indirectly replies to RV, X, 90, 3 (stanza taken up by the *Chāndogya Upaniṣad.*) This is an unexpected procedure, conceivable only in a tight system, greedy of its means, where words, duly selected, sufficed to evoke an entire sentence. As to the citations in the Brahmasūtras, cf. recently L. Renou, *Norman Brown Comm. Volume*, p. 199.

3. The non-Ṛgvedic *mantras* are insignificant in number. The Ṛgveda has, altogether, a weaker position than the Bhagwad-Gītā.

Paragraph 37

1. *Mantrā api śrutyādiviniyuktāḥ prayogasamavāyino 'bhidhānārthaḥ...na kasya cid arthasya pramāṇam.*

2. For the list of *mantras*, which are contradictory in appearance, see the commentary on the *Bṛhadāraṇyaka Upaniṣad*, II 5, 15.

3. *Nyāyasudhā*, 211 (cited by S. Siauve, *Voie vers la connaissance de Dieu*, p. 73) : *mantra brāhmaṇayor atattvāvedakayor avidvadviṣayayor dvaitālambanatve 'py upaniṣadām advaitaniṣṭhatvāt.*

4. The principle, apparently of grammatical origin (JA, 1957, p.

127), even though it is again found elsewhere. Śaṃkara contends that the secondary meaning depends on the primary meaning. As R. V. de Smet correctly recalls, *Theological Method*, p. 210, one holds on to the primary meaning as long as no incongruities result therefrom; "We must not interpret the declarations as eulogies (*stuti*) if we are not at the stage of literally explaining them, for the Scriptures cannot be elusive," cf. commentary on BĀU, I, 3, 1 (p. 18) cited by R. V. de Smet, as well as on I, 4, 10 (p. 58), commentary on the *Brahmasūtras*, I, 1, 4 (p. 63).

5. All this according to the exposition of J. A. B. v. Buitenen, editor-translator of the *Vedārthasaṃgraha*, p. 57.—The declarations are made from the angle of *aparā vidyā*; the literal meaning is negligible.

6. The considerable role of the *lakṣanā* in Śaṅkara has been highlighted notably by O. Lacombe, *l' Absolu selon le Vedānta*, p. 75; Buitenen op. cit., p. 59; R. V. de Smet, op. cit., p. 284.

7. It would appear that the post-Śaṅkarians lost sight of the questions posed by the presence of the *mantras* in the Vedic context, to the same degree that they rid themselves of Mīmāṃsā. The *Brahmasiddhi* notes the contradiction that certain people see between *karma*= and *jñāna-kāṇḍa*, the author of this treatise himself being in favour of *samuccaya* or the syncretic tendency, cf. S. Kuppuswami Sastri's edition of the *Brahmasiddhi*, p. XXXIII; this late Mimāṃsist thus seeks a compromise between Vedanta and Mīmāṃsā.

Paragraph 38

1. P. N. Srinivasichari, *Viśiṣṭādvaita*, p. 265; Buitenen, op. cit., p. 57 et passim; Sinha, op. cit., II, p. 657.

2. Made accessible by the remarkable edition and translation of V. Buitenen, already cited many times.

3. In any case a discussion arose on the known *mantra*, *tad viṣṇoḥ paramam padam*, § 128 and other quotations of the Ṛgveda, § 21, 109, 127, 128 and 131.

4. Op. cit., § 84, *mukhyārthāparityāgaḥ*.

5. § 118, 137 (where is quoted the fundmental axiom of the Mīmāṁsā Sūtras, *autpattikas tu śabdasyārthena sambandhaḥ*.

6. § 139, *pūrvapūrvoccāraṇakramajanitasamskāreṇa, tam eva kramaviśeṣam smṛtvā, tenaiva krameṇoccāryamāṇatvam*.

7. Ibid., *vedarāśer uddhṛtya*.

8. Ibid., *vaidikā eva sarve vācakāḥ śabdāḥ*, cf. above § 33, note 1, and below § 46.

Paragraph 39

1. "God being the agent of Vedic duties, only He can assure the fruits thereof", Das Gupta, IV, p. 423; "One must abandon all hope in the Vedic injunction and turn oneself towards God as the sole support.", Ibid., p. 425.

2. Apart from the manuals (Das Gupta, IV, p. 203), see H. von Glasenapp, *Madhva's Philosophie*; B. N. Krishnamurti Sharma, *Dvaitavāda*, and particularly S. Siauve, *Voie vers a connaissance de Dieu* (along

with the notes 12 to 18 which deal with the problem of the Veda). Even today, recalls Glasenapp, p. 21, the Mādhvas are preoccupied with showing that they belong to a well-defined Veda, and Madhva quotes those *śrutis* which, the most often, carry names of Vedic schools.

3. All this is according to Siauve, p. 7, 80, 84, 88.

4. "The value of the human speech is the condition for the value of the Scripture", Siauve, p. 96.

5. Siauve, p. 88, who quotes, ibid., a passage of the *Nyāyasudhā* fully affirming the unifying intention, *aśeṣato'pi vedasyaika-vākyatāyā yogo ghaṭanā ca syād eva* "there is a way of applying and putting into absolutely unified form, the propositions of the Veda". Madhva protests against the *vyākula-buddhis* who harm the Veda by attaching to it a sole point of view, *ekarūpatām anusaṃdadhānāḥ* (quoted by Krishnamurti Sharma, p. 13); he tries, for his part, to explain all the *karmakāṇḍa* as a function of the theory of *brahman* (*ibid.*, p. 66).

6. It seems as though the Vedantins belonging to other schools do not have any great new thing to say on the Veda. On Vallabha, see Sinha, II, II, p. 708; cf. also H. v. Glasenapp, *Von Buddha Zu Gandhi*, 1962, p. 200; on Śrīkaṇṭha (Shivaite Vedanta), Das Gupta, V, p. 74; on Śrīpati, ibid., V, p. 182; Śrīpati also seeks to harmonise the Veda, in the sense of *bhedābheda*, C. Hayavadana Rao, *Śrīkara-bhāṣya*, I, p. 243.

Paragraph 40

1. Besides the general manuals, see specially D. V. Garge, *Citations in Śabara-bhāṣya* (which contains much more than its title indicates) and G. Jha, *Pūrva-Mīmāṃsā in its sources*. Also, more recently, P. V. Kane, *History of Dharmaśāstra*, V, passim (cf. index *sub* Veda, p. 238).

2. "Statement of fact" or rather doubtlessly "a declaration of aim (as put forward by such and such injunction)": word known since the *Paribhāṣā-sūtras* of Kātyāyana and of Āpastamba (among the latter in no. 133, *arthavāda* refers, according to the commentary, to the *mantras* ?). The *Abhidhārājendra*, the Jaina encyclopedia, distinguishes, Note 6, p. 1430, three modes of Vedic expression (*vedapada*), the *vidhi*, the *anuvāda* (a term known to Nyāya, see above § 32, note 7), and the *stuti*.

3. G. A. Jacobi, JRAS, 1914, p. 297, had already drawn attention to the quotations from Śabarasvāmin; now done more fully in Garge (*On the Ṛgveda*, p. 69). As to the body of Jaimini itself (the greatest collection known in *sūtra* style), there are no more than 22 quotations, all in *pratika* form (see Garge's list, p. 297). They are, as with Bādarāyaṇa, isolated words related to the context by *śabdāt* (on analogy), or more often by *iti* (which Bādarāyaṇa, subject to correction, lacks). Not one of these *pratīkas* deals with a *mantra*, with the exception of the *adhrigupraiṣa* to which, paradoxically, Jaimini devotes not less than a dozen *adhikaraṇas* (Garge, p. 204) crammed with literal coments.

4. One sees for example, Ṛgveda, X, 121, I (verse to Hiraṇyagarbha) quoted (Śabarasvāmin, X, 3, 13-15) as referring to Indra, because it is the homage to Indra which is required by the ritual at the moment

reciting this *mantra* : the primate of liturgical conveniences.

5. One of the comments concerns the famous verse on the Four Horns, Śabarasvāmin, I, 2, 46, a typical example of the quest for "*gauṇa*" values. On the Vedic exigesis of Śabarasvāmin, see Garge, *Bullletin of the Deccan College*, III, p. 531; IV, p. 128.

6. Favour of the Taittirīya, Garge, *Citations.*, p. 73; F. Edgerton's translation of the *Mīmāṃsā-Nyāyaprakāśa*, p. 23. Sāyaṇa, who at heart is a Mimāṃsist, is very much of the opinion that the Yajurveda is more important than the Ṛgveda or the Sāmaveda; "the latter are like frescoes, the Yajurveda is the wall itself on which they are painted." (Introduction to the commentary on the Taittirīya Saṃhitā, quoted by Max Müller, ASL, p. 175.)

Paragraph 41

1. *Mīmāṃsā-sūtras*, 2. 1, 33.

2. Śabarabhāṣya 2. 1. 32, and cf. Brhaddevatā, already quoted, § 23, note 3.

3. Jha, op. cit., p. 179; H. Oertel, *Apologetik*, p. 6. It is remarkable that early Mīmāṃsā never tried to define the *mantra*; later a commentary of *karaṇa* "instrument (of the offering)" was proposed which at least had the merit of underlining the subordinate character of the *mantra*. The best definition is that of *Arthasaṃgraha*, edited by G. Thibaut, p. 25 (German translation, Oertel, p. 34).

4. Cf. the *ākṛtigaṇa* of grammar.

5. Jha, p. 187; cf. the *upamās* in later *Alaṃkāra*.

6. It is the *siddhānta* given by *Sāyaṇa* (Oertel, p. 5) to a *pūrvapakṣa* showing that the *mantras* are heterogeneous amongst themselves (*atyantavijātīya*); that further they are ill-distinguishable from the *brāhmaṇas*, as much by the content as by the form, that a number among them have the bearing of the *vidhis*, etc. On the way, the *Siddhāntin* (p. 11) denies that there is anything in the Veda other than the *mantra* and *brāhmaṇa*, the other categories being subordinate to one of these two.

7. *Mīmāṃsā-sūtras*, II; 1, 31 and 32.

8. Prabhākara clearly denies the quality of the *arthavāda* to the *mantras*, Jha, p. 182; the assimilation that appears to be made by the *sūtras*, I, 2, 46 between the *mantra* and the *arthavāda* must be considered specious. and Oertel was undoubtedly right in translating (p. 62, note) *arthavāda* in this passage by "metaphorical meaning." The *Tattvasaṃgraha* alludes to the *arthavādas* which would be contained in the *mantras* (sūtras 3199-320).

9. On the nature of the *vidhi*, S. N. Das Gupta, II, p. 479. The act replacing the word as in "Faust" !

10. Jha, p. 206.

11. Of the two superimposed *bhāvanās*, verbality and optavity (*liṅtva*), which characterise the *vidhi* on the formal plane (F. Edgerton, *Language*, IV, p. 174), the mantric *bhāvanās* are at least of the first kind. From our point of view it goes without saying that many *mantras* are exhortative if not

expressly injunctive It is an aspect of the Vedic style that P. Thieme. ZDMG, 107, p. 95 has happily defined as Gastmahlspoesie.

12. *Tantravārttika*, II, 1, 30. The contrary view is that of the *pūrvapakṣa*, II, 1, 30-31. Cf. also *Śabarasvāmin*, II, 1, 36: "the *mantra* does no more than speak of that which has already been enjoined."

13. In fact, it is the (Śrauta) sūtras which have, more often than the Brāhmaṇas, the verb in the optative prescription: but they are, as we mentioned before, outside of the range of Mīmāṃsā.

14. *Śabarasvāmin*, III, 1, 6, Jha, p. 274.

Paragraph 42

1. Cf. *Mīmāṃsā-sūtras*, III, 3, 14, Jha, p. 283, Garge, p. 276.

2. This is the distinction that one again finds in grammar (above § 37, note 4—the formula *mukhye kāryasampratyayaḥ* forms part of the paribhāṣā 15), in Rhetoric and even in the Vedanta which however operates (at least in *Śaṅkara*) more with *pāramārthika/vyāvahārika* distinction (see above § 37) which at bottom, is the same in accordance with another perspective. As J. A. B. v. Buitenen, *Vedārthrasaṃgraha*, p. 57 points out (in opposition to R. V. de Smet, *Theological Method*, p. 205), the distinction *vidhi/arthavāda* of Mīmāṃsā has no essential link with this distinction of the Vedanta.

3. *Śabarasvāmin*, III, 2, 1 at end.—In short if Mīmāsmā places foremost the primary sense in spite of such strong tendencies of the *mantra* to figuration, it must be to save face and to avoid the diminution of authority which could follow the erruption of irrational values. Thus in the Śankarian Vedanta the secondary meaning takes the risk of introducing qualifying elements improper to the pure *brahman*.

4. Śabararvāmin, III, 2, 3.

5. On the option, see *Jha*, p. 353, Garge, p. 287. A case of the non-mantric option is given in the *Mimāṃsā sūtras*, XII, 3, 10. Rarely does the option concern directly the *mantra*, as in XII, 3, 29, where one sees many *mantras* applicable to the same design and coinciding with the start of the same act, (it is a question of knowing which *mantra* should be recited on which precise occasion: the *mantra* is taken here as a portion of an act, and not because of its own capacity; XII, 4, 2 where there is a free choice between the pairs of *yājyā-anuvākyā*; under XII, 4, 1, is taught not choice but pluralism, (*samuccaya*) under the form of a combined use of many *mantras*, which—a rare thing—are not connected to any act.

Paragraph 43

1. Where (*Āpastamba*, No. 131) the *ūha* is said to be proper to the acts outside the *prakṛit* (archetype). *Śāṅkhāyana S. S.*, VI, 1, 4, strangely excludes it from the domain of the *ṛc*: a privilege of the most "noble" tradition.

2. *Śabarasvāmin*, IX, 3, 1. On the *ūha* in general, *Jha*, p. 339, Garge, p. 282. According to Bhaṭṭanāyaka, quoted by V. Raghavan, *Analysis* of *Śṛṅgāraprakāśa*, p. 116, the *kāvya* is distinguished from the Veda, in as

much as words cannot be changed in the Veda. Synonymic substitution is, indeed, the soul of *kāvya*, but opinion concerning the Veda is sacral, not at all realistic.

3. Cf. § 22, note 1, above, to which add the commentators on Pāṇini, I, 1, 16 (*anārṣe*), *sūtras* which had provoked a controversy between B. K. Ghosh, IHQ, X, p. 665, *Indian Culture*, IV, p. 387, P. Thieme, IHQ, XIII, p 239, *Indian Culture*, V, p. 363 (also *Pāṇini and the Veda*, p. 3), K. Chattopadhyaya, IHQ, XIII, p. 343 and S. P. Chaturvedi, NIA, I, p. 450. The grammatical commentators considered the forms of the *padapāṭha* being detached from their context, a simple imitation (*anukaraṇa*) of Vedic forms.

4. Thus *bhū*, substitute of the root *as*—is not a root. Such partly is the justification of the *sūtra*, *sthānivad ādeśaḥ* and its corollaries.

5. The *ekavāyatā* and the *vākyabheda* occupy a substantial place in juridical Mīmāṃsā, that is to say, in the Mimāṃsist reasoning of the commentators of the Dharma. This is not the place to deal with it; cf. Garge, p. 256; P. V. Kane, *History of Dharmaśāstras*, indices under *ekavākya* (etc.) and ABORI, V, p. 1 (passim); K. L. Sarkar, *Mīmāṃsist Rules of Interpretation as applied to Hindu Law*.

6. *Anuṣaṅga* is the name of a type of *mantra*, Śabarasvāmin, II, 1, 32.

7. Amongst the Grammarians the *vākyasaṃskāra* (*pakṣa*), the principle of explanation which bears on the words such as they present themselves when they are combined among themselves to form a sentence (thus in *gāṃ pāṭhaya* "to teach (this stupid) man to read", *Paribhāṣenduśekhara*, p. 16, line 4), is only a very occasional counterpart, *padasaṃskāra* (*pakṣa*), *Terminologie grammaticale*, see under *pada*.

Paragraph 44

1. Therefore, the *paribhāṣās* of the "clarifying" type (*Mahābhāṣya*, I, 1, 49 vt. 4) cf. *Terminologie*, I, p. 12 (under *adhikāra*).

2. *Autapattika* (according to I, 1, 48), not *kārya*.

3. In *Nyāya*, the relation word/meaning is conventional, not at all innate, II, 1, 49-54. Only the poeticians specify the nature of the ties existing between the word and its meaning; ties which are three in number in *Mammaṭa*, six in *Abhinavagupta*, twelve in *Bhoja*, V. Raghavan, op. cit., p. 12, 87.

4. Jha, p. 123, 152.

5. Opinion of the *pūrvapakṣin*, *under* I, 1, 24.

6. In grammar, the *anarthaka* elements (in the sūtras) are unknown, all the terms being by definition *arthavant*; they can only be due to a miscomprehension, to a position of *pūrvapakṣa*; they contravene the sacred character of the Treatise, *Mahābhāṣya*, I, 1, 1, vt. 7. On the contrary, the (so-called) *Vārttika* admits that certain profane sentence may be denuded of sense.

Paragraph 45

1. Cf. *Garge*, p. 39, 228 (curiously the work of Jha does not mention this important argument); also by the same author, *Bulletin of the Deccan*

College, II, p. 139. The comparison of Mīmāṃsā/Nirukta goes back to R. Roth, *Abhandlung*, p. 21, *Erlaüterungen* p. 11, (*J. Muir, II*, p. 181 and elsewhere).

2. The links between Mīmāṃsā and the Nirukta, are given by the nature of things, both treatises occupying themselves through diverse procedures with Vedic exegesis. Already the Nirukta, I, 12-14—in the controversy attributed to Śākaṭāyana on the verbal origin of names ended in a conclusion near to the postulate of the Mīmāṃsā giving primacy to the verb (*bhāvanā*), the verb being at the origin of the *apūrva*, which releases the *vidhi*. Quite to the contrary, grammar restricts the role of the verb; only the primary derivates are recognised as such, amongst whom the link with a root is evident. Others are relegated to the *uṇādisūtras*—the hold all of the primary derivation. In Prakrit grammar, the phonetic equivalences are given as a function of the nominal forms and rarely of the verbal forms.—The argument in *pūrvapakṣa/siddhānta* is unusual in the Nirukta and is only to be found precisely, again in I, 12-14, whose development can be summarised thus—etymology is justified if one admits that the names arise out of verbal roots; it remains to be shown (this will be the business of Nirukta, I, 15-16) that the *mantras* have by themselves, a meaning; if not what purpose is served by applying to it etymological rules ?—All of this Nirukta, I, 12-16, can emanate from a pre-Mimāṃsist school, already utilising the *pūrvapakṣa siddhānta* scheme.

3. S. L. Katre, *New Ind. Ant.*, I, p. 383. K. M. Shembavanekar, ABORI, XII, p. 40, sees in Kautsa not a sceptic or a heretic, but a doctor preoccupied with giving a rational foundation to a ritual.

Paragraph 46

1. The debut of the *Vājasaneyī Prātiśākhya* (penetratingly studied by P. Thieme, ZII, VIII, p. 25) outlines the same idea in the *sūtra* 3 (*samatvāt*), posing the similitude of the two vocabularies. Evidently, in the epoch of the Nirukta and of the Prātiśākhyas, the "*laukika*" portion did not present the same developments as at the time of Śabara and Kumārila. —In *Vāj. Pratiśākhya*, I. 4, the expression *āmnāyadharmitvāt* would be more interesting if one was permitted to render it "from the fact that (the Veda) has memorisation as a law", which would have the advantage of reuniting the *uccāraṇamātra* so often alleged by the Mīmāṃsā.

2. Cf. above, §. 33 and note 1, thereon. In the *Alaṃkāraśāstra* distinct languages are more readily admitted (but the *kāvya* has passed by there !), such as the *laukika*, the *vaidika*, the *sāmayika* ("conventional", that is to say, "poetic") according to *Bhāvaprakāśana*, edited by K. S. Ramaswami Sastri, p. 76; the *śrauta*, the *ārṣa* (=Purāṇic), the *laukika* according to the *Śṛṅgāraprakāśa* (quoted §. 16, note 5) which can answer to the *atibhāṣās*, *āryabhāṣās*, *jātibhāṣās* (respectively) of Bharata.—Cf. also *Sāyaṇa*, quoted H. Oertel, *Apologetik*, p. 55.

Paragraph 47

1. In all ten *sūtras*, therefore one in addition, arising from the fact that the first reply had been fragmented through three *sūtras*, when, inversely, a sole *sūtra* replies to two objections. The *Tantravārttika* (on 48)

notes in a strange manner that the formulated reply to the aforesaid *sūtra* has no corresponding *pūrvapakṣa*.

2. With Sāyaṇa (Oertel, p. 15 and 53) the *ānarthakya* is not, directly enunciated, but the argument moves between two rubrics, a) *na vedaḥ pramāṇam* "the Veda is no authority"; b) the *mantras* aim at an *adṛṣṭa* objective, being by themselves elocutory and non-significant. This dichotomy entails a reiteration of the same objections and the same replies. The series (a) has the advantage of bearing both on the *mantras* as well as on the *brāhmaṇas* (*vidhi* and *arthavāda*), indeed to cover theoretically *jñānakāṇḍa*. But the basis of the discussion is more concerned with the *mantras* alone.

3. *Nirukta* (argument No. 2) *brāhmaṇena rūpasampannāḥ* (=*sambaddhaḥ svārthena* or *svārthe labdhaviniyogāḥ*, Skanda-Maheśvara) was more clear and rejoined directly with the idea of *sampannatva* of the AB (see above §. 18 note 4); Durga "if the *mantras* were meaningful the ritual indications would not be specified by a *brāhmaṇa*." The Mīmāṃsā dealt almost exclusively with the *mantras* linked to the *brāhmaṇas* (an exception was quoted above, § 18, note 4), the *brāhmaṇa* being the essential: the view was the inverse in the *Atharva Prātiśāskhya*, IV, 104, "no 'strained' sacrifice in the Vedas", that is to say, without the *mantras*.

4. The commentary of Skanda-Maheśvara notes equally that *ānarthakya* signifies the use of *mantras* destined to elocutionally accompany an act, not to make known a determinate meaning.—With Sāyaṇa the argument is drawn up thus: *mantreṇaiva pratītatvāt* (Oertel, p. 54)

Paragraph 48

1. The idea of "invisible" is a convenient artifice, which Mīmāṃsā limits to cases where it is impossible to discover a "visible" reason. Cf., in the course itself of this controversy, Śabaravāmin, I, 2, 44 (together with 32), 45 (together with 33), 46 (with 34). Seen from another angle, it is a variant of the alternation *mukhya/gauṇa*. The *Tantravārttika* 32, specifies that the *mantra* has a fairly "visible" reason flowing from the *liṅga*: it is, namely, how to make known (*prakāśana*) the *aṅgas*. Cf. also, § 32, note 1.

2. Ibid., Sāyaṇa (Oertel, p. 56): the *brāhmaṇa* is *guṇavidhānārtha*, it serves to enunciate the aim (*arthavāda*) of the injunction.

Paragraph 49

1. Śabarasvāmin, *niyatapadakrama*, Sāyaṇa, (Oertel, p. 59) *niyatapāṭhakrama*; the Nirukta already gives (argument no. 1): *niyatavācoyuktayaḥ, niyatānupūrvyāḥ*. The argument is quoted in *Tattvasaṃgraha*, no. 2453.

2. More naïvely, the Nirukta observes that it happens also in current language that words have a fixed order. The *Mahābhāṣya*, I, 1, 1 after vt. 7 states as a matter of fact that the order of words is free in the independent phrase (but evidently one doesn't say *pacati-pra* or *pra...pacati* in place of *prapacati*); the *Padamañjarī* discusses the case of some Pāṇinean *sūtras* which can appear to be teaching a restriction as to the order of words, and brushes aside this interpretation. The *Vājasaneyī Prātiśākhya* (already quoted above, §. 46,

note 1), commences also by posing a *niyama* applicable to the Veda (therefore: to the *mantras*), a *niyama* bearing on the accent and on the morphology (cf. *Thieme* quoted, ad. loc.). The words of usage do not lie under the blow of such a *niyama*, but why? *Arthapūrvakatvāt*, which one is tempted to render as "because they are provided with meaning" (and because the words of the *mantra* are not such an idea which would coincide with the *pūrvapakṣa* of the Nirukta and of Jaimini), but which Thieme renders "because the *niyama* follows the meaning."

3. *Nirukta* (no. 6), *jānantam sampreṣyati*; *Sāyaṇa* (Oertel, p. 60) *buddhārtha*, with the same reply as Jaimini; also (p. 24) *lokaprasiddha*, with the reply a little different.

4. *Nirukta*, *āmnāya*, an expression which can be joined with *āmnāyadharmitvāt*, above, § 46, note 1).

5. *Nirukta*, no. 4, *anupapannārthā*, Sāyaṇa, (Oertel, p. 18), *viparītārthabodhaka*. The same reply in Sāyaṇa (also p. 62), with, for a corollary, the argument which follows as no. 35. The same reply also in Yāska, for whom the act enjoined in the *mantra* does not take place *in reality*.

6. For the secondary meaning, as the base of the *kāvya*, cf. (amongst others) K.S. Ramaswami Sastri, editor of the *Bhāvaprakāśaśāstra*, Introduction, p. 42 onwards.

7. Nothing corresponding in the Nirukta; Sāyaṇa (Oertel, p. 63) follows Jaimini and, in reply to the objection, refers to *Brahmasūtra*, II, 1, 5 (*Kaimutika* maxim) in equally bringing out a *gauṇa* meaning.

8. *Nirukta*, *vipratiṣedhārtha* (No. 7), Sāyaṇa (Oertel, p. 22, 64) *vyāghātabodhaka*; the reply in Sāyaṇa takes into account the contradictions between schools, as in Smṛti, and resolves the difficulty by specifying that the *vidhis* are limited (as to their validity) to such and such schools: it is the opposite of the *sarvaśākhāpratyaya* (see above § 16, note 2) to which the Vedanta holds: the Mīmāṃsā indeed deals with *karmakāṇḍa*, distributed in the strict instruction of the schools, Vedanta with the *jñānakāṇḍa*, where the Veda presents itself unitarily.

9. According to Jha's translation of Śabarasvāmin, ad. loc. Nothing in Yāska. The comparison is more explicit and more pointed in Sāyaṇa. (Cf. the translation in Oertel, *Apologetik*, p. 65).

10. The reply is otherwise articulated in Sāyaṇa (*Oertel*, p. 66).

11. Nirukta, no. 8, *avispaṣṭārtha*; Sāyaṇa (Oertel, p. 15 and 66) *abodhaka*. The typical example is *jarbharī...*, cf. above, § 27, note 4.

12. The reply of Śabara is less Mimāṃsist than Niruktian: the word *nigama* is itself frequent in the Nirukta, exceedingly rare elsewhere (in this sense) and Pāṇini in some passages where he uses it (P. Thieme, *Pāṇini and the Veda*, p. 71), he borrows it perhaps from Yāska or some other source of the Nirukta.

13. Nothing in the Nirukta; Sāyaṇa p. 68 as Jaimini.

14. Cf. The *pratirūpakatva* in grammar: recourse to this principle (*Terminologie grammaticale*, s.u.) serves to justify forms which, in the first place, seem incompatible with some given rule: these terms which one believes to be significant (such as *asti*) are simply *nipātas* more or less denuded of meaning, and the rule is safeguarded.

Paragraph 50

1. Argument borrowed by Sāyaṇa, (Oertel, p. 69).

2. Sāyaṇa (Oertel, p. 70).

3. Sāyaṇa (Oertel, p. 71).

4. Explicitly in Sāyaṇa (Oertel, p. 72) *dṛṣṭam varam adṛṣṭataḥ* "that which has a visible objective (in this case the *mantras*) score over that which has (only) an invisible object".

5. Sāyaṇa (Oertel, p. 17)adds this subsidiary objection: certain *mantras* merely formulate a doubt in the guise of an interrogation), *saṃdigdhārthabodhaka* (a frequent type in fact in the speculative Veda). Reply: it is here a question of a secondary value. The *gauṇārthatva* is still applied to the *arthavādas* in *Śabarasvāmin*, I, 2, 15, (*vidyāpraśaṃsā*). It is therefore one of the resources of the Mimāṃsist dialectic.—The majority of the arguments concerns the term itself of the *mantras* (or rather, of some *mantras*) but *sūtra* 31 deals with the external link of the *mantra* (with the *brāhmaṇa*), *sūtras* 33 and 37, in the manner (still more external) in which the *mantras* are learnt (by heart).

Paragraph 51

1. On the subject, on which a very clear appreciation is given by Rāmānuja (quoted in A. B. van Buitenen, *Rāmānuja on the Gītā*, p. 61), "one should not accept all that is taught by the Vedas; just as a thirsty man does not take more water from a fountain than he has need of, so a Brahmin aspiring to Salvation should not take from the Vedas more than what is required for his Salvation."

2. "Poetry is superior to the Veda", affirms the *Sāhitya Darpaṇa*, I2, the later (notes the commentator) being insipid (*nīrasatā*), difficult (*duhkhād eva*), made for mature intelligences, (if not declining ones) (*Pariṇatabuddhi*).

3. But Mīmāṃsā considers that cultivated people (*abhiyuktas*) can arrive at an absolute comprehension of the *mantras* (*Tantravārttika*, I, 2, 49 end). One can recall here the very unfavourable judgements on the Veda on the part of certain scholars of the XIXth century, (not only in the West) or of certain readers interested in Indology, judgements of which S. Reinach (in *Orpheus*) very complacently made himself the echo. One can assuredly understand how L. Von Schroeder, *Ind. Liter. u. Cultur*, p. 112 could compare the *yajuṣ* to the writings and words of certain mental patients; but one can comprehend less easily how Max Müller was not responsive to the astonishing mode of thought of the Brāhmaṇas (quotation in M. Winternitz, *Geschichte.*, I, p. 163); as to the "galimatias" described by A Bergaigne, the term, much abused since then, had with this author, a rigorously technical sense, designating the procedures of the complex metaphor in the Ṛgveda.

4. Can an oral text be really understood ? If the Veda had been read like the Bible, and not only understood, if it had been (like the latter) translated into vulgar languages (nay, into classical Sanskrit), the result would have been different. The first impression of the Ṛgveda by Max

Müller was quite an event—not only in the limited circle of scholars—about which we are told in a lively manner, in *Life and Letters*, I, p. 97 and elsewhere (index under Ṛgveda) and especially in the Preface to Volume I; also *Deutsche Rundschau*, 1884, p. 419.

5. Judicious remarks of R. Roth, *Nirukta*, p. 219.

6. Op. cit., p. 117, Rāmānuja promises the heaven of Indra, then the return on earth (*saṃsāra*) to the adepts of the Veda, the *traividyas*, in contrast with the *mahātmans*, who gain Salvation. The happiness of the former would therefore be temporary, and definitely illusory; the same text soon after evokes the "ignorant ones" to whom it reserves exactly the same fate as to the *traividyas*.

7. One can read with profit A. J. Toynbee, *History*, VII, p. 749, a subsidiary chapter entitled "Holy Writ" (where the Veda is mentioned).

8. A text which shows in happy fashion how an interpretation of the Veda should be made, is the *pariśiṣṭa* XII in the 13th chapter of the Nirukta (edited by L. Sarup, p. 227). After having recalled the (possible) etymologies of the word *akṣara*, the author adds, "similar etymological deduction (*abhyūha*), emanating from a reflection on the meaning of the *mantras* is deduced (*abhyūḍha*, that is to say), obtained at the same time by oral tradition (*śruti*) and by logical reasoning (*tarka*)". (Here is an attempt to submit the Veda to reason, by placing revelation and reasoning on a par). "The *mantras*," continues the author, "should not be interpreted separately, but according to their context, *na pṛthaktvena mantrā nirvaktavyāḥ, prakaraṇaśa eva nirvaktavyāḥ*". (This is the rejection simultaneously of the strict Niruktian position and that of the Mimāṃsists, to the benefit of a *true* interpretation). Finally, "the gods have given to trained men the faculty-of-reasoning as Ṛṣis (*tarkam ṛṣiṃ prāyachhan*), so that all that an instructed man can deduce (by reasoning), takes (immediately) an ārṣic value, *yad eva kiṃ cānūcāno 'bhyūhaty ārṣam tad bhavati*". (A remark of Lutherian accent, which suffices to justify the hopes of the moderns in their effort to penetrate the arcana of the Veda). The last phrase is taken up again in the *Tantravārttika*, I, 3, 7 ed., p. 132.

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
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